Water politics in the Middle East deals with control of the water resources of the Middle East, an arid region where issues of the use, supply, control, and allocation of water are of primary importance.
Overview
Nile River, Egypt
Water politics plays a role in various areas of politics in the Middle East, and it is particularly important in one of the defining features of the region’s political landscape. Water issues reflect a central aspect of the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; namely, the original influx of an additional large population mass to a relatively fragile geographical area of land, and the massive expansion of previously existing populations. Concerns over water have significantly helped to shape the Middle East’s political development.[citation needed]
International relations and water
Jordan River near B’not Yaakov bridge,Israel
Issues relating to water supplies, then, affect international and inter-regional affairs, with disputes over countries’ rights and access to water resources most often the cause of tensions in this arena. The contended nature of some water provisions has tended to mean that certain waters become more prone to political conflicts (those which are primarily prone to this in the Middle East and northern Africa are the Nile, Jordan and Tigris–Euphrates rivers). In order to secure reliable levels of water access for their populations, states must either have a large water supply in terms of economic availability, or their rights to such supplies must be established.[1]
Studies of water in the Middle East have also suggested that, in a sensitive hydrological location, a country’s existingsurface– and ground-water access should be protected as a first priority if it is to begin to address any water difficulties or shortages. Such measures as these can be seen as being the primary responsibilities of national governments or ruling authorities; and water is therefore closely tied up with statehood and geographical territory in international relations, and with the recognition and rights of nation states as the central actors in this field.
The political process and interactions underlying the international relations of water have been characterised as having three stages. These are that a state must go through a process of; firstly claiming its right to water resources, secondly receiving recognition of this right, and finally seeking to attain its entitlement to water in accordance with the recognition of its claim. However, these processes have not always succeeded.[citation needed]
In this regard, water politics in the Middle East has been impacted by changes in the international political order and their implications for the area. The involvement of the USSR in Middle Eastern political affairs was seen to have had a constraining effect upon this process, in terms of claims and recognition in the Cold War era.[2]
The post–Cold War period, therefore, has since been perceived to offer the opportunity for transforming water politics in the Middle East, in light of the shift which it has brought about in global political dynamics in the region. This potential, however, had failed to be fulfilled by the end of the decade, with states in the Middle East ‘still mainly involved in… asserting water rights over shared waters’. The consequence of this has been that ‘non-agreed water sharing is an unavoidable reality in present Middle Eastern international relations’, with attendant political problems invariably surfacing.[3]
Middle Eastern river systems
The claims over rights to water in the Middle East are centred around the area’s three major river systems. As mentioned above, these are the River Nile, the River Jordan, and the Tigris-Euphrates river basin. International water agreements in the Middle East have been rare, but the situation regarding regional water relations in the three main basins will be explored below.
The River Nile
As with the other major Middle Eastern river systems, political agreements over access to the water of the Nile have been few and far between. The first such accord was the 1929 Nile Agreement. However, this was an agreement that largely represented the nature of world geopolitical realities at that time, rather than being a mutual expression of accord between the participating parties of the region.[citation needed]
This, it is argued, is because it was essentially a product of British national interest. The priority of the United Kingdom, as part of its strategy as the dominant contemporary political and economic power in the Middle East, was maintaining secure supplies of water to Egypt, and this was what the agreement primarily provided for.[4]
The next agreement on water use in the Nile did not come for exactly three more decades. The new 1959 Nile Agreement was signed by Egypt and Sudan, and was at this point free from political influence by the UK. However, the limitation of this agreement was that it was not more than a bilateral treaty between the two participant countries and, as such, it provided solely for an agreement on the sharing of water between the two nations. The 1959 Nile Agreement has not been granted recognition by the other states through which the Nile also runs.[5]
The Tigris-Euphrates river basin
The countries which rely upon the Tigris-Euphrates water system remain at the first stage of claiming their rights to water. However, the key player in terms of water politics in this area is Turkey, who Allan reports as having ‘gone a substantial way to[wards]… what it regards as its water rights by its construction programmes on the Euphrates without having them recognised by downstream Syria and Iraq’.[6] This refers to the dams built by Turkey from the 1970s, partially funded by World Bank loans.[7]
River Jordan[edit]
Banias waterfall, Golan Heights
Flood waters exiting from the Yarmuk reservoir to the Yarmuk river, 1933
The Syria-Lebanon-Palestine boundary was a product of the post–World War I Anglo-French partition of Ottoman Syria.[8][9] British forces had advanced to a position at Tel Hazor against Turkish troops in 1918 and wished to incorporate all the sources of the river Jordan within the British controlled Palestine. Due to the French inability to establish administrative control the frontier between Syria and Palestine was fluid. Until, 1934, when the French managed to asserted authority over the Arab nationalist movement and King Faisal had been deposed.[10] In the unratified Treaty of Sèvres from the San Remo conference, the 1920 boundary extended the British controlled area to north of the Sykes Picot line (straight line between the midpoint of the Sea of Galilee and Nahariya). The international boundary between Palestine and Syria was finally agreed by Great Britain and France in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne after Britain had been given a League of Nations mandate for Palestine in 1922. Banyas (on the Quneitre/Tyre road) was within the French Mandate of Syria. The border was set 750 metres south of the spring.[9][11]
In 1941 Australian forces occupied Banyas in the advance to the Litani during the Syria-Lebanon Campaign. When Free French and Indian forces invaded Syria in the Battle of Kissoué[12] In 1946, France and Britain signed a bilateral agreement to hand over control of the Banias to the British Mandate authorities although the Syrian government declared France’s signature invalid.[13] British Mandate projects to drain the marshland for cultivation angered the Arab villagers.
After the establishment of the State of Israel, Syria offered to adjust the armistice lines, and cede to Israel’s 70% of the DMZ, in exchange for a return to the pre-1946 border in the Jordan basin area, with Banias water resources returning uncontested to Syrian sovereignty. On 26 April, the Israeli cabinet met to consider the Syrian suggestions; with head of Israel’s Water Planning Authority, Simha Blass, in attendance. Blass noted that while the land to be ceded to Syria was not suitable for cultivation, the Syrian map did not suit Israel’s water development plan. Blass explained that the movement of the International boundary in the area of Banias would affect Israel’s water rights.[citation needed]
On 13 April, the Syrian delegates seemed very anxious to move forward and offered Israel around 70% of the DMZ’s. Significant results were achieved and a number of suggestions and summaries put in writing, but they required decisions by the two governments. The Israeli cabinet convened on 26 April to consider the Syrian proposals. Simha Blass, head of Israel’s Water Planning Authority, was invited to the meeting. Dayan showed Blass the Syrian suggestions on the map. Blass told Dayan that although most of the lands that Israel was expected to relinquish were not suitable for cultivation, the map did not suit Israel’s irrigation and water development plans. On May 4 and 27, Israel presented its new conditions. These were rejected by Syria, and the negotiations ended without agreement.
In 1951 Israel started the Hula Valley Swamps drainage works. In 1953, Israel unilaterally started a water diversion project within the Jordan River basin by the Israeli National Water Carrier. In September 1953 Israel advanced plans to divert water to help irrigate the coastal Sharon Plain and eventually the Negev desert by launching a diversion project on a nine-mile (14 km) channel midway between the Huleh Marshes and Lake Galilee (Lake Tiberias) in the central DMZ to be rapidly constructed. Syria claimed that it would dry up 12,000 acres (49 km2) of Syrian land. The UNTSO Chief of Staff Major General Vagn Bennike of Denmark claimed the project would divert water to two Palestinian water mills and dry up Palestinian farmland. UN Security Council Resolution 100 deemed it desirable for Israel to suspend work started on 2 September “pending urgent examination of the question by the Council”. The Security Council ultimately rejected Syrian claims that the work was a violation of the Armistice Agreements. Hula Valley Swamps drainage works were resumed and the work was completed in 1957.
On 1964 Israel completed its National Water Carrier which siphoned water (within the limits of the Johnston Plan) from the Sea of Galilee. The water were used for irrigation of the southern Negev desret.
In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was Israel’s diversion of water from the north to irrigate the south and the expected reduction in the water supplies available to Syria and Jordan. The preamble to its decision stated that “the establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel.”
The project was to divert 20 to 30 million cubic metres of water from the river Jordan tributaries to Syria and Jordan for the development of Syria and Jordan.[17] This led to military intervention from Israel, first with tank fire and then, as the Syrians shifted the works further eastward, with airstrikes.[18]
On June 10, 1967, the last day of the Six Day War, Golani Brigade forces invaded the village of Banyas where a Syrian fort stood. Eshkol’s priority on the Syrian front was control of the water sources.
Jordan claims it has riparian rights to water from the Jordan basin and upper Jordan tributaries. Due to the water diversion projects, the flow to the river Jordan was reduced from 1,300/1,500 million cubic metres to 250/300 million cubic metres. Water quality was further reduced as the flow of the river Jordan consists run-off from agricultural irrigation and saline springs.
The agreement between Jordan and Israel is the only one in the Middle East region which has led to recognition of water rightson both sides. The water agreement forms a part of the broader political treaty which was signed between Israel and Jordan in 1994.[21] In 1999, when the treaty’s limitations were revealed by events concerning water shortages in the Jordan basin. A reduced supply of water to Israel due to drought meant that Israel which is responsible for providing water to Jordan, decreased its water provisions to the country, provoking a diplomatic disagreement between the two and bringing the water component of the treaty back into question.[22][23]
Israel’s complaints about the reduction in water from the tributaries to the river Jordan caused by the Jordan/Syrian dam have gone unheeded.[24]
War and water
Constant conflict in the Middle East has seen some major environmental consequences of water related damage. A report [25] by Strategic Foresight Group, a think tank in Asia, details in the damage and destruction done to water systems and resources. The Middle East is an extremely water scarce region and any damage to this vital resource has an adverse impact on health, bio-diversity and eco-systems in the region. Water scarcity in the future could prove to be both cause and cost of conflict. Countries in the region are highly dependent on others for their water supply, and nations such as Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait and Syria have a dependency ratio above 50%.[citation needed]
The first Gulf War in 1990 caused untold damage to the water network and the Shatt al-Arab waterways, and many of these systems have yet to be fully functional. 8 major dams were destroyed and over 30 municipal facilities were destroyed. The second Gulf War has resulted in over 70% of the population without adequate water supply. The Israel-Hezbollah war has also resulted in severe damage to water systems with the destruction of 45 distribution units and pumping stations.[citation needed]
A new approach to water in the Middle East was introduced by Strategic Foresight Group, in a report co-sponsored by the Swiss and Swedish governments titled The Blue Peace: Rethinking Middle East Water[26] Blue Peace is defined as the comprehensive, integrated and collaborative management of all water resources in a circle of countries in a way that is sustainable for the long-term, in an interdependent relationship with social and political dynamics. Instead of concentrating on how to share or divide the stock of water resources, the Blue Peace approach is concerned about preserving, expanding and improving the water budget for the benefit of human life, as well as environment. The Blue Peace is derived from and reinforced by positive relations between water and society and between one society and another. A recent report “Water Cooperation for a Secure World” published by Strategic Foresight Group concludes that active water cooperation between countries reduces the risk of war. This conclusion is reached after examining trans-boundary water relations in over 200 shared river basins in 148 countries.Countries in the Middle East face the risk of war as they have avoided regional cooperation for too long. The report provides examples of successful cooperation, which can be used by countries in the Middle East.[27]
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
| Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam | |
|---|---|
Rendition of the dam
|
|
 Location of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam |
|
| Country | Ethiopia |
| Location | Benishangul-Gumuz Region |
| Coordinates | 11°12′51″N 35°05′35″ECoordinates: 11°12′51″N 35°05′35″E |
| Purpose | Power |
| Status | Under construction |
| Construction began | April 2011 |
| Opening date | July 2017[1] |
| Construction cost | $4.8 billion USD |
| Owner(s) | Ethiopian Electric Power Corp |
| Dam and spillways | |
| Type of dam | Gravity, roller-compacted concrete |
| Impounds | Blue Nile River |
| Height | 170 m (558 ft) |
| Length | 1,800 m (5,906 ft) |
| Reservoir | |
| Creates | Millennium Reservoir |
| Total capacity | 63×109 m3(51,074,931 acre·ft) |
| Power station | |
| Commission date | 2018 (planned) |
| Turbines | 16 x 375 MW Francis turbines |
| Installed capacity | 6,000 MW (max. planned) |
| Annual generation | 15,692 GWh Est |
| Website www.grandmillenniumdam.net |
|
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD or Taehige; Amharic: ታላቁ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ግድብ? Tālāqu ye-Ītyōppyā Hidāse Gēdīb ), formerly known as the Millennium Dam and sometimes referred to as Hidase Dam, is a gravity damon the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia currently under construction. It is in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia, about 40 km (25 mi) east of the border with Sudan.[2] At 6,000 MW, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed, as well as the 8th largest in the world sharing the spot with Krasnoyarskaya.[3] The reservoir at 63 billion cubic meters will be one of the continent’s largest.[4] According to the Ethiopian government, as of February 2014, the dam is 30% complete.[5]
The potential impacts of the dam have been the source of severe regional controversy. The Government of Egypt, a country which relies heavily on the waters of the Nile, has demanded that Ethiopia cease construction on the dam as a preconditions to negotiations, sought regional support for its position, and some political leaders have discussed methods to sabotage it.[6] Egypt has planned a diplomatic initiative to undermine support for the dam in the region as well as in other countries supporting the project such as China, Italy, and Norway.[7] However, other nations in the Nile Basin Initiative have expressed support for the dam,the only other nation downstream of the Blue Nile, which has accused Egypt of inflaming the situation.[8] Ethiopia denies that the dam will have a negative impact on downstream water flows and contends that the dam will in fact increase water flows to Egypt by reducing evaporation on Lake Nasser.[9] It has accused Egypt, which is furthermore demanding to increase its share of the Nile’s water flow from 66% to 90% (as downstream nations seek to repudiate the 1957 treaty that allocated them no share thereof), of being unreasonable.[9]
Background
The eventual site for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was identified by the United States Bureau of Reclamationduring a Blue Nile survey conducted between 1956 and 1964. The Ethiopian Government surveyed the site in October 2009 and August 2010. In November 2010, a design for the dam was submitted.[1] On 31 March 2011, a day after the project was made public, a US$4.8 billion contract was awarded without competitive bidding to Salini Costruttori and the dam’s foundation stone was laid on 2 April 2011 by then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.[10] A rock crushing plant has been constructed along with a small air strip for fast transportation.[11] The first two generators are expected to become operational after 44 months of construction.[12] Egypt, which lies downstream, opposes the dam which it believes will reduce the amount of water that it gets from the Nile.[13] Zenawi argued, based on an unnamed study, that the dam would not reduce water availability downstream and would also regulate water for irrigation.[12] In May 2011, it was announced that Ethiopia would share blueprints for the dam with Egypt so the downstream impact could be examined.[14]
The dam was originally called “Project X”, and after its contract was announced it was called the Millennium Dam.[15] On 15 April 2011, the Council of Ministers renamed it Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.[16] In March 2012, the Ethiopian government announced an upgrade to the power plant’s design, increasing it from 5,250 MW to 6,000 MW.[17] Ethiopia has a potential for around 45,000 MW of hydropower.[18] The dam is being funded by government bonds and private donations. It is slated for completion in July 2017.[1]
Design
Renaissance Dam and associated facilities.
The dam will be a 170 m (558 ft) tall, 1,800 m (5,906 ft) long gravity-type composed of roller-compacted concrete and will have two power houses, each on either side of the spillway. The left and right power houses will each contain 8 x 350 MW Francis turbine-generators.[19] Supporting the dam and reservoir will be a 5 km (3 mi) long and 50 m (164 ft) high saddle dam.[4] The dam’s reservoir will have a volume of 63 billion cubic metres (51 million acre feet).[10]
Cost and financing
The Ethiopian government has stated that it intends to fund the entire cost of the dam by itself. It has issued a bond targeted at Ethiopians in the country and abroad to that end.[12] The turbines and associated electrical equipment of the hydropower plants costing about US$1.8 billion are reportedly financed by Chinese banks. This would leave US$3 billion to be financed by the Ethiopian government through other means.[20] The estimated US$4.8 billion construction cost, apparently excluding the cost of power transmission lines, corresponds to less than 15% of Ethiopia’s Gross Domestic Product of US$41.906 billion in 2012.
Construction
The main contractor will be the Italian company Salini Costruttori, which also served as primary contractor for the Gilgel Gibe II,Gilgel Gibe III, and Tana Beles dams. It is expected to consume 10 million metric tons of concrete,[21] the government has pledged to use only domestically produced concrete. In March 2012, Salini awarded the Italian firm Tratos Cavi SPA a contract to supply low- and high-voltage cable for the dam.[22] Alstom will provide the eight 375 MW Francis turbines for the project’s first phase, at a cost of €250 million.[23] As of April 2013, nearly 32 percent of the project is complete. Site excavation and some concrete placement is underway. One concrete batch plant has been completed with another under construction.[24] Diversion of the Blue Nile was completed on 28 May 2013 and marked by a ceremony the same day.[25]
Benefits
A major benefit of the dam will be hydropower production. The electricity to be produced by the hydropower plant is to be sold in Ethiopia and to neighboring countries including Sudan and possibly Egypt. Selling the electricity from the dam would require the construction of massive transmission lines to major consumption centers such as Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa and Sudan’s capital Khartoum, both located more than 400 km away from the dam. These sales would come on top of electricity that is expected to be sold from other large hydropower plants that are under construction in Ethiopia, such as Gilgel Gibe III.
The plant load factor of the planned hydropower plant – the expected electricity production divided by the potential production if the power plant was utilized permanently at full capacity – is only 33% compared to 45-60% for other, smaller hydropower plants in Ethiopia. Critics conclude that a smaller dam would be more cost-effective.[26]
Renaissance Reservoir
It appears that some form of environmental study has been undertaken, since the press reported that an international panel reviewed an environmental study in 2012. The NGO International Rivers has commissioned a local researcher to make a field visit because so little information is available.[27]
Public consultation about dams in Ethiopia is affected by the political climate in the country. International Rivers reports that “conversations with civil society groups in Ethiopia indicate that questioning the government’s energy sector plans is highly risky, and there are legitimate concerns of government persecution. Because of this political climate, no groups are actively pursuing the issues surrounding hydro-power dams, nor publicly raising concerns about the risks. In this situation, extremely limited and inadequate public consultation has been organised” during the implementation of major dams.[28] In June 2011, Ethiopian journalist Reeyot Alemu was imprisoned after she raised questions about the proposed Grand Millennium Dam. Staff of International Rivers have received death threats. In the meantime, the late prime minister Meles Zenawi called opponents of the project “hydropower extremists” and “bordering on the criminal” at a conference of the International Hydropower Association(IHA) in Addis Abeba in April 2011. At the conference, the Ethiopian state power utility was embraced as a “Sustainability Partner” by the IHA.
Impact on Ethiopia
Since the Blue Nile is a highly seasonal river, the dam would reduce flooding downstream of the dam, including on the 40 km stretch within Ethiopia. On the one hand, the reduction of flooding is beneficial since it protects settlements from flood damage. On the other hand, it can be harmful, if flood recession agriculture is practiced in the river valley downstream of the dam since it deprives fields from being watered. The dam could also serve as a bridge across the Blue Nile, complementing a bridge that was under construction in 2009 further upstream.[30] An independent assessment estimated that at least 5,110 people will be resettled from the reservoir and downstream area, and the dam is expected to lead to a significant change in the fishery.[27] According to an independent researcher who conducted research in the area where the dam is being built, near to 20,000 people are being relocated. According to the same source, “a solid plan (is) in place for the relocated people” and those who have already been resettled “were given more than they expected in compensation”. Locals have never seen a dam before and “are not completely sure what a dam actually is”, despite community meetings in which affected people were informed about the impacts of the dam on their livelihoods. Except for a few older people, almost all locals interviewed “expressed hope that the project brings something of benefit to them” in terms of education and health services or electricity supply based on the information available to them. At least some of the new communities for those relocated will be downstream of the dam. The area around the reservoir will consist of a 5 km buffer zone for malaria control that will not be available for settlement. In at least some upstream areas erosion control measures will be undertaken in order to reduce siltation of the reservoir.
Impact on Sudan and Egypt
The precise impact of the dam on the downstream countries is not known. Egypt fears a temporary reduction of water availability due to the filling of the dam and a permanent reduction because of evaporation from the reservoir. The reservoir volume is about equivalent to the annual flow of the Nile at the Sudanese-Egyptian border (65.5 billion cubic meter). This loss to downstream countries would most likely be spread over several years. Reportedly during the filling of the reservoir 11 to 19bn cubic meters of water per year could be lost, which would cause two million farmers to lose their income during the period of filling the reservoir. Allegedly, it would also “affect Egypt’s electricity supply by 25 to 40 percent, while the dam is being built”.[32] Actually hydropower accounts for less than 12 percent of total electricity production in Egypt in 2010 (14 out of 121 billion kWh),[33] so that a temporary reduction of 25 percent in hydropower production translates into an overall temporary reduction in Egyptian electricity production of less than 3 percent. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam could also lead to a permanent lowering of the water level in Lake Nasser, if floods are stored instead in Ethiopia. This would reduce the current evaporation of more than 10 billion cubic meter per year, but it would also reduce the ability of the Aswan High Dam to produced hydropower to the tune of a 100 MW loss of generating capacity for a 3m reduction of the water level.
The dam will retain silt. It will thus increase the useful lifetime of dams in Sudan – such as the Roseires Dam, the Sennar Dam and the Merowe Dam – and of theAswan High Dam in Egypt. The beneficial and harmful effects of flood control would affect the Sudanese portion of the Blue Nile, just as it would affect the Ethiopian part of the Blue Nile valley downstream of the dam.[34]
The reservoir, located in the temperate Ethiopian Highlands and up to 200 m deep, will experience considerably less evaporation than downstream reservoirs such as Lake Nasser in Egypt, which loses 12% of its water flow due to evaporation as the water sits in the lake for 10 months. Through the controlled release of water from the reservoir to downstream, this could facilitate an increase of up to 5% in Egypt’s water supply, and presumably that of Sudan as well.[35]
Reactions: cooperation and condemnation
Egypt has serious concerns about the project so that it requested to be granted inspection allowance on the design and the studies of the dam, in order to allay its fears, but Ethiopia has denied the request unless Egypt relinquishes its veto on water allocation.[36] After a meeting between the Ministers of Water of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia in March 2012, Sudan’s President Bashir said that he supported the building of the dam.[37]
A Nile treaty signed by the upper riparian states in 2010, the Cooperative Framework Agreement, has not been signed by either Egypt or Sudan, as they claim it violates the 1959 treaty which gives Sudan and Egypt exclusive rights to the Nile’s waters.[38] The Nile Basin Initiative provides a framework for dialogue among all Nile riparian countries.
Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan established an International Panel of Experts to review and assess the study reports of the dam. The panel consists of 10 members; 6 from the three countries and 4 international in the fields of water resources and hydrologic modelling, dam engineering, socioeconomic, and environmental.[34] The panel held its fourth meeting in Addis Ababa in November 2012. It reviewed documents about the environmental impact of the dam and visited the dam site.[39] The panel submitted its preliminary report to the respective governments at the end of May 2013. Although the full report has not been made public, and will not be until it is reviewed by the governments, Egypt and Ethiopia both released details. The Ethiopian government stated that, according to the report, “the design of the dam is based on international standards and principles” without naming those standards and principles. It also said that the dam “offers high benefit for all the three countries and would not cause significant harm on both the lower riparian countries”.[40] According to Egyptian government, however, the report “recommended changing and amending the dimensions and the size of the dam”.[41]
On 3 June 2013 while discussing the International Panel of Experts report with President Mohammad Morsi, Egyptian political leaders suggested methods to destroy the dam, including support for anti-government rebels.[42][43] Unbeknownst to those at the meeting, the discussion was televised live.[6] Ethiopia requested that the Egyptian Ambassador explain the meeting.[44] Morsi’s top aide apologized for the “unintended embarrassment” and his cabinet released a statement promoting ““good neighborliness, mutual respect and the pursuit of joint interests without either party harming the other.” An aide to the Ethiopian Prime Minister stated that Egypt is “…entitled to day dreaming” and cited Egypt’s past of trying to destabilize Ethiopia.[45] Morsi reportedly believes that it is better to engage Ethiopia rather than attempt to force them.[6] However, on 10 June 2013, he said that “all options are open” because “Egypt’s water security cannot be violated at all,” clarifying that he was “not calling for war,” but that he would not allow Egypt’s water supply to be endangered.[46]
In January 2014, Egypt left negotiations over the dam, citing Ethiopian intransigence.[9] Ethiopia countered that Egypt had set an immediate halt on construction and an increase of its share to 90% as the preconditions, which were deemed wholly unreasonable. Egypt has since launched a diplomatic offensive to undermine support for the dam, sending its Foreign Minister, Nabil Fahmi to Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to garner support. Egyptian media outlets declared the visits productive and that the leaders of those nations had expressed “understanding” and “support” of Egypt’s position.[47] However, the accuracy of such statements are questionable; when Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karti criticised Egypt for “inflaming the situation” through its statements on the dam, and that it was considering the interests of both sides Al-Masry Al-Youm declared that Sudan had “proclaimed its neutrality”.[8][48] The campaign is intensive and wide-reaching; in March 2014, for the first time, just Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Tanzania were invited by Egypt to participate in the Nile Hockey Tournament.[49] Foreign Minister Fahmi and Water Resources Minister Muhammad Abdul Muttalib planned visits to Italy and Norway to express their concerns and try to compel them to pull their support for the GERD.[7]
In April 2014 Ethiopia’s Prime Minister invited Egypt and Sudan to another round of talks over the dam and Nabil Fahmi stated in May 2014 that Egypt was still open to negotiations.[50]
Many of these yet-to-be-fulfilled prophesies concerning the nations of the Middle East can be found beginning in Isaiah 13 and continuing for several chapters. Isaiah 19 gives us a very detailed prophecy of the final days of Egypt before the Lord’s return and continuing into the Millennium. Here is the sequence of events in Egpyt according to this prophecy…
1. Civil War
2. Revival of sorcery
3. Rise of a cruel tyrant
4. Severe drought (or something) which will cause massive water shortage, including the drying up of the Nile
5. The responses to this crisis will be foolish, self-deluding, and self-destructive
6. In consequence, the Egyptians will live in extreme fear and dread; one of the objects of their fear will be Israel, yet they will be loath to admit this
7. The Egyptians will finally cry out to the true God because of their oppression and misery
8. The Egyptians will turn to God and believe in the Messiah
9. Memorials, pillars, and altars will be erected in worship of the true God
10. There will be peace between Egypt, Israel and Assyria as all three will join together in worship of the true God
in Africa is the most affected when it come to water crisis because there are many dam that have been built and are to built in Ethiopia and Sudan what was cush before
The Promise and Threat of Ethiopia’s Dam on the Nile: 21st century Water Conflicts
The Nile River – river of legend – is not just a river in Egypt. It is the lifeblood of 11 different African nations and the longest river in the world, extending over 6,500 kilometers long and draining a watershed of over 3 million square kilometers. The eleven nations that share the Nile are Egypt, Ethiopia, the Sudan and South Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea, the DR of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.
The river is really two major rivers: the White Nile and the Blue Nile, which meet near Khartoum and become the mainstem of the Nile, flowing north to Egypt and the Mediterranean. The White Nile originates in the highlands of the Great Lakes region of Rwanda and Burundi. The Blue Nile originates in the Lake Tana region of Ethiopia. Of all of the water that reaches Egypt, the majority comes in the Blue Nile.
Over the past centuries, indeed over the past millennia, the waters of the Nile have been captured and harnessed by the people of Egypt, who depended initially on the ebb and flow of the river for recession agriculture, and in modern times, on hydropower and irrigation waters pulled from the massive Aswan Dam or from downstream diversion systems. By some estimates, 97% of all of Egypt’s water comes from the Nile, and to say that the nation is critically dependent upon it – with a population of more than 80 million people — is an understatement.
It should be no surprise then that Egypt, as the most downstream nation on the Nile, is extremely sensitive to what happens upstream of its borders. As long ago as the1970s and 1980s, statements from senior Egyptian officials warned upstream countries to keep their hands off of the Nile. In 1978 President Anwar Sadat said
“We depend upon the Nile 100 per cent in our life, so if anyone, at any moment, thinks of depriving us of our life we shall never hesitate to go to war. . . . The only matter that would take Egypt to war is water.”
Egyptian Foreign Minister and later UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali stated in 1985:
“The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics.”
Some have argued that such statements are simple rhetoric and that Egypt would never go to war over water. Perhaps. Political statements are always simple rhetoric — until actions replace words. But the rhetoric is now getting its most severe test ever.
Ethiopia, which has never had the economic, political, or technical ability to exploit the waters of the Blue Nile except in a simple way, has begun building what will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, the Grand Renaissance Dam, very close to the Ethiopian/Sudanese border. The massive reservoir behind the dam will be capable of storing more than an entire year’s flow of the Nile. Like any major energy project, this one has complicated advantages and disadvantages. But the political and hydrological implications for Sudan and Egypt are potentially the most explosive. [A later post may discuss the environmental, social, and economic pros and cons of the dam, the complicated international political story behind the dam’s construction and financing, and the implications for the region’s development. My focus here is the geopolitical challenges posed by the dam.]
The implications for the waters reaching Egypt are uncertain. No comprehensive environmental or technical assessment of the dam has been released – it is possible one has not even been prepared. And much of the ultimate impact depends on how the dam is built and operated and how the waters are managed. But here is what can be predicted, using official descriptions of the dam and reservoir:
- First, flows to the Sudan and Egypt will be substantially reduced during the period just after the dam is completed and the reservoir is being filled. This may be spread over several years, but the net loss to the downstream countries is equal to the volume of water stored in the reservoir – estimated to be around 74 billion cubic meters: equivalent to approximately a year and a half of flow.
- Second, flows in the Blue Nile will be reduced by the amount of water that evaporates off of the surface of the new reservoir. My rough estimate is that around 2.5 billion cubic meters of water will be lost to evaporation annually.
- Third, additional losses downstream will result if any of the water is withdrawn for use in irrigated agriculture in the region. While the dam is being billed as a “hydroelectric” dam, it seems highly likely that over time, extensive withdrawals for irrigation will occur. These have the potential to dramatically cut flows to downstream countries even more, but no official estimates of this are available. This is a fact of life of major transboundary rivers and dams: for example, the massive Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River in Turkey, just upstream of the Syrian border, has drastically and permanently reduced water flows to Syria and Iraq. Dams and withdrawals on the Colorado River in the US have reduced the flows to Mexico by 90 percent.
Finally, the dam is already being seen in the light of larger political disputes. In February this year, Saudi Arabia’s deputy defense minister Khalid Bin Sultan harshly criticized the Ethiopian project and argued that its location close to the Sudanese border was “for political plotting rather than for economic gain and constitutes a threat to Egyptian and Sudanese national security…” He went on to link the project with Arab/African tensions: “There are fingers messing with water resources of Sudan and Egypt which are rooted in the mind and body of Ethiopia. They do not forsake an opportunity to harm Arabs without taking advantage of it…”
An international panel of experts has just completed a study (reportedly submitted this week to the governments of Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia but not yet made public) about the dam. Whether that report serves to facilitate discussions among the parties about the design and operation of the dam, or simply hardens the political positions of the countries remains to be seen. But the risks of rhetoric over shared international water resources bubbling over into actions seem to be growing.
In the end, I hope and expect this conflict to remain political and rhetorical, not military. The costs of military actions against a neighboring country solely because of disputes over water are extraordinarily high: politically and economically. There is a long history of conflicts over water, but rarely is access to water the sole cause of interstate conflict; rather it can be a contributing and complicating factor when disputes start for other reasons. Yet almost nowhere else on the planet is a powerful downstream country so completely dependent on upstream nations for critical water supply as is the case for Egypt. That reality plays a special role in the story now unfolding on the Nile.
Hydropolis Aims to Restore the Nile Valley’s Natural Agricultural Rrhythm
Just about everyone learned in their early geography classes that the Nile Valley was once a fertile haven. Crops proliferated on the green banks due to natural flooding that deposited rich nutrients, although occasionally these floods inundated and destroyed crops as well, and the land of the Pharaohs was a mecca for agriculture.
But when construction on the Aswan Dam began in 1902, the ecosystem was forever altered. The natural flooding cycle was disrupted, silt began to accumulate in places and crucial nutrients were no longer deposited. Margaux Leycuras, Marion Ottmann and Anne-Hina Mallette hope to restore it with Hydropolis – a series of floating modular structures that reorganize the local agricultural system.
Students from the Architecture school of Nantes, the team who designed Hydropolis recently won a prize in a competition organized by the Foundation Jacques Rougerie. Their idea was to develop a well-integrated modular system that would solve the dual problem of hunger and environmental destruction.
The design proposes in part to restore something of the Nile River’s natural flooding system by opening the dam gates during the wettest months of the year ( July to September.) This would allow the fields to receive their nutrients, as well as a certain level of hydro saturation, so that rice crops can grow once again.
The floating cities would be organized on different sections of Lake Nasser, creating “eco-modules” on a 200 meter deep reservoir. While the floodgates are open, these reservoirs will likewise receive water to see the communities through the dry months.
Ideally suited for rice cultivation, this system would be connected by a series of canals and other links that enhance cohesiveness among the various communities.
A sea wall envelope would shelter the city and the Nile River can return to its initial work.
While Hydropolis seems rather far-fetched for Egypt given its current economic and political environment, not to mention the dispute between Egypt and its neighbors to the south over water rights, it is a thoughtful idea and we’ll be keeping a close eye on its development.
– See more at: http://www.greenprophet.com/2013/01/hydropolis-aims-to-restore-the-nile-valleys-natural-agricultural-rhythm/#sthash.QtvMi6TX.dpuf
Aswan Dam
Ezekiel 29:10
therefore I am against you and against your streams, and I will make the land of Egypt a ruin and a desolate waste from Migdol to Aswan, as far as the border of Cush. this passage speak about this dam begin destroy
| Aswan High Dam | |
|---|---|
The Aswan High Dam as seen from space
|
|
Location of the Aswan Dam in Egypt |
|
| Official name | Aswan High Dam |
| Location | Egypt |
| Coordinates | 23°58′14″N 32°52′40″ECoordinates: 23°58′14″N 32°52′40″E |
| Construction began | 1960 |
| Opening date | 1970 |
| Dam and spillways | |
| Type of dam | Embankment |
| Impounds | River Nile |
| Height | 111 metres (364 ft) |
| Length | 3,830 metres (12,570 ft) |
| Width (base) | 980 metres (3,220 ft) |
| Spillway capacity | 11,000 cubic metres per second (390,000 cu ft/s) |
| Reservoir | |
| Creates | Lake Nasser |
| Total capacity | 132 cubic kilometres (107,000,000 acre·ft) |
| Surface area | 5,250 square kilometres (2,030 sq mi) |
| Max. length | 550 kilometres (340 mi) |
| Max. width | 35 kilometres (22 mi) |
| Max. water depth | 180 metres (590 ft) |
| Normal elevation | 183 metres (600 ft) |
| Power station | |
| Commission date | 1967–1971 |
| Turbines | 12× 175 MW Francis-type |
| Installed capacity | 2,100 MW |
The Aswan Dam is an embankment dam situated across the Nile River in Aswan, Egypt. Since the 1960s, the name commonly refers to the High Dam. Construction of the High Dam became a key objective of the Egyptian Government following the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, as the ability to control floods, provide water for irrigation, and generatehydroelectricity were seen as pivotal to Egypt’s industrialization. The High Dam was constructed between 1960 and 1970, and has had a significant impact on the economy and culture of Egypt.
Before the dams were built, the Nile River flooded every year during late summer, when water flowed down the valley from its East African drainage basin. These floods brought high water and natural nutrients and minerals that annually enriched the fertile soil along the floodplain and delta; this had made the Nile valley ideal for farming since ancient times. Because floods vary, in high-water years the whole crop might be wiped out, while in low-water years widespreaddrought and famine occasionally occurred. As Egypt’s population grew and conditions changed, both a desire and ability developed to control the floods, and thus both protect and support farmland and the economically importantcotton crop. With the reservoir storage provided by the Aswan dams, the floods could be lessened and the water stored for later release.
Construction history
The earliest recorded attempt to build a dam near Aswan was in the 11th century, when the Arab polymath and engineer Ibn al-Haytham (known as Alhazen in the West) was summoned to Egypt by the Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, to regulate the flooding of the Nile, a task requiring an early attempt at an Aswan Dam.[1] His field work convinced him of the impracticality of this scheme.[2]
Aswan Low Dam, 1898–1902
The British began construction of the first dam across the Nile in 1898. Construction lasted until 1902, and the dam was opened on 10 December 1902. The project was designed by Sir William Willcocks and involved several eminent engineers, including Sir Benjamin Baker and Sir John Aird, whose firm, John Aird & Co., was the main contractor.[3][4]
Prelude, 1954–1959
In 1912 the Greek-Egyptian engineer Adrian Daninos began to develop the plan of the new Aswan Dam. Although the Low Dam was almost over-topped in 1946, the Egyptian government of King Farouk showed no interest in Daninos’s plans. Instead the Nile Valley Plan by British hydrologist Harold Edwin Hurst to store water in Sudan and Ethiopia, where evaporation is much lower, was favored. The Egyptian position changed completely with the overthrow of the monarchy, led by the Free Officers Movement includingGamal Abdel Nasser. The Free Officers were convinced that the Nile Waters had to be stored in Egypt for political reasons, and within two months the plan of Daninos was accepted.[5] Initially, both the US and the USSR were interested in the development of the dam, but this occurred in the midst of the Cold War, as well as growing intra-Arab rivalries.
In 1955 Nasser was trying to portray himself as the leader of Arab nationalism, in opposition to the traditional monarchies, especially Hashemite Iraq following its signing of the 1955 Baghdad Pact. At that time the US feared that communism would spread to the Middle East and saw Nasser as a natural leader of an anti-communist Arab league. The US and Britain offered to help finance construction of the high dam, with a loan of US$270 million, in return for Nasser’s leadership in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. While opposed both to communism and imperialism, Nasser presented himself as a tactical neutralist, and sought to work with both the US and the USSR for Egyptian and Arab benefit.[6] After a particularly criticized raid by Israel against Egyptian forces in Gaza in 1955, Nasser realized that he could not legitimately portray himself as the leader of pan-Arab nationalism if he could not defend his country militarily against Israel. In addition to his development plans, he looked to quickly modernize his military, and turned first to the US.
Egyptian President Nasserand Soviet leader Khrushchevat the ceremony to divert the Nile during the construction of the Aswan High Dam on May 14, 1964. At this occasion Khrushchev called it “the eighth wonder of the world”.
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and US President Dwight Eisenhower told Nasser that the US would supply him with weapons only if they were used for defensive purposes and accompanied by US military personnel for supervision and training. Nasser did not accept these conditions and then looked to the Soviet Union for support. Although Dulles believed that Nasser was only bluffing and that the USSR would not aid Nasser, he was wrong–the USSR promised Nasser a quantity of arms in exchange for a deferred payment of Egyptian grain and cotton. On 27 September 1955, Nasser announced an arms deal, with Czechoslovakia acting as a middleman for the Soviet support.[7] Instead of retaliating against Nasser for turning to the Soviets, Dulles sought to improve relations with him. This explains the later offer of December 1955, in which the US and UK pledged $56 and $14 million respectively towards the construction of the dam.
Nasser observing the construction of the dam, 1963
Though the Czech arms deal actually increased US willingness to invest in Aswan, the British cited the deal as a reason for withdrawing their funding. What angered Dulles much more was Nasser’s recognition of communist China, which was in direct conflict with Dulles’s policy ofcontainment.[9] There are several other reasons why the US decided to withdraw the offer of funding. Dulles believed that the Soviet Union would not fulfill its commitment to help the Egyptians. He was also irritated by Nasser’s neutrality and attempts to play both sides of theCold War. At the time, other western allies in the Middle East, including Turkey and Iraq, were irritated that Egypt, a persistently neutral country, was being offered so much aid.
In June 1956 the Soviets offered Nasser $1.12 billion at 2% interest for the construction of the dam. On 19 July the US State Department announced that American financial assistance for the High Dam was “not feasible in present circumstances.”
On 26 July 1956, with wide Egyptian acclaim, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal as well as fair compensation for the former owners. Nasser planned on the revenues generated by the canal helping to fund construction of the High Dam. When the Suez War broke out, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel seized the canal and the Sinai, but pressure from the US and the USSR at the United Nations and elsewhere forced them to withdraw.
In 1958 the Soviet Union provided funding for the dam project.
A view from the vantage point in the middle of High Dam towards the monument of Arab-Soviet Friendship (Lotus Flower) by architects Piotr Pavlov, Juri Omeltchenko and sculptor Nikolay Vechkanov
In the 1950s archaeologists began raising concerns that several major historical sites, including the famous temple of Abu Simbel were about to be under water. A rescue operation began in 1960 under UNESCO (for details see below under impacts).
Construction and filling, 1960–1976
A central pilon of the monument of the Arab-Soviet Friendship, commemorating the completion of Aswan High Dam. The coat of arms of the Soviet Union is on the left and the coat of arms of Egypt is on the right, by sculptor Nikolay Vechkanov.
The Soviets also provided technicians and heavy machinery. The enormous rock and clay dam was designed by the SovietHydroproject Institute along with some Egyptian engineers. Twenty-five thousand Egyptian engineers and workers contributed to the construction of the dams.
On the Egyptian side, the project was led by Osman Ahmed Osman‘s Arab Contractors. The relatively young Osman underbid his only competitor by one-half.[11]
- 1960: Start of construction on 9 January[12]
- 1964: First dam construction stage completed, reservoir started filling
- 1970: The High Dam, as-Sad al-‘Aali, completed on 21 July[13]
- 1976: Reservoir reached capacity
- 2011: plans to build extension to dam
Specifications
The Aswan High Dam is 3,830 metres (12,570 ft) long, 980 metres (3,220 ft) wide at the base, 40 metres (130 ft) wide at the crest and 111 metres (364 ft) tall. It contains 43,000,000 cubic metres (56,000,000 cu yd) of material. At maximum, 11,000 cubic metres per second (390,000 cu ft/s) of water can pass through the dam. There are further emergency spillways for an extra 5,000 cubic metres per second (180,000 cu ft/s) and the Toshka Canal links the reservoir to the Toshka Depression. The reservoir, named Lake Nasser, is 550 kilometres (340 mi) long and 35 kilometres (22 mi) at its widest with a surface area of 5,250 square kilometres (2,030 sq mi). It holds 132 cubic kilometres (1.73×1011 cu yd) of water.
A panorama of Aswan Dam
Irrigation scheme
Green irrigated land along the Nile amidst the desert
Water balances
Main irrigation systems (schematically)
Due to the absence of appreciable rainfall, Egypt’s agriculture depends entirely onirrigation. With irrigation, two crops per year can be produced, except for sugar canewhich has a growing period of almost one year.
The high dam at Aswan releases, on average, 55 cubic kilometres (13 cu mi) water per year, of which some 46 cubic kilometres (11 cu mi) are diverted into the irrigation canals.
In the Nile valley and delta, almost 33,600 square kilometres (13,000 sq mi) benefit from these waters producing on average 1.8 crops per year. The annual crop consumptive use of water is about 38 cubic kilometres (9.1 cu mi). Hence, the overall irrigation efficiency is 38/46 = 0.82 or 82%. This is a relatively high irrigation efficiency. The field irrigation efficiencies are much less, but the losses are re-used downstream. This continuous re-use accounts for the high overall efficiency.
The following table shows that the equal distribution of irrigation water over the branch canals taking off from the main irrigation canals leaves much to be desired:[14]
| Branch canal | Water delivery in m³/feddan * |
|---|---|
| Kafret Nasser | 4700 |
| Beni Magdul | 3500 |
| El Mansuria | 3300 |
| El Hammami upstream | 2800 |
| El Hammami downstream | 1800 |
| El Shimi | 1200 |
- * Period 1 March to 31 July. 1 feddan is about 1 acre or 0.42 ha.
- * Data from the Egyptian Water Use Management Project (EWUP)[15]
The salt concentration of the water in the Aswan reservoir is about 0.25 kilograms per cubic metre (0.42 lb/cu yd), a very low salinity level. At an annual inflow of 55 cubic kilometres (13 cu mi), the annual salt import reaches 14 million tons. The average salt concentration of the drainage water evacuated into the sea and the coastal lakes is 2.7 kilograms per cubic metre (4.6 lb/cu yd).[16] At an annual discharge of 10 cubic kilometres (2.4 cu mi) (not counting the 2 kilograms per cubic metre [3.4 lb/cu yd] of salt intrusion from the sea and the lakes, see figure “Water balances”), the annual salt export reaches 27 million ton. In 1995, the salt export was higher than the import, and Egypt’s agricultural lands were desalinizing. Part of this could be due to the large number of subsurface drainage projects executed in the last decades to control the water table and soil salinity.[17]
Drainage through sub-surface drains and drainage channels is essential to prevent a deterioration of crop yields from waterlogging and soil salinization caused by irrigation. By 2003, more than 20,000 square kilometres (7,700 sq mi) have been equipped with a subsurface drainage system and approximately 7.2 square kilometres (2.8 sq mi) of water is drained annually from areas with these systems. The total investment cost in agricultural drainage over 27 years from 1973 to 2002 was about US$3.1 billion covering the cost of design, construction, maintenance, research and training. During this period 11 large-scale projects were implemented with financial support from World Bank and other donors[18]
Impacts
The High Dam has resulted in protection from floods and droughts, an increase in agricultural production and employment, electricity production and improved navigation that benefits tourism. Conversely, the dam flooded a large area, causing the relocation of over 100,000 people and submerged archaeological sites, some of which were relocated as well. The dam is also blamed for coastline erosion, soil salinity and health problems.
The assessment of the costs and benefits of the dam remains a controversial issue, however, decades after its completion. According to one estimate, the annual economic benefits of the High Dam right after its completion were Egyptian Pound (EP) 255 million (US$587 million using the 1970 exchange rate of US$2.30 per EP): EP140 million from agricultural production, EP100 million from hydroelectric generation, EP10 million from flood protection, and EP5 million from improved navigation. At the time of its construction, total cost, including unspecified “subsidiary projects” and the extension of electric power lines, amounted to Egyptian EP450 million. Not taking into account the negative environmental and social impacts of the dam, its costs are thus estimated to have been recovered within only two years.[19] One observer notes: “The impacts of the Aswan High Dam (…) have been overwhelmingly positive. Although the Dam has contributed to someenvironmental problems, these have proved to be significantly less severe than was generally expected, or currently believed by many people.”[20] Another observer disagrees and recommended that the dam should be torn down. Tearing it down would cost only a fraction of the funds required for “continually combating the dam’s consequential damage” and 500,000 hectares of fertile land could be reclaimed from the layers of mud on the bed of the drained reservoir.[21]
Periodic floods and droughts have affected Egypt since ancient times. The dam mitigated the effects of floods, such as in 1964, 1973 and 1988. Navigation along the river has been improved, both upstream and downstream of the dam. Sailing along the Nile is a favorite tourism activity, which is mainly done during winter when the natural flow of the Nile would have been too low to allow navigation of cruise ships. A new fishing industry has been created around Lake Nasser, though it is struggling due to its distance from any significant markets. The annual production was about 35 000 tons in the mid-1990s. Factories for the fishing industry and packaging have been set up near the Lake.[22]
Drought protection, agricultural production and employment
The Egyptian countryside benefited from the Aswan High Dam through improved irrigation as well as electrification, as shown here South of Luxor.
The dams also protected Egypt from the droughts in 1972–1973 and 1983–1987 that devastated East and West Africa. The High Dam allowed Egypt to reclaim about 2 million feddan (840,000 hectares) in the Delta and along the Nile Valley, increasing the country’s irrigated area by a third. The increase was brought about both by irrigating what used to be desert and by bringing under cultivation of 385,000 ha that were previously used as flood retention basins.[23] About half a million families were settled on these new lands. In particular the area under rice and sugar cane cultivation increased. In addition, about 1 million feddan (420,000 hectares), mostly in Upper Egypt, were converted from flood irrigation with only one crop per year to perennial irrigation allowing two or more crops per year. On other previously irrigated land, yields increased because water could be made available at critical low-flow periods. For example, wheat yields in Egypt tripled between 1952 and 1991 and better availability of water contributed to this increase. Most of the 32 km³ of freshwater, or almost 40 percent of the average flow of the Nile that were previously lost to the sea every year could be put to beneficial use. While about 10 km³ of the water saved is lost due to evaporation in Lake Nasser, the amount of water available for irrigation still increased by 22 km³.[22] Other estimates put evaporation from Lake Nasser at between 10 to 16 billion cubic meter per year.[24]
Electricity production
Power plant of the Aswan High Dam, with the dam itself in the background.
The dam powers twelve generators each rated at 175 megawatts, with a total of 2.1 gigawatts. Power generation began in 1967. When the dam first reached peak output it produced around half of Egypt’s entire electricity production (about 15 percent by 1998) and allowed most Egyptian villages to use electricity for the first time. The High Dam has also improved the efficiency and the extension of the Old Aswan Hydropower stations by regulating upstream flows.[22]
Resettlement
A picture of the old Wadi Halfa town that was flooded by Lake Nasser.
Lake Nasser flooded much of lower Nubia and 100,000 to 120,000 people were resettled in Sudan and Egypt.[25]
View of New Wadi Halfa, a settlement created on the shore of Lake Nasser to house part of the resettled population from the Old Wadi Halfa town.
In Sudan, 50,000 to 70,000 Sudanese Nubians were moved from the old town of Wadi Halfa and its surrounding villages. Some were moved to a newly created settlement on the shore of Lake Nasser called New Wadi Halfa, and some were resettled approximately 700 kilometres south to the semi-arid Butana plain near the town of Khashm el-Girba up the Atbara River. The climate there had a regular rainy season as opposed to their previous desert habitat in which virtually no rain fell. The government developed an irrigation project, called the New Halfa Agricultural Development Scheme to grow cotton, grains, sugar cane and other crops. The Nubians were resettled in twenty five planned villages that included schools, medical facilities and other services including piped water and some electrification.
In Egypt, the majority of the 50,000 Nubians were moved three to ten kilometers from the Nile near Kom Ombo, 45 kilometers downstream from Aswan in what was called “New Nubia”. Housing and facilities were built for 47 village units whose relationship to each other approximated that in Old Nubia. Irrigated land was provided to grow mainly sugar cane.[26][27]
Archeological sites
The statue of Ramses the Great at the Great Temple of Abu Simbel is reassembled after having been moved in 1967 to save it from being flooded.
22 monuments and architectural complexes, including the Abu Simbel temples, that were threatened by flooding from Lake Nasser were preserved by moving them to the shores of Lake Nasser under the UNESCO Nubia Campaign.[28] Also moved were Philae, Kalabsha and Amada.[22] Other monuments were granted to countries that helped with the works (such as theDebod temple in Madrid, the Temple of Taffeh in Leiden and the Temple of Dendur in New York). The remaining archeological sites have been flooded by Lake Nasser, among others the Buhen fort.
Loss of sediments
Lake Nasser behind the Aswan dam displaced more than 100,000 people and traps significant amounts of sediment.
Before the construction of the High Dam, the Nile deposited sediments of various particle size – consisting of fine sand, silt and clay – on fields in Upper Egypt through its annual flood, contributing to soil fertility. However, the nutrient value of the sediment has often been overestimated. 88 percent of the sediment was carried to the sea before the construction of the High Dam. The nutrient value added to the land by the sediment was only 6,000 tons of potash, 7,000 tons of phosphorus pentoxide and 17,000 tons of nitrogen. These amounts are insignificant compared to what is needed to reach the yields achieved today in Egypt’s irrigation.[29] Also, the annual spread of sediment due to the Nile floods occurred along the banks of the Nile. Areas far from the river which never received the Nile floods before are now being irrigated.[30]
The trapping of sediment by the dam has also increased coastline erosion surrounding the Nile Delta. The coastline erodes an estimated 125–175 m (410–574 ft) per year.[31]
Waterlogging and increase in soil salinity
Before the construction of the High Dam, groundwater levels in the Nile Valley fluctuated 8–9 m per year with the water level of the Nile. During summer when evaporation was highest, the groundwater level was too deep to allow salts dissolved in the water to be pulled to the surface through capillary action. With the disappearance of the annual flood and heavy year-round irrigation, groundwater levels remained high with little fluctuation leading to waterlogging. Soil salinity also increased because the distance between the surface and the groundwater table was small enough (1–2 m depending on soil conditions and temperature) to allow water to be pulled up by evaporation so that the relatively small concentrations of salt in the groundwater accumulated on the soil surface over the years. Since most of the farmland did not have proper subsurface drainage to lower the groundwater table, salinization gradually affected crop yields.[23] Drainage through sub-surface drains and drainage channels is essential to prevent a deterioration of crop yields from soil salinization and waterlogging. By 2003 more than 2 million have been equipped with a subsurface drainage system at a cost from 1973 to 2002 of about US$ 3.1 billion
Health
Skin vesicles: a symptom of schistosomiasis whose spread was temporarily increased by the irrigation infrastructure associated with the Aswan High Dam.
The standing water in irrigation canals is a breeding ground for snails carrying the parasite bilharzia.[33] The incidence of bilharzia increased due to the Aswan High Dam inhibiting the natural fluctuations in water height. Important factors contributing to the prevalence of schistosomiasis were poor sanitation and limited awareness of how the disease was transmitted. Provision of clean water, sanitation, health education and rural clinics has reduced the overall prevalence ofschistosomiasis from more than 40 percent during the pre-dam period to 10 percent in 1995 and only 2 percent in 2002.
Other impacts
Sediment deposited in the reservoir is lowering the water storage capacity of Lake Nasser. The reservoir storage capacity is 162 km³, including 31 km³ dead storage at the bottom of the lake below 147 m above sea level, 90 km³ live storage, and 41 km³ of storage for high flood waters above 175m above sea level. The annual sediment load of the Nile is about 134 million tons. This means that the dead storage volume would be filled up after 300–500 years if the sediment accumulated at the same rate throughout the area of the lake. Obviously sediment accumulates much faster at the upper reaches of the lake, where sedimentation has already affected the live storage zone.[29]
Before the construction of the High Dam, the 50,000 km of irrigation and drainage canals in Egypt had to be dredged regularly to remove sediments. After construction of the dam, aquatic weeds grew much faster in the clearer water, helped by fertilizer residues. The total length of the infested waterways was about 27,000 km in the mid-1990s. Weeds have been gradually brought under control by manual, mechanical and biological methods.[22]
The catch of Sardines in the Mediterranean off the Egyptian coast declined after the Aswan Dam was completed, but the exact reasons for the decline are still disputed.
Mediterranean fishing and brackish water lake fishery declined after the dam was finished because nutrients that used to flow down the Nile to the Mediterranean were trapped behind the dam. For example, the Sardine catch off the Egyptian coast declined from 18,000 tons in 1962 to a mere 460 tons in 1968, but then gradually recovered to 8,590 tons in 1992. A scientific article in the mid-1990s noted that “the mismatch between low primary productivity and relatively high levels of fish production in the region still presents a puzzle to scientists.”[34]
A concern before the construction of the High Dam had been the potential drop in river-bed level downstream of the Dam as the result of erosion caused by the flow of sediment-free water. Estimates by various national and international experts put this drop at between 2 and 10 meters. However, the actual drop has been measured at 0.3–0.7 meters, much less than anticipated.[22]
The red-brick construction industry, which consisted of hundreds of factories that used Nile sediment deposits along the river, has also been negatively affected. Deprived of sediment, they started using the older alluvium of otherwise arable land taking out of production up to 120 square kilometers annually, with an estimated 1,000 square kilometers destroyed by 1984 when the government prohibited, “with only modest success,” further excavation.[35] According to one source, bricks are now being made from new techniques which use a sand-clay mixture and it has been argued that the mud-based brick industry would have suffered even if the dam had not been built.[30]
Because of the lower turbidity of the water sunlight penetrates deeper in the Nile water. Because of this and the increased presence of nutrients from fertilizers in the water, more algae grow in the Nile. This in turn increases the costs of drinking water treatment. Apparently few experts had anticipated that water quality in the Nile would actually decrease because of the High Dam.[23]
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