From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Headquarters Vienna, Austria
Official language English
Type Cartel
 • Secretary General Abdallah Salem el-Badri
Establishment Baghdad, Iraq
 • Statute 10–14 September 1960
 • in effect January 1961
 • Total 13,759,546 km2
5,312,590 sq mi
 • estimate 669,521,706
 • Density 48.7/km2
126.1/sq mi
Currency Indexed as USD-per-barrel

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, /ˈpɛk/ oh-pek), is an international organization headquartered in Vienna, Austria. OPEC was established in Baghdad, Iraq on 10–14 September 1960.[1] The formation of OPEC represented a collective act of sovereignty by petroleum-exporting nations, and marked a turning point in state control over natural resources. OPEC was formed when the international oil market was largely dominated by a group of multinational companies known as the “Seven Sisters“. In the 1960s OPEC ensured that oil companies could not unilaterally cut prices.[2]:503–505

OPEC’s mission is “to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its member countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets, in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers, and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry.”[3] As of December 2015, OPEC has thirteen members:Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (the de facto leader), the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.[4] As of 2014, approximately 80% of the world’s proven oil reserves were located in OPEC member countries, and two-thirds of OPEC’s reserves were located in the Middle East.[5]

According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), OPEC crude oil production is an important factor affecting global oil prices. OPEC sets production targets for its member nations and generally, when OPEC production targets are reduced, oil prices increase. Projections of changes in Saudi production result in changes in the price of benchmark crude oils.[6]Within their sovereign territories, the national governments of OPEC members are able to impose production limits on both government-owned and private oil companies.[7] In December 2014, “OPEC and the oil men” ranked as number 3 on Lloyd’s list of “the top 100 most influential people in the shipping industry”.


Current members[edit]

As of December 2015, OPEC has 13 member countries: six in the Middle East (Western Asia), one in Southeast Asia, four in Africa, two in South America. Their combined rate of oil production represents approximately 40% of the world’s total:

Country Region Joined OPEC[9] Population
(July 2012)[10]
(bbl/day, 2014)[12]
 Algeria Africa 1969 37,367,226 2,381,740 1,721,000 (17th)
 Angola Africa 2007 18,056,072 1,246,700 1,756,000 (16th)
 Ecuador South America (1973) 2007[A 1] 15,223,680 283,560 557,000 (28th)
 Indonesia Southeast Asia (1962) 2015[A 2] 248,645,008 1,904,569 911,000 (22nd)
 Iran Middle East 1960[A 3] 78,868,711 1,648,000 3,375,000 (7th)
 Iraq Middle East 1960[A 3] 31,129,225 437,072 3,371,000 (8th)
 Kuwait Middle East 1960[A 3] 2,646,314 17,820 2,780,000 (11th)
 Libya Africa 1962 5,613,380 1,759,540 516,000 (29th)
 Nigeria Africa 1971 170,123,740 923,768 2,427,000 (13th)
 Qatar Middle East 1961 1,951,591 11,437 2,055,000 (14th)
 Saudi Arabia Middle East 1960[A 3] 26,534,504 2,149,690 11,624,000 (2nd)
 United Arab Emirates Middle East 1967 5,314,317 83,600 3,471,000 (6th)
 Venezuela South America 1960[A 3] 28,047,938 912,050 2,689,000 (12th)
Total 669,521,706 13,759,546 37,253,000
  1. Jump up^ Ecuador initially joined in 1973, left in 1992, and rejoined in 2007.
  2. Jump up^ Indonesia initially joined in 1962, left in 2009, and rejoined in 2015.
  3. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e One of five founder members that attended the first OPEC conference, in September 1960.

In October 2015, Sudan formally submitted an application to join OPEC.[13] Approval of a new member country requires agreement by three-fourths of the existing members, including all five of the founders.[14]

Former members[edit]

Country Region Joined OPEC Left OPEC
 Gabon Africa 1975 1994

Some commentators consider that the United States was a de facto member during its formal occupation of Iraq due to its leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority.[15][16] But this is not borne out by the minutes of OPEC meetings, as no US representative attended in an official capacity.[17][18]

Leadership and decision-making[edit]

OPEC Conference at Swissotel,Quito, Ecuador, December 2010

The OPEC Conference is the supreme authority of the Organization, and consists of delegations normally headed by the oil ministers of member countries. The Conference usually meets at the Vienna headquarters, at least twice a year and in additional extraordinary sessions whenever required. It operates on the principle of unanimity, and one member, one vote.[14] However, since Saudi Arabia is by far the largest oil exporter in the world, it serves as “OPEC’s de facto leader”.[19] The chief executive of the Organization is the OPEC Secretary General.

Publications and research[edit]

Since 2007, OPEC publishes the World Oil Outlook (WOO) annually, in which it presents a comprehensive analysis of the global oil industry including medium- and long-term projections for supply and demand.[20]

Crude oil benchmarks[edit]

Main article: Benchmark (crude oil)

A “crude oil benchmark” is a standardized petroleum product that serves as a convenient reference price for buyers and sellers of crude oil. Benchmarks are used because oil prices differ based on variety, grade, delivery date and location.

The OPEC Reference Basket of Crudes is an important benchmark for crude oil prices. It is currently calculated as a weighted average of prices for petroleum blends from OPEC member countries: Saharan Blend (Algeria), Girassol (Angola), Oriente (Ecuador), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), Bonny Light (Nigeria), Qatar Marine (Qatar), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE), and Merey (Venezuela).[21]

North Sea Brent Crude Oil is the leading benchmark for Atlantic basin crude oils, and is used to price approximately two-thirds of the world’s traded crude oil.[22] Other well-known benchmarks are West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Dubai Crude, Oman Crude, and Urals oil.

Spare capacity[edit]

The U.S. Energy Information Administration, the statistical arm of the U.S. Department of Energy, defines spare capacity for crude oil market management, “as the volume of production that can be brought on within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days.” OPEC spare capacity “provides an indicator of the world oil market’s ability to respond to potential crises that reduce oil supplies.”[6]

In November 2014, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that OPEC’s effective spare capacity was 3.5 million barrels per day (560,000 m3/d) and that this number would increase to a peak in 2017 of 4.6 million barrels per day (730,000 m3/d).[23] By November 2015, the IEA changed its assessment “with OPEC’s spare production buffer stretched thin, as Saudi Arabia – which holds the lion’s share of excess capacity – and its Gulf neighbours pump at near-record rates.”[24]


The OPEC headquarters in Vienna

In 1949 Venezuela and Iran were the first countries to move towards the establishment of OPEC by approaching Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, suggesting that they exchange views and explore avenues for regular and closer communication among petroleum-producing nations.[25]

In 1959, the International Oil Companies (IOCs) reduced the posted price for Venezuelan crude by 5¢ and then 25¢ per barrel, and that for Middle Eastern crude by 18¢ per barrel.[25]

The First Arab Petroleum Congress convened in Cairo, Egypt, where they established an ‘Oil Consultation Commission’ to which IOCs should present price change plans to authorities of producing countries.[25] In 1959 journalist Wanda Jablonski introduced Abdullah Tariki to Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo at the Arab Oil Congress in Cairo. They were both infuriated by the cut in posted prices by IOCs or Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs). This meeting resulted in the Maadi Pact or Gentlemen’s Agreement.[2]:499

In 1960, journalist Wanda Jablonski reported a marked hostility toward the West and a growing outcry against absentee landlordism in the Middle East. In his influential book entitled The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, Daniel Yergin described how the Standard Oil, who controlled 75% of the US oil business, in August 1960 with no direct warning to oil exporters, announced cut of up 7 per cent of the posted prices of Middle Eastern crude oils. Esso and other oil companies unilaterally reduced the posted price for Middle East crudes.[26] Middle Eastern countries already felt resentment towards the West over the absentee landlordism of MOCs who at the time controlled all oil operations within the host countries.[2]:503


In 10–14 September 1960, the Baghdad conference was held at the initiative of the Venezuelan Mines and Hydrocarbons minister Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso and the Saudi Arabian Energy and Mines minister Abdullah al-Tariki. The governments of Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela met in Baghdad to discuss ways to increase the price of the crude oil produced by their respective countries and respond to unilateral actions by the MOCs who at the time controlled all oil operations within the host countries. “Together with Arab and non-Arab producers, Saudi Arabia formed the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) to secure the best price available from the major oil corporations.”[27]

Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela were the OPEC founding member nations in 1960. Later it was joined by nine more governments: Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962–2009, rejoined 2015), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973–1992, rejoined 2007), Angola (2007), and Gabon(1975–1994). The Arab countries originally called for OPEC headquarters to be in Bagdad or Beirut, but Venezuela argued for a neutral location, and so Geneva, Switzerlandwas chosen. However, on 1 September 1965, OPEC moved to Vienna, Austria.[28]

Oil exports minus imports (2008)

OPEC was founded to unify and coordinate members’ petroleum policies. Between 1960 and 1975, the organization expanded to include Qatar , Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Nigeria. Ecuador and Gabon were early members of OPEC, but Ecuador withdrew on 31 December 1992[29] because it was unwilling or unable to pay a $2 million membership fee and felt that it needed to produce more oil than it was allowed to under the OPEC quota,[30] although it rejoined in October 2007. Similar concerns prompted Gabon to suspend membership in January 1995.[31] Angola joined on the first day of 2007. Norway and Russia have attended OPEC meetings as observers. Indicating that OPEC is not averse to further expansion, Mohammed Barkindo, OPEC’s Secretary General, asked Sudan to join.[32] Iraq remains a member of OPEC, but Iraqi production has not been a part of any OPEC quota agreements since March 1998.

In the 1970s, OPEC began to gain influence and steeply raised oil prices during the 1973 oil crisis in response to US aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War.[33] It lasted until March 1974.[34] OPEC added to its goals the selling of oil for socio-economic growth of the poorer member nations, and membership grew to 13 by 1975.[28] A few member countries became centrally planned economies.[28]

In a 1979 U.S. District Court decision held that OPEC’s pricing decisions have sovereign immunity as “governmental” acts of state, as opposed to “commercial” acts, and are therefore beyond the legal reach of U.S. courts competition law and are protected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.[35][36]

In the 1980s, the price of oil was allowed to rise before the adverse effects of higher prices caused demand and price to fall. The OPEC nations, which depended on revenue from oil sales, experienced severe economic hardship from the lower demand for oil and consequently cut production in order to boost the price of oil. During this time, environmental issues began to emerge on the international energy agenda.[28] Lower demand for oil saw the price of oil fall back to 1986 levels by 1998–99.

In the 2000s, a combination of factors pushed up oil prices even as supply remained high. Prices rose to then record-high levels in mid-2008 before falling in response to the2007 financial crisis. OPEC’s summits in Caracas and Riyadh in 2000 and 2007 had guiding themes of stable energy markets, sustainable oil production, and environmental sustainability.[28]

In April 2001, OPEC, in collaboration with five other international organisations (APEC, Eurostat, IAE, OLADE and the UNSD) launched the Joint Oil Data Exercise, which became rapidely the Joint Organization Data Initiative (JODI).

In 2003 the International Energy Agency (IEA) and OPEC held their first joint workshop on energy issues and they continued to meet since then to better “understand trends, analysis and viewpoints and advance market transparency and predictability.”[37]:7

By 2011 OPEC called for more efforts by governments and regulatory bodies to curb excessive speculation in oil futures markets. OPEC claimed this increased volatility in oil prices, disconnected price from market fundamentals. In 2011 Nymex oil future trades reached record highs. By mid-March the Nymex WTI “exceeded 1.5 million futures contracts, 18 times higher than the volume of daily traded physical crude.”[38]

While there have been some allegations that OPEC acted as a cartel when it adopted output rationing in order to maintain price in 1996, for example,[39] Jeff Colgan argued in 2013 that, since 1982, countries cheated on their quotas 96% of the time, largely neutralizing the ability of OPEC to collectively influence prices.[40]

In 2011 the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that OPEC would break above the US$1 trillion mark earnings for the first time at US$1.034 trillion. In 2008 OPEC earned US$965 billion.[41]

1973 oil embargo[edit]

Main article: 1973 oil crisis

In October 1973, OPEC declared an oil embargo in response to the United States’ and Western Europe’s support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The result was a rise in oil prices from $3 per barrel to $12 starting on 17 October 1973, and ending on 18 March 1974 and the commencement of gas rationing. Other factors in the rise in gasoline prices included a market and consumer panic reaction, the peak of oil production in the United States around 1970 and the devaluation of the U.S. dollar.[42] U.S. gas stations put a limit on the amount of gasoline that could be dispensed, closed on Sundays, and limited the days gasoline could be purchased based on license plates. Even after the embargo concluded, prices continued to rise.

The Oil Embargo of 1973 had a lasting effect on the United States. The Federal government got involved first with President Richard Nixon recommending citizens reduce their speed for the sake of conservation, and later Congress issuing a 55 mph limit at the end of 1973. Daylight saving time was extended year round to reduce electrical use in the American home. Smaller, more fuel efficient cars were manufactured.

On 4 December 1973, Nixon also formed the Federal Energy Office as a cabinet office with control over fuel allocation, rationing, and prices.[43] People were asked to decrease their thermostats to 65 degrees and factories changed their main energy supply to coal.

One of the most lasting effects of the 1973 oil embargo was a global economic recession. Unemployment rose to the highest percentage on record while inflation also spiked. Consumer interest in large gas guzzling vehicles fell and production dropped. Although the embargo only lasted a year, during that time oil prices had quadrupled and OPEC nations discovered that their oil could be used as both a political and economic weapon against other nations.[44][45]

OPEC aid[edit]

OPEC aid dates from well before the 1973–1974 oil price explosion. Kuwait has operated a program since 1961 (through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development).

The OPEC Special Fund “was conceived […] in Algiers, Algeria, in March 1975”, and formally founded early the following year. “A Solemn Declaration ‘reaffirmed the natural solidarity which unites OPEC countries with other developing countries in their struggle to overcome underdevelopment,’ and called for measures to strengthen cooperation between these countries”, operating under a reasoning that the Fund’s “resources are additional to those already made available by OPEC states through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels.” The Fund became a fully fledged permanent international development agency in May 1980 and was renamed the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), the designation it currently holds.[46][47]

1975 hostage incident[edit]

Main article: OPEC siege

On 21 December 1975, Ahmed Zaki Yamani and the other oil ministers of the members of OPEC were taken hostage in Vienna, Austria, where the ministers were attending a meeting at the OPEC headquarters. The hostage attack was orchestrated by a six-person team led by Venezuelan terrorist Carlos the Jackal (which included Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann and Hans-Joachim Klein). The self-named “Arm of the Arab Revolution” group called for the liberation of Palestine. Carlos planned to take over the conference by force and kidnap all eleven oil ministers in attendance and hold them for ransom, with the exception of Ahmed Zaki Yamani and Iran’s Jamshid Amuzegar, who were to be executed.

The terrorists searched for Ahmed Zaki Yamani and then divided the sixty-three hostages into groups. Delegates of friendly countries were moved toward the door, ‘neutrals’ were placed in the centre of the room and the ‘enemies’ were placed along the back wall, next to a stack of explosives. This last group included those from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and the UAE.

Carlos arranged bus and plane travel for the team and 42 hostages, with stops in Algiers and Tripoli, with the plan to eventually fly to Aden then Baghdad, where Yamani and Amuzegar would be killed. All 30 non-Arab hostages were released in Algiers, excluding Amuzegar. Additional hostages were released at another stop. With only 10 hostages remaining, Carlos held a phone conversation with Algerian President Houari Boumédienne who informed Carlos that the oil ministers’ deaths would result in an attack on the plane. Boumédienne must also have offered Carlos asylum at this time and possibly financial compensation for failing to complete his assignment. Carlos expressed his regret at not being able to murder Yamani and Amuzegar, then he and his comrades left the plane. Hostages and Carlos and his team walked away from the situation.

Some time after the attack it was revealed by Carlos’ accomplices that the operation was commanded by Wadi Haddad, a Palestinian terrorist and founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It was also claimed that the idea and funding came from an Arab president, widely thought to be Muammar al-Gaddafi. In the years following the OPEC raid, Bassam Abu Sharif and Klein claimed that Carlos had received a large sum of money in exchange for the safe release of the Arab hostages and had kept it for his personal use. There is still some uncertainty regarding the amount that changed hands but it is believed to be between US$20 million and US$50 million. The source of the money is also uncertain, but, according to Klein, it was from “an Arab president.” Carlos later told his lawyers that the money was paid by the Saudis on behalf of the Iranians and was, “diverted en route and lost by the Revolution”.[48]

1980s oil glut[edit]

Main article: 1980s oil glut

OPEC net oil export revenues for 1972–2007[49]

In response to the high oil prices of the 1970s, industrial nations took steps to reduce dependence on oil. Utilities switched to usingcoal, natural gas, or nuclear power while national governments initiated multibillion-dollar research programs to develop alternatives to oil. Demand for oil dropped by five million barrels a day while oil production outside of OPEC rose by fourteen million barrels daily by 1986. During this time, the percentage of oil produced by OPEC fell from 50% to 29%. The result was a six-year price decline that culminated with a 46 percent price drop in 1986.

In order to combat falling revenues, Saudi Arabia pushed for production quotas to limit production and boost prices. When other OPEC nations failed to comply, Saudi Arabia slashed production from 10 million barrels daily in 1980 to just one-quarter of that level in 1985. When this proved ineffective, Saudi Arabia reversed course and flooded the market with cheap oil, causing prices to fall to under ten dollars a barrel. The result was that high price production zones in areas such as the North Sea became too expensive. Countries in OPEC that had previously failed to comply to quotas began to limit production in order to shore up prices.[50]

Responding to war and low prices[edit]

Leading up to the 1990–91 Gulf War, The President of Iraq Saddam Hussein recommended that OPEC should push world oil prices up, helping all OPEC members financially. But the division of OPEC countries occasioned by the Iraq-Iran War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait marked a low point in the cohesion of OPEC. Once supply disruption fears that accompanied these conflicts dissipated, oil prices began to slide dramatically.

After oil prices slumped at around $15 a barrel in the late 1990s, joint diplomacy achieved a slowing down of oil production beginning in 1998.

In 2000, Venezuela President Hugo Chávez hosted the first summit of OPEC in 25 years in Caracas. The next year, however, the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, and the following invasion of Afghanistan, and 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation prompted a sharp rise in oil prices to levels far higher than those targeted by OPEC itself during the previous period. Price volatility peaked in 2008, as crude oil surged to a record US$147/b in July and then plunged to just US$32/b in December, during the worst global recession since World War II.[51]

In May 2008, Indonesia announced that it would leave OPEC when its membership expired at the end of that year, having become a net importer of oil and being unable to meet its production quota.[52] A statement released by OPEC on 10 September 2008 confirmed Indonesia’s withdrawal, noting that it “regretfully accepted the wish of Indonesia to suspend its full Membership in the Organization and recorded its hope that the Country would be in a position to rejoin the Organization in the not too distant future.”[53]Indonesia is still exporting light, sweet crude oil and importing heavier, more sour crude oil to take advantage of price differentials (import is greater than export).

Production disputes[edit]

The economic needs of the OPEC member states often affects the internal politics behind OPEC production quotas. Various members have pushed for reductions in production quotas to increase the price of oil and thus their own revenues.[54] These demands conflict with Saudi Arabia’s stated long-term strategy of being a partner with the world’s economic powers to ensure a steady flow of oil that would support economic expansion.[55] Part of the basis for this policy is the Saudi concern that expensive oil or supply uncertainty will drive developed nations to conserve and develop alternative fuels. To this point, former Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani famously said in 1973: “The stone age didn’t end because we ran out of stones.”[56][57]

On 10 September 2008, one such production dispute occurred when the Saudis reportedly walked out of OPEC negotiating session where the organization voted to reduce production. Although Saudi Arabian OPEC delegates officially endorsed the new quotas, they stated anonymously that they would not observe them. The New York Timesquoted one such anonymous OPEC delegate as saying “Saudi Arabia will meet the market’s demand. We will see what the market requires and we will not leave a customer without oil. The policy has not changed.”[58]

With regard to disputes related to international trade, OPEC has not been involved in any related to the rules of the World Trade Organization, even though the objectives, actions, and principles of the two organizations diverge considerably.[59]

Oil price decline 2014–2015[edit]

Countries by oil production (2013)

According to the New York Times the oil-drilling boom in the United States has increased oil production by over 70 percent since 2008 and has reduced the United States oil imports from OPEC by fifty per cent.[60] United States oil inventory has increased because of this new production and surplus oil.[61] The price of oil has been influenced by market participants shorting crude oil in the United States which cannot be exported.[62] The low price of oil has created record profits for oil refineries.[63]

Types of crude oil

Since 2011 the United States absorbed the rapidly increased domestic production of sweet, light, tight oil by reducing like-for-like or similar grade, imported crude oil[64] from Nigerian and other African suppliers.[60] From 2011 to 2013 fifty per cent of oil import reductions impacted light crude (API gravity35+).[65] Almost 96 per cent of the 1.8 million barrels per day (290,000 m3/d) of its growth comes from light, sweet crude from tight resource formations.[64] As domestic production continues to increase, the U.S. is facing future challenges of absorbing the light, sweet tight oil.[65]

In June 2014 crude oil prices abruptly dropped by about a third as U.S. shale oil production increased and China and Europe’s demand for oil decreased. Just before the United States rapidly backed out of the crude oil import market because of booming national production, the spot price of North Sea Brent crude oil peaked on 17 June 2014 at more than US$115 per barrel.[66]

Nigeria is the largest producer of sweet oil in OPEC. By July 2014, as the US stopped importing light sweet crude, more crude oil became available to refineries in China, India, Japan and South Korea. They collectively purchased 42% more Nigerian crude in 2014 compared with 2013. Starting in June 2014 Saudi Aramco—Saudi Arabia’s national oil and gas company and the world’s largest oil company in terms of production—discounted the price of its crude to Asian refineries[67] to compete with oil from Nigerian and other African suppliers.[60]

In their press release 27 November 2014 at the OPEC Conference in Vienna, it was announced that the ‘OECD-Americas’ was the main non-OPEC oil supply contributor to an anticipated supply growth of 1.4 million barrels per day (220,000 m3/d) to average 57.3 million barrels per day (9,110,000 m3/d) in 2015. From 2011 until mid-June 2014 the annual average price of oil was about US$110 per barrel. Since June 2014 however, the price of oil slid to US$80. OPEC argued that this drop in the price of oil was not exclusively “attributed to oil market fundamentals.” While oil market fundamentals, “ample supply, moderate demand, a stronger US dollar and uncertainties about global economic growth” contributed to the drop in price, “speculative activity in the oil market has also been an important factor.”[68]

In spite of global oversupply, on 27 November 2014 in Vienna, Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi, blocked the appeals from the poorer OPEC member states, such as Venezuela, Iran and Algeria, for production cuts. Benchmark crude, Brent oil plunged to US$71.25, a four-year low. Al-Naimi argued that the market would be left to correct itself. OPEC had a “long-standing policy of defending prices.” According to some analysts, OPEC would let price of Brent oil drop to US$60 to slow down US shale oil production.[69] In spite of a troubled economy in member countries, al-Naimi repeated his statement on Saudi inaction.[70]

By November 2014 with production at 30.56 million barrels per day (4,859,000 m3/d) OPEC entered its sixth month of exceeding their collective target production.[66] By 11 December 2014 the price of OPEC Reference Basket of Crudes had dropped to US$60.50[71] and by 13 December the price of Brent ICE dropped to US$61.85.[66] On 12 January 2015 price of OPEC Reference Basket of Crudes had dropped to US$43.55[71] In February 2015, OPEC had entered its ninth consecutive month of exceeding its collective target production.[72]

In August 2015, Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro sought an emergency OPEC meeting and joint coordination with Russia to stem the tumble in oil prices.[73] Ecuador supported Venezuela’s position.[74] Previously in February 2015, Nigeria sought to call an emergency OPEC meeting if oil prices continued to decline.[75] In April 2015, Iran and Libya called on OPEC to reduce oil output.[76] Angola and Algeria also sought a production cut in cooperation with the African Petroleum Producers Association.[77] Algeria said Mexico supported the bid to cut oil output.[78] In September 2015, President Vladimir Putin met Venezuelan President Nicolas to discuss oil policies.[79] Saudi Arabia, though, pushed OPEC to increase production levels.[80]

In mid-2015, Bank of America said that OPEC is “effectively dissolved”,[81][82] and JPMorgan Chase estimated that OPEC’s decision to maintain production was costing Saudi Arabia about $90 billion/year and probably close to $200 billion/year for OPEC as a whole.[83]

In October 2015, OPEC held an unusual meeting with oil officials from nonmember states like Russia and Mexico, in a bid to forge a common response to fallen oil prices.[84] At OPEC’s Vienna meeting on 4 December 2015, after exceeding its production ceiling for 18 consecutive months, and with Indonesia rejoining and Iranian output poised to surge with the removal of international sanctions, OPEC decided to set aside its ineffective production ceiling until the next ministerial conference in June 2016.[85][86][87] On 9 December 2015, the OPEC Reference Basket was down to US$34.80 for the first time since December 2008

China National Petroleum Corporation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
China National Petroleum Corporation
Type Government-owned corporation
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 1988
Headquarters Dongcheng District, Beijing,China
Key people Zhou Jiping (Chairman)
Liao Yongyuan (President)
Products Petroleum, natural gas, and other petrochemicals
Revenue Increase US$ 378.025 billion (2011)[1]
Net income Increase US$ 16.317 billion (2011)[1]
Total assets Increase US$ 481.07 billion (2011)[1]
Total equity Increase US$ 240.53 billion (2011)[1]
Owners Government of the People’s Republic of China
Employees 1,668,072 (2011)[1]
Subsidiaries PetroChina
Website www.cnpc.com.cn/en/

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (simplified Chinese: 中国石油天然气集团公司; traditional Chinese: 中國石油天然氣集團公司; pinyin: Zhōngguó Shíyóu Tiānránqì Jítuán Gōngsī)[2] is a Chinese state-owned oil and gascorporation and the largest integrated energy company in the People’s Republic of China. Its headquarters are inDongcheng District, Beijing.[3]

CNPC is the parent of PetroChina, the fourth largest company in the world in terms of revenue as of July 2014.

Corporate structure

CNPC is the government-owned parent company of publicly listed PetroChina, which was created on November 5, 1999 as part of the restructuring of CNPC. In the restructuring, CNPC injected into PetroChina most of the assets and liabilities of CNPC on its hydrocarbon exploration and production, refining and marketing, chemicals and natural gas businesses. CNPC and PetroChina develop overseas assets through a joint venture, CNPC Exploration & Development Company (CNODC), which is 50% owned by PetroChina.

In March 2014, CNPC chairman Zhou Jiping announced that CNPC would be opening six business units to private investors.[5]


Unlike Chinese Petroleum Corporation, which was ceded to Taiwan with establishment of the Republic of China, CNPC can be traced from the beginning as a governmental department of the People’s Republic of China government. In 1949, the Chinese government formed a ‘Fuel Industry Ministry’ dedicated to the management of fuel. In January 1952 a division of the fuel ministry was formed to manage petroleum exploration and mining, called the ‘Chief Petroleum Administration Bureau’. In July 1955 a new ministry was created to replace the Fuel Industry Ministry, called the Ministry of Petroleum. From 1955 to 1969, about 4 oil fields were found in 4 areas in Qinghai, Heilongjiang (Daqing oilfield), Bohai Bay and Songliao basin. CNPC was created on 17 September 1988, when the government decided to create a state-owned company to handle all Petroleum activities in China and disbanded the Ministry of Petroleum.[citation needed]

CNPC’s international operations began in 1993. The CNPC subsidiary SAPET signed a service contract with the government of Peru to operate Block VII in theTalara Province basin.[citation needed] This was followed[when?] by an oil contract with the government of Sudan to manage Block 1/2/4 in the Muglad oilfield.[citation needed] In August 2005 it was announced that CNPC agreed to buy the Alberta-based PetroKazakhstan for US$4.18 billion, then the largest overseas acquisition by a Chinese company. The acquisition went through on 26 October 2005 after a Canadian court turned down an attempt by LUKoil to block the sale.[6]In 2006 67% of shares were sold from the parent company to PetroChina[7] In June 1997, the company bought a 60.3% stake in the Aktobe Oil Company ofKazakhstan, and in July 1997 CNPC won an oil contract for the Intercampo oilfield and East Caracoles oilfield in Venezuela.[citation needed]

In July 1998, the government restructured the company in accordance with the upstream and downstream principle of the oil industry.[8] and CNPC spun off most of its domestic assets into a separate company, PetroChina. On 5 November 2007, HK listed PetroChina was listed as an A share in the Shanghai Stock Exchange.[citation needed]

In July 2013, CNPC and Eni signed a $4.2 billion deal to acquire a 20% stake in a Mozambique offshore natural gas block.[9]

In June 2014, the “head of a key China National Petroleum subsidiary was recalled to Beijing” and fell “from public view”.[10] Replacement of China National Petroleum’s top representative in Canada was announced in July.[10]


Fuel prices at a petrol station in Dalian

CNPC holds proven reserves of 3.7 billion barrels (590,000,000 m3) of oil equivalent. In 2007, CNPC produced 54 billion cubic metres of natural gas.[11] CNPC has 30 international exploration and production projects with operations in Azerbaijan,Canada, Iran, Indonesia, Myanmar, Oman, Peru, Sudan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. The exploration projects, both domestic and overseas, are run by a wholly owned subsidiary, the Great Wall Drilling Company (GWDC).[12]

New Zealand[edit]

CNPC operates in New Zealand as CCDC NZ Drilling and has one rig, a triple stand DC rig named Rig 43. CNPC (CCDC NZ) started work over/drilling operations in the Kapuni gas fields of South Taranaki New Zealand in late 2012 for “tight gas”. The rig completed the Kapuni drilling campaign of 4 wells for STOS (Shell Todd Oil Services) in August 2013. Its next drilling project commenced August 2013 for Tag Oil with one well successfully drilled at Cheal C of a depth of just under 5,000m. The rig is currently awaiting decisions for appeals for the next stage of a drilling campaign for Tag Oil and is currently not operational during this period, with maintenance operations being carried out.


Main article: Rumaila field

In March 2009, CNPC began development of Ahdab, an oil field in Wasit Governorate holding a modest one billion barrels, becoming “the first significant foreign investors” in Iraq.[13] The project progressed despite security problems with local farmers. Dozens of farmers complained of damage to property because of work on the site and Iraqi oil officials claimed thievery from the oil site by local farmers.[13] Adhab is not expected to be a major profit center, earning the company a projected 1 percent profit, but the field was seen as an entry strategy into Iraq.

Following Adhab, CNPC obtained a production contract during the 2009/2010 Iraqi oil services contracts tender to develop the larger “Rumaila field” with joint venture partner BP, which has an estimated 17.8 billion barrels (2.83×109 m3) of oil. It is expected that crude oil production from Rumaila will expand by 10% by the end of 2010 once the BP PLC/CNPC consortium takes over development of the field in June 2010.[14][15] A contract was also awarded to a consortium led by CNPC (37.5%), including Total (18.75%) and Petronas (18.75%) for the “Halfaya field” in the south of Iraq, which has an estimated 4.1 billion barrels (650,000,000 m3) of oil.[16][17]


CNPC became increasingly involved in development of Iranian oil fields following Western sanctions that targeted the Iranian oil and gas sectors leading many European energy companies such as Shell Oil, Repsol, and etc. to shut down operations in Iran. The CNPC along with Sinopec has been involved in various projects relating to Iran oil/gas development. As of 2011, CNPC has been developing Iran’s age-old Masjed Soleyman Oil Field, the oldest oil field of the Middle East, together with Iranian counterpart NIOC in a deal worth 200 million dollars. Production from this particular oil field was expected to increase in 2011 from 2,500 barrels (400 m3) a day to 25,000 barrels (4,000 m3) after the completion of the first phase, and to 55,000,000 bbl/d (8,700,000 m3/d) after the completion of phase 2 of the project.[18]


CNPC with Indian state oil firm, ONGC created a joint venture to acquire minority stakes ranging from about 33.3% to 38% in several mature Syrian oil and natural-gas properties. The combined entity was a notable instance of cooperation between two state oil firms that regularly competed for assets around the world.[19]


CNPC is heavily involved in the development of Kazakh oil after the acquisition of Alberta-based PetroKazakhstan, a company with all operations in Kazakhstan. The company was purchased for $4.18 billion. Political resistance in Kazakhstan to the deal was placated by the sale of a minority stake in PetroKazakhstan by CNPC toKazMunaiGaz, the Kazakh state-owned oil company.


In 2006, CNPC formed an international consortium with state-run Uzbekneftegaz, LUKoil Overseas, Petronas, and Korea National Oil Corporation to explore and develop oil and gas fields in the Aral Sea.[20]

Xinjiang Pipeline[edit]

In October 2004, CNPC began construction of a pipeline from the Middle East to Xinjiang.


In December 2011, Afghanistan signed a deal with CNPC for the development of oil blocks in the Amu Darya basin, a project expected to earn billions of dollars over two decades; the deal covers drilling and a refinery in the northern provinces of Sar-e Pol and Faryab and is the first international oil production agreement entered into by the Afghan government for several decades.[21]

South Sudan[edit]

CNPC has been a major investor in South Sudan‘s oil sector.[22]


In May 2014, A 30-year deal between Russia‘s Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which was 10 years in the making was estimated worth $400 billion. The agreement was signed at a summit in Shanghai and is expected to deliver some 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year, starting around 2018, to China‘s burgeoning economy.[23]

Accidents and incidents[edit]

2003 Gas Leak in Chongqing[edit]

On 23 December 2003, a gas blowout occurred at the Luojia No. 16H gas well. 243 people died, 2,142 were hospitalised.[24]

Jilin Chemical Plant[edit]

In 2005, there were explosions at a CNPC owned petrochemical plant causing six deaths, a mass evacuation, and a massive oil spill over the Songhua River.

Gas Pipeline Explosion in Sichuan[edit]

A gas pipeline exploded on 20 January 2006 in Sichuan. Reportedly, nine were killed and nearly 40 injured.[25]

2006 Gas Leak in Chongqing[edit]

A leak occurred on 25 March 2006 in the Luojia No. 2 gas well.[24] The third attempt six days after the blowout succeeded; 15,000 were evacuated.[26]

Chishui River diesel spill[edit]

In 2009 a CNPC pipeline burst, spilling 150 m3 (5,300 cu ft) of diesel oil into the Chishui River in Shaanxi province.[27]

Xingang Port oil spill[edit]

In July 2010, two pipelines exploded at an oil storage depot belonging to China National Petroleum Corp near Dalian’s Xingang Harbour in Liaoning province which spilled an estimated 1,500 tonnes of crude into the sea. The worst of the spill initially covered 180 km2 (69 sq mi).[28][29]

Suspension of operations in Chad[edit]

The operations of a CNPC subsidiary in Chad were entirely suspended in August 2013 by the country’s government after it violated environmental standards while drilling for crude oil in the south of the country.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Not to be confused with Malaysian gas company Petronas.
Petróleo Brasileiro S.A.
Type Sociedade Anônima
Traded as
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 3 October 1953 (61 years)
Headquarters Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
Area served Worldwide
Key people Maria das Graças Foster (CEO)[1][2]
Almir Guilherme Barbassa (CFO)
Products Petroleum and its derivatives,natural gas, lubricant,petrochemical, fertilizer, biofuel
Revenue Increase US$ 130.0 billion (2013)[3]
Net income Increase US$ 10.0 billion (2013)[3]
Owners Brazilian Government (64 percent)[4]
Employees 80,497 (2010)[3]
Subsidiaries Petrobras Distribuidora, Transpetro,Petrobras Argentina, Braskemamong others.[5]
Website www.petrobras.com/en

Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. or Petrobras (Portuguese pronunciation: [ˌpɛtɾoˈbɾas]) is a semi-public[6] Brazilianmultinational energy corporation headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is the largest company in the Southern Hemisphere by market capitalization and the largest in Latin America measured by 2011 revenues.[7][8][9]

Petrobras was founded in 1953. While the company ceased to be Brazil’s legal monopolist in the oil industry in 1997, it remains a significant oil producer, with output of more than 2 million barrels (320,000 m3) of oil equivalent per day. The company owns oil refineries, oil tankers, and is a major distributor of oil products. Petrobras is a world leader in development of advanced technology from deep-water and ultra-deep water oil production.[10][11]

In September 2010, Petrobras conducted the largest share sale in history, when US$72.8 billion worth of shares in the company were sold on the BM&F Bovespa stock exchange.[12][13] Upon the sale, Petrobras immediately became the fourth-largest company in the world measured by market capitalisation.[13][14][


Petrobras headquarters in downtown Rio de Janeiro.

Petrobras controls significant oil and energy assets in 18 countries in Africa, North America, South America, Europe, and Asia. These holdings as well as properties in Brazil give it total assets of $137.3 billion (2012). Petrobras is Latin America’s largest company with 2008 sales of $118.3 billion, according to a ranking from Latin Business Chronicle over Latin America’s Top 500 Companies. The Brazilian government directly owns 54 percent of Petrobras’ common shares with voting rights, while the Brazilian Development Bank and Brazil’s Sovereign Wealth Fund (Fundo Soberano) each control 5 percent, bringing the State’s direct and indirect ownership to 64 percent.[16] The privately held shares are traded on BM&F Bovespa, where they are part of the Ibovespa index.

Petrobras began processing oil shale in 1953, developing Petrosix technology for extracting oil from oil shale. An industrial size retort began processing shale in the 1990s.[17] In 2006, Petrobras claimed that this industrial retort had a design capacity to process 260 tonnes/hour of oil shale.[18] Petrobras operated the world’s largest oil platform — the Petrobras 36 Oil Platform – until an explosion on 15 March 2001 led to its sinking on 20 March 2001. P-36 was replaced by FPSO-Brasil. In 2007, Petrobras inaugurated the Petrobras 52 Oil Platform. The 52 is the biggest Brazilian oil platform and third in the world.[19]

Petrobras is also recognized as the largest sponsor of arts, culture, and environmental protection in Brazil. Among the environmental initiatives, Petrobras is the main supporter of whale conservation and research through the Brazilian Right Whale Project[20] and the Instituto Baleia Jubarte (Brazilian Humpback Whale Institute).[21] Petrobras has been a sponsor of the Williams Formula-1 team. The company employs the H-Bio process to produce biodiesel.[22]

According to Forbes, as of April 2011, Petrobras is the 8th largest company in the world.[23]


Petrobras standard model for its land oil pump, popularly known as Wooden Horse (Cavalo de Pau in Portuguese) in UFRN, Natal, Brazil.

Skyscraper hosting Petrobras’ offices in Paulista Avenue, São Paulo.

Petrobras was created in 1953 during the government of Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas, with the support of both the ruling parties and the opposition alike in Congress. However, with the creation of a new government the following year, opposition from the government emerged to Petrobras.

Petrobras commenced its activities with the collection it inherited from the old National Oil Council (pt) (Conselho Nacional do Petróleo, CNP), which, however, preserved its inspection function for the sector.

The oil exploration and production operations, as well as the remaining activities connected to the oil, natural gas, and derivative sector, except for wholesale distribution and retail via service stations, were a monopoly Petrobras held from 1954 to 1997. Early on, in 1961, it was hurt by a pessimistic government report concerning oil prospects in Brazil. Two years after the report’s release, Petrobras created its research center Cenpes.

Unfortunately, only ten years later, the company’s period of growth was halted by the 1973 oil crisis. The entire country was affected, and the “Brazilian miracle”, a period of rapid growth in the economy ended. Petrobras itself nearly went bankrupt. But, then, a year later, the company discovered an oil field in Bacia de Campos. This discovery boosted its finances and helped it restructure nationwide. In 1975, Petrobras signed contracts partnering with private oil contracts concerning exploration for more oilfields in Brazil. The company was also affected by the 1979 energy crisis, but not as bad as in 1973.

During this period, Petrobras became the leader in derivative marketing in Brazil, and, thanks to the company’s performance, it was awarded the Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) in 1992, one which it was granted again in 2001.[24]

After 40 years of exploration, production, refining, and transportation of Brazil’s oil, Petrobras started to compete with other foreign and domestic companies in 1997 when the government approved Law N.9.478. This law broke Petrobras’s monopoly and allowed for competitors to develop Brazil’s oilfields. The Brazilian government also created the National Petroleum Agency (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, ANP), responsible for the regulation and supervision of activities in the petroleum industry, and the National Council of Energy Policies, a public agency responsible for the development of public energy policy. That same year, Petrobras reached the mark of producing 1 million barrels (160,000 m3) per day. The company also executed agreements with other Latin American governments and began operations outside of Brazilian domains.

In 2000, Petrobras achieved a world record for oil exploration in deep waters. The exploration reached a depth of 1,877 metres (6,158 ft) below sea level. The following year, an accident at the P-36 Platform, the world’s largest oil platform, caused it sink on March 20. Petrobras lost about 1,500 tons of oil from this one accident alone.

In 2003, commemorating its 50 years, Petrobras doubled its daily production of oil and natural gas, surpassing the mark of 2 million barrels (320,000 m3). That same year, it acquired the Argentine company Perez Companc Energía (PECOM Energía S.A.). This acquisition also included bases in Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay. Two years later, on December 19, 2005, Petrobras announced a contract with the Japanese Nippon Alcohol Hanbai to launch a joint-venture. The project, namedBrazil-Japan Ethanol, would import ethanol from Brazil, in a bid to develop an ethanol market in Japan.

On April 21, 2006, the company started production on the P-50 oil platform, in the Albacora East Field at Campos Basin, which gave Brazil self-sufficiency in oil production.[25] The following year, the Tupi oil field in the Santos Basin was discovered. This field could possibly be the world’s largest. In 2008, Petrobras announced the discovery of the Jupiter field, off the coast of Rio de Janeiro.

The following year, Petrobras discovered what is possibly the world’s third largest oil field in the State of São Paulo. However, no evidence has been shown for this so far. In 2009, Petrobras announced a market capitalization plan to finance its future investments in ultra-deep oil exploration. The share offering in the BM&F Bovespa Stock Exchange took place in September 2010, becoming the largest market capitalization in history, with R$ 120,4 billion (US$69,97 billion) in shares issued.[26] In 2009, it also acquired Esso‘s Chilean business. Petrobras also finalized a $10 billion loan from China in return for a ten years long supply of oil (150,000 barrels (24,000 m3) a day the first year, 200,000 barrels (32,000 m3) a day the nine others).[27]

Bolivian controversy[edit]

On May 1, 2006, Bolivia’s president Evo Morales announced the nationalization of all gas and oil fields in the country. Evo Morales ordered the occupation of all fields by the Bolivian Army. Petrobras was heavily affected by the nationalization. At the time, the company’s Bolivian subsidiary had great importance in the country’s economy:[28]

  • Petrobras represented 24 percent of the Bolivian industrial taxes, 18 percent of the country’s GDP and 20 percent of the foreign investments.
  • The company operated in 46 percent of the oil reserves in Bolivia and was responsible for 75 percent of the country’s gas exports to Brazil.
  • The company invested, between 1994 and 2005, US$1.5 billion in the Bolivian economy.

The nationalization strained the relationship between Petrobras and the Bolivian government. On October 28, 2006, after a long negotiation, Petrobras and Bolivia signed an agreement, whereby the company would take 18 percent of the profits, and the Bolivian government would take the remainder.[29]

U.S spying allegations

It emerged in September 2013 that the US government had been allegedly spying on Petrobras after Organizações Globo reported the claims on national television. The information was reportedly provided by US journalist Glenn Greenwald.[30] Petrobras announced that it was investing R$21 billion over five years to improve its data security.[31]


Petrobras’ most important assets are petroleum reserves in Brazil. Its oil field in the Campos Basin accounts more than 80 percent of the Brazilian oil production. The company also works on developing “green energy”, including biodiesel fuel. Petrobras recently opened its business to the ethanol fuel, facing great competition against the North American ethanol. However, investment in biofuels will represent only 1 percent of the company’s profit between 2008 and 2012.[32]

Petrobras works extensively with foreign acquisitions too, buying and controlling some of the most important energy companies in South America and exploring huge deep-water fields of West Africa and the Gulf of Mexico. Petrobras is known for its technology in deep-water exploration. The Tupi field, which could be the world’s third largest oil field (although data is still unverified), is a deep-water discovery, located in the pre-salt layer.[clarification needed]

The company began to increase profits from 2002, with the government’s heavy investments. In the first quarter of 2008, Petrobras reached the market value of US$295.6 billion, surpassing companies such as Microsoft, BP, and Chevron-Texaco, but behind ExxonMobil and General Electric. Petrobras’ market value is also larger than Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, making it the sixth largest company by market value in the world.[33]

Petrobras is involved in the following areas of business

Petrobras’ financial growth between 2002 and 2006

  • Domestic sales: Domestic sales represent the majority of the company’s profit and include the extraction and distribution of oil, natural gas, derivatives, electricity and petrochemical products;
  • Export: The main exports are not of oil extraction itself, but are related to mechanic technologies. However, it is planned that the company starts to export oil in large quantities when it begins to explore the Jupiter and the Tupi fields (see “List of recent oil field discoveries”);
  • Foreign exchange gains: The company imports natural gas from other South American countries, mostly from Bolivia. According to the Brazilian group National Petroleum Agency, Petrobras owns Brazil’s largest and most important gas pipe network, having a near monopoly of the natural gas marketed in the country.


  • Rising prices: the company profited from rising oil prices in 2007-2008.
  • Increasing demand: oil demand has increased drastically in the emergent countries, for which Petrobras exports its technologies. The BRIC countries’ (Brazil itself, Russia, India and China) growth explains this huge demand. The Brazilian self-sufficiency in Petroleum (as of May 2006) allowed the company to export small quantities of oil.
  • Political issues: despite of being nearly half privately owned, the majority of shares belong to the Brazilian government, which gives it control of the company’s finances and operations. The recent growth of the company is explained by political stability. Since 1997 the Brazilian oil market was opened to foreign investments, but Petrobras continues to be the largest oil company in the country, enjoying a near monopoly.

Oil reserves

At the 20th National Forum, it was revealed that Petrobras, with 11.7 billion barrels (1.86×109 m3) of oil, has the fourth biggest oil reserves among petrochemical companies with publicly traded shares. The figure does not include the recent discoveries in the mega-fields of Tupi, Jupiter, Carioca and Bem-te-vi.[34]


The discovery of large reserves in Santos Basin increased its stock price by about 19 percent in one day. Petrobras is considered the most reliable Blue Chip of the Bovespa Stock Exchange.[citation needed] While the North American Crisis of 2007 decreased the value of the stocks of a great majority of STOCK MARKETS in the world, Petrobras helped hold the Bovespa’s activities steady, making it one of the least affected stock exchanges in the world by the crisis.[citation needed]

Investment grade

On 30 April 2008, Brazil received an “investment grade” rating from Standard & Poor’s, given to countries with stable and consistent growing economy. According toStandard & Poor’s, Brazil jumped from a BB+ grade to a BBB-, the minimum level any country needs to reach to receive the grade. Petrobras played a big part in the country’s growth, and the high rating would be useful in attracting foreign investments.[citation needed]

Investors often criticize the company for not increasing gasoline prices in Brazil, in spite of increasing prices in the international market. The company is having problems adapting its business to the ethanol market.[citation needed]


After a great advance on its stock shares (reaching 52.30 Brazilian real (R$) in Ibovespa) in May 2008,[citation needed] Petrobras faced a devaluation in the following month, its shares decreasing to R$43.90 on 19 June 2008.[35][36][37] The most probable explanation for the great fall was the lack of information about the mega-fields recently discovered by the company.[citation needed] The great instability in Wall Street‘s markets also had great weight in those results.

Petrobras’ fall also led to bad results on the entire BM&F Bovespa, as Petrobras and Vale accounted for more than 25% of BM&F Bovespa‘s trade value,[38] the devaluation of those companies’ shares led it to lose more than 6,000 points in just 25 days.

However, with the continuous decrease of oil prices, Petrobras’ stock shares fell to R$33,00 on 14 August 2008. Its market cap presented the biggest loss of value in the Americas,[citation needed] with US$93 billion (13 August 2008).

List of recent oil field discoveries

Oil platform P-51, the first 100-percent Brazilian oil platform

Petrobras doubled its success rate at drilling new wells, 2002–5.[39]

Petrobras latest Oil Discoveries
Date Basin Field API gravity
April 18, 2006 Espirito Santo Golfinho 38[40]
July 11, 2006 Santos Tupi 30[41]
March 2, 2007 Campos Caxareu 30[42]
June 8, 2007 Espirito Santo Pirambu 29[43]
September 5, 2007 Santos Tupi 27[44]
September 10, 2007 Campos Xerelete 17[45]
September 20, 2007 Santos Tupi Sul 28[46]
December 21, 2007 Santos Caramba 27[47]
January 21, 2008 Santos Jupiter Huge Gas field[48]
May 21, 2008 Santos Bem-Te-Vi 36[49]
May 29, 2008 Santos Tiro 36[49]
June 12, 2008 Santos Guará 28[50]
July 14, 2008 Espirito Santo Golfinho 27[51]
August 20, 2008 Campos Aruanã 28[52]
September 26, 2008 Santos Sidon 36[53]
November 21, 2008 Espirito Santo Jubarte 30[54]
November 25, 2008 Jequitinhonha BM-J-3 ?[55]
January 26, 2009 Santos Piracucá ?[56]
April 8, 2009 Santos Corcovado-1 ?[57]
November 16, 2009 Campos Marimbá 29[58]


The company’s most important discoveries started at the end of 2007, when the first mega-field, named Tupi, was found at a depth of 5,000 meters below the sea level, the first discovery of the company in the pre-salt layer. The second discovery was announced on January 21, 2008: the new mega-field was named Jupiterand had the same size as Tupi.[59] The company revealed no more information about the field, forcing many investors to regard those facts as an “industrial secret”.

On May 21, 2008, the company announced the discovery of a third oil megafield,[60] located 250 km distant from the state of São Paulo, at a depth between 6000 and 6300 meters below sea level. The discovery was made by a consortium formed by Petrobras (66 percent of participation), Shell (20 percent) and Galp Energia(14 percent). The field’s oil reserves had an API gravity between 25 and 28.


According to the Brazilian economy website InfoMoney.com, North American stock companies are considering the oil mega-field discoveries suspicious. On May 24, 2008, the company’s shares fell 4 percent because of the scarce information given by Petrobras about the fields.[61]

An article written by Roberto Altenhofen Pires Pereira for InfoMoney.com said (translated from Portuguese):

Despite the incredible advance of 14 percent in Petrobras stock shares after the discovery of Tupi and Jupiter fields, the North American answer for the shares was the worst possible. Petrobras’ ADR’s — American Depositary Receipts — fell more than 4 percent in New York. It seems that the market is interpreting the discovery with mistrust. (…) Everyone knows that the potential of the fields is huge, but that stills being only a “potential”. No concrete information about the fields’ capacity has been released at any time. These are only expectations, which still face a great technological challenge to the exploration of so deep deposits, which may even make this exploration unfeasible.


By the end of 2003, Petrobras subscribed to the United Nations Global Compact, a voluntary agreement which encompasses a set of principles regarding human rights, working conditions and the environment. The company’s growth since 2006 has made Petrobras the most profitable company in the Brazilian economy, and gave it great importance worldwide, being recognized as the eighth biggest oil exploring company in the world.[63] Since 2006 Petrobras has been listed in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, an important reference index for environmentally and socially responsible investors. On February 25, 2008, the Spanish consultancy firmManagement and Excellence acknowledged Petrobras as the world’s most sustainable oil company.[64]

The civil society named Transparency International, which fights against global corruption, published a list on April 28, 2008 containing the names of 42 companies with high transparency levels, in which Petrobras was included.[65]

In May 2008, World Trademark Review magazine awarded[66] the Petrobras trademark team with an Industry Award for Latin American Team of the Year, a category in which Petrobras competed with Coca-Cola, Pepsico, and Procter and Gamble.[67]

Major oil spills – 1975 to 2001[68]
Date Volume (litres) Location
March 1975 6 million Guanabara Bay
October 1983 1.5 – 3 million Bertioga
February 1984 700,000 Cubatão
August 1989 690,000 São Sebastião
January 1994 350,000 – 400,000 Campos Basin
May 1994 2.7 – 3.1 million São Sebastião
March 1997 600,000 – 2.8 Guanabara Bay
October 1998 1 – 1.5 million São José dos Campos
January 2000 1.3 million Guanabara Bay
March 2000 18,000 Tramandaí
March 2000 7,250 São Sebastião
July 2000 4 million Barigui Iguaçu Rivers
August 2000 1,800 Rio Grande de Norte
August 2000 4,000 Angra dos Reis
November 2000 86,000 São Sebastião
March 2001 1.4 million Campos Basin

Global operations

Petrobras’ global oil exploration, as shown in December 2006 with a total of 243,292 BOED

Refinery in Cochabamba, Bolivia

Petrobras global operations extends over 27 countries (including Brazil). Those operations are more related to diplomatic trades than oil exploration, although the company has important fields in India, Turkey, Angola and Nigeria. The most important countries for commercial agreements are Japan, United Kingdom and China. The complete map can be seen in Petrobras official link Petrobras Worldwide.

International Associations

Petrobras is a member of the following international associations:

New Zealand

In June 2010, Petrobras was granted a five-year permit for exploration of the Raukumara Basin, off the East Cape of New Zealand.[69] April 2011 and the Orient Explorer began surveying off the east coast of New Zealand’s North Island. Greenpeace protestors, in opposition to the deal between the New Zealand government and Petrobras, attempted to halt the work by swimming in front of the survey ship.[70] Local Maori[71] felt the risk to the local waters and fish stocks, should oil be found and drilling go ahead, was too high a price and that better consultation with local people was required.[72] In 2012 Petrobras returned their exploration licences amidst their “annus horribilis“.[71]

Petrobras in popular culture

  • Petrobras maintains a high budget to fund Brazil’s cultural production, such as films, theatre plays and scholarly works. It is the largest sponsor of culture in Brazil since the 1990s.[73]
  • In the Speed Racer live-action movie, one of the cars featured is the “Green Energy”, a biodiesel fueled racing car sponsored by Petrobras.
  • Petrobras is the main sponsor of the Brazilian Série A.
  • Petrobras was a secondary sponsor for the AT&T WilliamsF1 Team from 1998 to 2008 and has resigned with Williams F1 from 2014 onwards.
  • Petrobras was a sponsor for Flamengo in Brazil from 1984 to 2009.
  • The sauropod dinosaur Petrobrasaurus is named after this company.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For the Byzantine nobleman and general, see Petronas (general).
Not to be confused with the Brazilian oil company Petrobras.

, short for Petroliam Nasional Berhad, is a Malaysian oil and gas company that was founded on 17 August 1974. Wholly owned by the Government of Malaysia, the corporation is vested with the entire oil and gas resources in Malaysia and is entrusted with the responsibility of developing and adding value to these resources. PETRONAS is ranked among Fortune Global 500‘s largest corporations in the world. Fortune ranks PETRONAS as the 75th largest company in the world in 2013. It also ranks PETRONAS as the 12th most profitable company in the world and the most profitable in Asia.[2][3][4]

Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS)
ڤيتروليام ناسيونل برحد
Type Government-owned corporation
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 17 August 1974
Headquarters Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Area served Malaysia
Key people Tan Sri Shamsul Azhar Bin Abbas, Group CEO and President
Products Petroleum, natural gas,petrochemicals
Services Shipping services
Revenue Increase US$100.744 billion (2014)[1]
Net income Increase US$21.91 billion (2012)
Total assets Increase US$161.472 billion (2014)[1]
Total equity Increase US$89.29 billion (2012)
Owners Malaysian Government
Employees 39,236 (2010)
Website www.petronas.com.my

Since its incorporation, PETRONAS has grown to be an integrated international oil and gas company with business interests in 35 countries. As of the end of March 2005, the PETRONAS Group comprised 103 wholly owned subsidiaries, 19 partly owned outfits and 57 associated companies. Together, these companies make the PETRONAS Group, which is involved in various oil and gas based activities. The Financial Times has identified PETRONAS as one of the “new seven sisters“:[5] the most influential and mainly state-owned national oil and gas companies from countries outside the OECD.

The group is engaged in a wide spectrum of petroleum activities, including upstream exploration and production of oil and gas to downstream oil refining; marketing and distribution of petroleum products; trading; gas processing andliquefaction; gas transmission pipeline network operations; marketing of liquefied natural gas; petrochemicalmanufacturing and marketing; shipping; automotive engineering; and property investment.

PETRONAS provides a substantial source of income for the Malaysian government, with 45% of the government’s budget dependent on PETRONAS’ dividend, moreover in 2011 government real balance has 5 percent deficit of Gross Domestic Product.[6]

The company is headquartered at the Petronas Towers which was officially opened on Malaysia’s 42nd National Day, 31 August 1998 – in the corporation’s 24th Anniversary year.


PETRONAS was not the first company to extract oil or gas in Malaysia. It was Royal Dutch Shell that began the oil exploration in Sarawak, then under the White Rajahs, at the end of the 19th century. In 1910, the first oil well was drilled in Miri, Sarawak. This became the first oil producing well known as the Grand Old Lady. Shell was still the only oil company in the area in 1963, when the Federation of Malaya, having achieved independence from Britain six years before, united with Sarawak and Sabah, both on the island of Borneo, and became Malaysia. The authorities in the two new states retained their links with Royal Dutch Shell, which brought Malaysia’s first offshore oil field onstream in 1968.

Meanwhile, the federal government turned to Esso, Continental Oil, and Mobil, licensing exploration off the state of Terengganu, in the Malay Peninsula, the most populous region and the focus of federal power. By 1974, however, only Esso was still in the area. It made its first discoveries of natural gas in that year and then rapidly made Terengganu a bigger producer of oil than either Sarawak or Sabah. By 1974, Malaysia’s output of crude oil stood at about 81,000 barrels per day (12,900 m3/d).

Setting up a state oil and gas company: 1970s

Several factors converged in the early 1970s to prompt the Malaysian government into setting up a state oil and gas company, as first proposed in its Five Year Plan published in 1971. Former Chief Minister of Sarawak, Tun Abdul Rahman Ya’kub was one of the people who proposed the idea of Malaysia setting up their own oil company. These were years in which power in the world oil industry began to shift away from the majors, which then controlled more than 90% of the oil trade, toward the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as well as a proliferation of new private and state companies joining in the search for reserves. By 1985, the majors, reduced in number from seven to five, were producing less than 20% of the world total. It seemed that Malaysia would either have to join the trend or continue to leave its oil and gas entirely to Royal Dutch/Shell and Esso, multinational corporations necessarily attuned to the requirements of their directors and shareholders, rather than to the priorities the government of a developing country might seek to realise.

Further, an agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia, signed in 1969, had settled doubts and disputes about each country’s claims over territorial waters and offshore resources at a time when both were heavily indebted to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments and banks as well as to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Setting up a state oil and gas company, through which the government could get international capital but avoid tangling with foreign oil companies or governments, had worked for Indonesia: why not for Malaysia as well? The oil crisis of 1973–74 made the government even more aware of Malaysia’s dependence on foreign oil and foreign capital in general.

Another factor in the decision was that the technology had recently been developed for extensive exploration and drilling offshore. The local geography included a combination of broad basins of sedimentary rock with calm and shallow waters around the Sunda Shelf, making exploration for gas and oil relatively easier and more successful than in most areas of the world. Malaysian crude turned out to be mostly high quality with low sulphur content.

A final and crucial factor in the creation of PETRONAS, and its continuation in much the same form since, has been the political stability of Malaysia. Since the restoration of parliament in 1971, the country has been ruled by the National Front (Barisan Nasional), the heirs to the Alliance Party which had been dominant from 1957 to 1969 and the originators in 1971 of the New Economic Policy, which was designed to improve the economic position of Bumiputras—native Malays and other natives in Sabah and Sarawak—relative to Chinese and Indian Malaysians and to foreign corporations. The difficulties this policy has caused for foreign companies and investors are outweighed by the benefits they believe they gain from Malaysia’s political stability.

The Malaysian government chose to create a state company, rather than using taxes, production limits, leasing, or other familiar instruments of supervision. The government wanted, and needed, the co-operation of the majors but also sought to assert national rights over the use of the country’s resources. A state company, having both supervisory powers over the majors and production activities of its own, was a workable compromise between allowing the majors full rein and excluding them, along with their capital and expertise, altogether.

PETRONAS was established in August 1974 and operates under the terms of the Petroleum Development Act passed in October 1974. It was modelled onPertamina, the Indonesian state oil and gas company founded in 1971 in succession to Permina, which had been set up in 1958. According to the 1971 plan, PETRONAS’ goals would be to safeguard national sovereignty over oil and gas reserves, to plan for both present and future national need for oil and gas, to take part in distributing and marketing petroleum and petrochemical products at reasonable prices, to encourage provision of plant, equipment, and services by Malaysian companies, to produce nitrogenous fertilizers, and to spread the benefits of the petroleum industry throughout the nation.

On 6 September 1974, Malaysia’s then prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, announced the appointment of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah as chairman and chief executive of PETRONAS. Tun Razak said: “From among the new blood, I intended to bring Tengku Razaleigh into the Cabinet. However, I have an important job for him, a job as important as that of a Cabinet Minister. I have decided to appoint him as chairman and chief executive of PETRONAS, which is equivalent to being a Cabinet Minister.”.[7] Subsequently, Razaleigh had to relinquish his job as Chairman of PERNAS which he held from 1970, but retained the chairmanship of Bank Bumiputra.

Having created PETRONAS, the government had to choose what forms its dealings with private oil companies would take. Starting with its legal monopoly on oil and gas activities and resources, it had several options: it could simply award concessions without taking part in production, management, or profits; it could try offering services at the supply end; or it could make contracts to cover profit-sharing, production-sharing, joint ventures—sharing both profits and costs—or all stages of the process, under “carried-interest” contracts. PETRONAS’ first move was to negotiate the replacement of the leases granted to Royal Dutch/Shell on Borneo and to Esso in THE PENINSULA with production-sharing contracts, which have been the favoured instrument, alongside joint ventures, ever since. These first contracts came into effect in 1976. Allowing for royalties to both federal and state governments, and for cost recovery arrangements, they laid down that the remainder would go 70% to PETRONAS and 30% to the foreign company. Esso began oil production in two offshore fields in 1978, exporting its share of the supply, unlike PETRONAS, whose share was consumed within the country.

PETRONAS went downstream for the first time in 1976, when it was chosen by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to begin construction on the second ASEAN joint industrial project, a urea plant. The subsidiary, Asean Bintulu Fertilizer (ABF), is based in Sarawak and now exports ammonia and urea all over the world.

Also in 1976, Malaysia became a net exporter of oil, but exports were at such a low level as to make the country ineligible to join OPEC. This situation benefited Malaysia, and PETRONAS, by allowing the company a degree of commercial and political flexibility and reinforcing PETRONAS’ chief purpose, Malaysian self-reliance.

PETRONAS supervised its foreign partners’ oil activities, taking no direct role in production until 1978, when the government saw to the creation of a subsidiary for oil exploration and production, PETRONAS Carigali. It began its work in an oil field off THE PENINSULA. PETRONAS retained its supervisory powers over all oil and gas ventures, particularly on issues of health and safety and environmental control.

Developing natural gas: the late 1970s to the mid-1980s

The government was determined to develop Malaysia’s natural gas as well as its oil Shipping Company (MISC), of which it owned 61%. These were to take LNG exports out of Malaysia, save the cost of hiring foreign tankers, and expand the country’s fleet under its own control—in contrast to cargo shipping, which was controlled by international conferences. Shell BV, the Royal Dutch/Shell subsidiary that was building the LNG plant off Sarawak with Japanese and Asian Development Bank aid, accepted production sharing with PETRONAS but baulked at sharing equity, transport management, or refining. Negotiations went on, pushing commencement further and further back, until 1977, when PETRONAS and the government, faced with the costs of maintaining the tankers between delivery and first use, surrendered management rights—leading to a repeal of part of the Petroleum Development Act—and settled for PETRONAS’ taking 60% of equity in the new company Malaysia LNG. The Sarawak state government took 5%, and the other 35% was divided equally between Shell BV and the Mitsubishi Corporation. Production of LNG in Sarawak at last began in 1983.

After negotiations lasting from 1977 to 1982, PETRONAS had concluded contracts with Tokyo Electric Power and Tokyo Gas for the sale and delivery of LNG through to the year 2003. Malaysia LNG was to send almost the entire output of its Bintulu gas fields to Japan, under these contracts and another one, signed in 1990, to supply Saibu Gas of Fukuoka, in southwestern Japan, for 20 years from 1993.

When in 1982 PETRONAS Carigali formed an exploration and production company with Société National Elf Aquitaine of France, it allowed Elf better terms for recovering costs than it had offered in earlier ventures. This development came against the background of the government’s imposition of a depletion policy on PETRONAS, Royal Dutch Shell, and Esso in trying to postpone the exhaustion of oil reserves. These were then estimated to be about 2.84 billion barrels (452,000,000 m3), and it was officially predicted that by the late 1980s Malaysia would be a net oil importer once again. By 1980, oil and gas already represented 24% of Malaysian exports, and the government decided to impose a tax on these exports at a 25% rate. The new policy and the new tax combined to cause Malaysia’s output and exports of crude oil to fall in 1981 for the first time since PETRONAS was established. Output rose again, beyond its 1980 level, in the following year, but exports took until 1984 to surpass their 1980 level.

However, the depletion policy was being undermined by external circumstances. Through the early 1980s, a worldwide oil glut, which OPEC proved unable to control, forced the Malaysian government to increase production to offset deterioration in its balance of increased payments to a deficit of $1 billion. It became clear that this could only be sustained by relaxing the conditions for joint ventures between PETRONAS and the major oil companies. In 1982, the PETRONAS–government share, which had risen to 80%, was cut to 70%, and taxes on company income were also cut.

PETRONAS went into refining and distribution in 1983. It initiated the construction of refineries at Malacca and at Kerteh to reduce its dependence on Royal Dutch/Shell’s two refineries at Port Dickson and Esso’s refinery in Sarawak. These two majors, and other foreign companies, already covered much of the domestic retail market, but the new subsidiary PETRONAS Dagangan was given the initial advantage of preference in the location of its stations. By 1990, 252 service stations carried the PETRONAS brand, all but 20 on a franchise basis, and another 50 were planned. Some were set up on grounds of social benefit rather than of strict commercial calculation.

As production from Royal Dutch/Shell and Esso’s existing fields moved nearer depletion, the companies sought new fields and new contracts. In 1985, the government and PETRONAS revised the standard production-sharing contract, increasing the rate of recovery of capital costs from 30% to 50% of gross production in the case of oil and from 35% to 60% in the case of natural gas, abolishing signature, discovery, and production bonus payments and increasing the foreign partners’ share of the profits. At first the drastic fall in oil prices during 1986, which cut Malaysia’s income from exported oil by more than a third even though the volume of exports rose by 16%, discouraged interest in the new arrangements, but by 1989 PETRONAS had signed 22 new contracts with 31 companies from 11 countries. However, the contract period was still restricted to five years—compared, such as, with the 35-year contracts available in neighbouring Singapore—and there was still a 25% levy on exported crude oil, a measure that was intended to promote the domestic refining industry. These conditions, cited as disincentives to foreign investment, were eventually relaxed over the next several years.

The government and PETRONAS aimed to encourage the replacement of fast-depleting oil within Malaysia itself and simultaneously to foster heavy industries which could help reduce the country’s overwhelming dependence on exporting its natural resources. In 1980, petroleum products accounted for 88% of the country’s commercial consumption of energy, the rest being provided from hydroelectric plants in Sarawak, too far away from the main population centres to become a major alternative. Five years later, gas accounted for 17%, hydroelectricity for 19%, coal for 2%, and petroleum products for 62% of such consumption, and about half of each year’s gas output was being consumed in Malaysia.

The PETRONAS venture responsible for this shift in fuel use, and—along with Malaysia LNG—for Malaysia’s becoming the third largest producer of LNG in the world, was the Peninsular Gas Utilization Project (Projek Penggunaan Gas Semenanjung), the aim of which was to supply gas to every part of THE PENINSULA. Its first stage was completed in 1985, following the success of smaller gasification projects in the states of Sarawak and Sabah, and involved the extraction of gas from three fields in the Natuna Sea, between the Peninsula and the island of Borneo; its processing in a plant at Kertih on the Peninsula’s east coast; and its distribution to the state of Terengganu by pipeline and abroad via an export terminal.

PETRONAS’ least happy venture was its ownership of the Bank Bumiputra, the second-largest, but least-profitable, of the commercial banks incorporated in Malaysia. PETRONAS spent more than MYR3.5 billion over five years trying to rescue the bank from the impact of the bad loans it had made, starting with its support of the Carrian property group of Hong Kong, which collapsed in 1985, taking the bank’s share capital down with it. In 1991, PETRONAS sold the bank back to another state company, Minister of Finance Inc., and announced its intention to concentrate on oil, gas, and associated activities in future.

Just as PETRONAS was disposing of this liability, the crisis caused by the Iraqi regime’s invasion of Kuwait culminated in military action against Iraq on behalf of the United Nations. PETRONAS had already raised Malaysia’s oil production rate from 605,000 to 650,000 barrels per day (103,000 m3/d) in late 1990 as the crisis unfolded. This move only reinforced the company’s awareness of the need to vary its policies, since, with known reserves of 2.94 billion barrels (467,000,000 m3), and assuming no new major finds of oil, Malaysia risked seeing output decline to 350,000 barrels per day (56,000 m3/d) in 2000 and running down to depletion within another five years. This was exacerbated by the possibility that Southeast Asia in general would enjoy rapid economic growth in the 1990s, so that demand for oil there would rise twice as fast as demand in the relatively more sluggish, more mature economies of North America and Europe. The Malaysian government, and its state oil and gas company, was forced to decide what mixture of policies to adopt in response.

Battling oil depletion: the late 1980s

Fortunately for Malaysia, exploration was by no means at an end and could yet produce more reserves. The Seligi field, which came onstream at the end of 1988 and was developed by Esso Production Malaysia, was one of the richest oilfields so far found in Malaysia waters, and further concessions to the majors would encourage exploration of the deeper waters around Malaysia, where unknown reserves could be discovered. Meanwhile, computerised seismography made it both feasible and commercially justifiable to re-explore fields which had been abandoned, or were assumed to be unproductive, over the past century. In 1990, PETRONAS invited foreign companies to re-explore parts of the sea off Sabah and Sarawak on the basis of new surveys using up-to-date techniques.

Another way to postpone depletion was to develop sources of oil, and of its substitute, natural gas, outside Malaysia. Late in 1989, the governments of Vietnam andMyanmar (Burma) invited PETRONAS Carigali to take part in joint ventures to explore for oil in their coastal waters. In 1990, a new unit, PETRONAS Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd, was created to take up a 15% interest in a field in Myanmar’s waters being explored by Idemitsu Myanmar Oil Exploration Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of the Japanese firm Idemitsu Oil Development Co. Ltd., in a production sharing arrangement with Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise. Thus began PETRONAS’ first oil exploration outside Malaysia. In May 1990, the governments of Malaysia and Thailand settled a long-running dispute over their respective rights to an area of 7,300 square kilometres in the Gulf of Thailand by setting up a joint administrative authority for the area and encouraging a joint oil exploration project by PETRONAS, thePetroleum Authority of Thailand, and the US company Triton Oil. In a separate deal, in October 1990, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand arranged with PETRONAS to study the feasibility of transferring natural gas from this jointly administered area, through Malaysia to Thailand, by way of an extension of the pipelines laid for the third stage of the Peninsular Gas Utilization Project.

That project was on course to becoming a major element in the postponement of oil depletion. Contracts for line pipes for the second stage of the project were signed in 1989 with two consortia of Malaysian, Japanese, and Brazilian companies. This stage, completed in 1991, included the laying of 730 kilometres of pipeline through to the tip of THE PENINSULA, from where gas could be sold to Singapore and Thailand; the conversion of two power stations—Port Dickson and Pasir Gudang—from oil to gas; and the expansion of PETRONAS’ output of methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE), propylene, and polypropylene, which were already being produced in joint ventures with Idemitsu Petrochemical Co. of Japan and Neste Oy of Finland. The third and final stage of the project was to lay pipelines along the northwest and northeast coastlines of the Peninsula and was completed in 1997.

Another new venture in 1990 was in ship-owning, since PETRONAS’ existing arrangements with MISC and with Nigeria’s state oil company would be inadequate to transport the additional exports of LNG due to start in 1994, under the contract with Saibu Gas. PETRONAS did not lose sight of the government’s commitment to Malaysian self-reliance, and the company’s second refinery at Malacca, completed in 1994, with a capacity of 100,000 barrels per day (16,000 m3/d), promoted the same policy. The fact that it was built in a joint venture with Samsung of Korea, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation of Taiwan, and Caltex of the United States did not negate the policy, for the subsidiary company PETRONAS Penapisan (Melaka) had a decisive 45% of equity while sharing the enormous costs of and gaining advanced technology for the project. More to the point, a side effect of the refinery’s completion was that PETRONAS was able to refine all of the crude oil it produced, instead of being partially dependent on refining facilities in Singapore.

PETRONAS, with its policies of promoting self-reliance, helping to develop associated industries, and varying the sources and uses of oil and gas, played an important role in the Malaysian economy as a whole. Under governments which—by current, if not historical, Western standards—were strongly interventionist, the contribution of oil taxes to the federal government’s revenue hovered at around 12% to 16% until 1980, when it showed a marked increase to 23%, followed by another leap to 32% in 1981. From then until 1988 the proportion fluctuated between 29% and 36%. PETRONAS was not just another big oil company: it controlled a crucial sector of the economy and remained, for better or worse, an indispensable instrument of the state.

Expanding globally: the 1990s and beyond[edit]

A Petronas station seen in Pattaya,Thailand.

During the mid- to late 1990s, international exploration, development, and production remained key components in PETRONAS’ strategy along with diversification. A key discovery was made in the RUBY field in Vietnam in 1994. That year, the firm also saw its first overseas production from the Dai Hung field in Vietnam and established its first retail station outside of Malaysia in Cambodia.[citation needed] In 1995, a subsidiary was created to import, store, and distribute liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). In addition, the company’s polyethylene plant in Kerteh began operations. PETRONAS marked a significant milestone during this time period—two of its subsidiaries, PETRONAS Dagangan Bhd and PETRONAS Gas Bhd, went public on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Between 1993 and 1996, it purchased the former sub-Saharaian branch of Mobil Oil, rebranded as Engen Petroleum.

In 1996, PETRONAS entered the aromatics market by way of a joint venture that created Aromatics Malaysia Sdn Bhd. It also formed a contract with China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Chevron Overseas Petroleum Ltd. to begin exploration of block 02/31 of the Liaodong Bay area in China. While the Asian economy as a whole suffered from an economic crisis during 1997 and 1998, Malaysia was quick to bounce back due to successful government reforms. From its new headquarters in the PETRONAS Twin Towers, the state-owned concern continued its development in the oil and gas industry. Soon India’s Liberty Group purchased a 1% stake in Petronas

During 1997, PETRONAS heightened its diversification efforts. The firm set plans in motion to build three petrochemical plants in Kuantan as well as an acetic facility in Kerteh. Its first LPG joint venture in China was launched that year and the company acquired a 29.3% interest in Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad (MISC). In 1998, PETRONAS’ tanker-related subsidiary merged with MISC, increasing PETRONAS’ stake in MISC to 62%. That year, PETRONAS introduced the Petronas E01, the country’s first commercial prototype engine. The company also signed a total of five new production sharing contracts (PSCs) in 1998 and 1999, and began oil production in the Sirri field in Iran.

PETRONAS entered the new century determined to expand its international efforts. The company forged deals for two new exploration plots in Pakistan and began construction on the Chad-Cameroon Integrated Oil Development and Pipeline Project. By 2002, PETRONAS had signed seven new PSCs and secured stakes in eight exploration blocks in eight countries, including Gabon, Cameroon, Niger, Egypt, Yemen, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The firm also made considerable progress in its petrochemicals strategy, opening new gas-based petrochemical facilities in Kerteh and Gebeng.

By 2003, Malaysia was set to usurp Algeria as the world’s second-largest producer of LNG with the completion of the Malaysia LNG Tiga Plant. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad commented on the achievement in a May 2003 Bernama News Agency article, claiming that “the PETRONAS LNG complex now serves as another shining example of a vision realized of a national aspiration, transformed into reality by the same belief among Malaysians that ‘we can do it.'” Indeed, PETRONAS had transformed itself into a global oil company over the previous decade, becoming a national symbol for success. The company realised, however, that it would have to continue its aggressive growth strategy to insure its survival in the years to come.

The PETRONAS overseas expansion drive continues with the acquisition of Woodside Energy Ltd Mauritania assets for $418 million in 2007.[8] The venture proved successful as they discovered oil in May 2008[9]

In 2004, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Datuk Mustapa Mohamed[citation needed], stated that PETRONAS contributed RM 25 Billion to the country’s treasury accounting for 25% of revenue collected via dividends and other revenues. PETRONAS continuously provides the Malaysian government dividends from its profits. Since inception in 1974, PETRONAS have paid the government RM 403.3 billion, with RM 67.6 billion in 2008. The payment represents 44% of the 2008 federal government revenue.[10] PETRONAS continues to focus on international exploration projects as 40% of revenue in 2008 was derived from international projects such as Iran, Sudan, Chad and Mauritania. The company’s international reserves stood at 6.24 billion barrels oil equivalent in 2008.[11]

On 29 October 2012, PETRONAS sources said it will renew a bid for gas producer Progress Energy Resources after Canada blocked its bid earlier this month. The $6-billion bid was approved by Ottawa on 7 December 2012.[12]

On 17 January 2013, PETRONAS issued a statement that an onshore oil and gas discovery has been made in the state after drilling a test well about 20 kilometres away from the city of Miri in northern Sarawak. The well was found to have a net hydrocarbon thickness of 349 meters. It had flow rates of 440 barrels of crude oil per day and 11.5 million standard cubic feet of gas per day. The find is the first onshore oil discovery in Malaysia in 24 years. [13]


Petronas logo used until 2013

PETRONAS Logo was created in 1974 by Dato’ Johan Ariff of Johan Design Associates.[14] He is also responsible in creating the Logo of many PETRONAS subsidiaries, JVs, link-companies and properties, including Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC), MISC, MMHE, Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS (UTP), Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre, Putrajaya Holdings, Prince Court Medical Centre (PCMC), PETLIN, Malaysian Petroleum Club and Mesra Mall, to name a few.

Logo Concept

The basic structure is geometric, embodying metaphoric and alpha glyphic nuances of an oil drop and a typography ‘P’, the latter being evident in the triangle assigned at the top right corner. The triangle is also an essential element to define directional movement and dynamism. The placement of a solid circle in the Logo is interpretive if the wheel of the oil and gas industry while outline of the drop simulates a driving system, the energy which to be derived from oil.

The Corporate Colour chosen for the Logo is EMERALD Green, an obvious reference to the sea from where oil and gas are drilled.

The Corporate Logotype named ‘Alpha PETRONAS’ is designed in uppercase exclusively for PETRONAS and its subsidiaries. Each alphabet is rendered with a rounded profile to assume fluidity and viscosity, while emphasising the oil based operation.

Logo Refreshed

PETRONAS recently introduced a refreshed version of its corporate logo[15] at the 2013 Asia Oil and Gas Conference (AOGC 2013). A renewed “look and feel” has been incorporated to the original PETRONAS’ oil drop logo to reflect the visual expression of PETRONAS’ Group Positioning, reimagining energy™. The refreshed logo is part of a group-wide exercise to further strengthen the visual potential of PETRONAS’ corporate icon by making it more contemporary while building on the existing equity and legacy of the PETRONAS brand.

In essence, the refreshed logo symbolises the growth and progression of the PETRONAS brand. PETRONAS was established during the oil and gas crisis in the early 1970s. Over the years it has focused on building its business and operational capabilities and continues to seek more efficient and better methods of managing and adding value to Malaysia’s oil and gas resources and meet increasing energy demands. This challenging spirit has propelled PETRONAS from being a manager of Malaysia’s hydrocarbon resources to become a fully integrated oil and gas multinational. The organisation was among the earliest national oil companies (NOC) to venture globally which has inspired many other NOCs to join the global oil and gas arena, changing the dynamics of today’s oil and gas industry. PETRONAS will continue to play an active role in oil and gas by focusing on collective efforts to do things differently by challenging industry norms to achieve real sustainable long-term growth. Throughout its journey, PETRONAS has ensured that people benefit from its activities through business and employment opportunities, education sponsorship and quality products and services.

The refreshed version is PETRONAS’ third generation logo. The original PETRONAS logo was developed in 1974 when PETRONAS was first incorporated. The basic structure comprises an oil drop feature and symbol “P” that conveys its core business in oil and gas, and dynamism of the company. At the centre of the oil drop is a solid circle that symbolises the complete cycle or value chain of the oil and gas industry. Meanwhile, the familiar PETRONAS emerald green represents the seas and land where oil and gas originates. The refreshed logo’s softer curves have been added to the oil drop which depicts a continuous flow that symbolises PETRONAS’ drive for progress and challenging spirit in meeting the energy demands and expectations of its stakeholders. The PETRONAS name has been repositioned below the oil drop and the font has been sharpened to enhance visibility and give prominence to the oil drop in the logo.


PETRONAS has more than 100 subsidiaries and around 40 Joint Venture companies in which PETRONAS has at least 50% stake in the company. Although PETRONAS is considering to listing more of its subsidiaries,[17] so far the company has listed at least 3 of its subsidiaries in the Bursa Malaysia.

PETRONAS Dagangan Berhad

A Petronas petrol station at km 54, Karak-Kuala Lumpur Highway

Involved in the distribution and sale of finished petroleum products and operations of service stations for the domestic market. The company has over 800 petrol stations around Malaysia as of July 2007[18]and further increase to 870 stations in January 2008[19]

The company has also teamed up with local food and beverage companies, banks and transportation companies to provide better services at their petrol stations. Companies include McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Dunkin’ Donuts, Konsortium Transnasional Berhad, Maybank, and CIMB Bank.


Involved in the provision of gas processing and transmission services to PETRONAS and its customers as a throughput company. Owns and operates thePeninsular Gas Pipeline which is 2,550 kilometres in length and runs from Kerteh in Terengganu to Johor Bahru in the South and Kangar in the North of Peninsular Malaysia.

MISC Berhad

Main article: MISC Berhad

Involved in ship-owning, ship-operating and other logistics and maritime transportation services and activities. Currently has the largest fleet of LNG transport vessels

KLCC Properties Berhad

Main article: KLCC Properties

Involved in the development and the management of the Kuala Lumpur City Centre project which includes the Petronas Twin Towers, Menara Exxon Mobil andKLCC Park. Other properties under its care include Dayabumi Complex which located near Dataran Merdeka.

PETRONAS Chemicals

The PETRONAS Chemicals is the latest company to be publicly listed. The IPO was done on 26 November 2010 with investor rise around US$4.40 billion, effectively become one of the largest IPO exercise in South East Asia.[20]

The business is the largest petrochemical producer and seller in South East Asia. Products include olefins, polymers, fertilisers, methanol and other basic chemicals and derivative products[21]

Malaysian Marine and Heavy Engineering

MMHE was listing on 29 October 2010 with MYR 1 billion raised on its IPO exercise.

The business builds offshore structures for oil and gas applications, help repair large vessels and converts vessels into Floating production storage and offloadingand FSOs.[22]

Other principal subsidiaries

Some of the key subsidiaries are:-

Others include PETRONAS Assets Sdn Bhd; PETRONAS Maritime Services Sdn Bhd; PETRONAS Trading Corp. Sdn Bhd; PETRONAS Argentina S.A.; PETRONAS Australia Pty Ltd.; PETRONAS Thailand Co. Ltd.; PETRONAS Energy Philippines Inc.; PETRONAS Cambodia Co. Ltd.; PETRONAS Technical Services Sdn Bhd; PETRONAS Group Technical Solutions Sdn Bhd; PETRONAS South Africa Pty Ltd.; PETRONAS India Holdings Company Pte Ltd.; PETRONAS China Co. Ltd.; PETRONAS International Corp. Ltd.; PETRONAS Marketing Thailand Co. Ltd.; Myanmar PETRONAS Trading Co. Ltd.; PETRONAS Marketing (Netherlands) B.V.and Indianoil Petronas


Visible Petronas logo on the car of BMW Sauber F1.

Petronas has sponsored the Formula One Malaysian Grand Prix as the title sponsor since its inaugural race in 1999.

Team Petronas Syntium Proton competed in the 2002, 2003 and 2004 British Touring Car Championship seasons.

Petronas has supported TOM’S, aToyota automobile racing squad inSuper GT since 2008.

PETRONAS was one of the main sponsors of the BMW Sauber Formula One team alongside Intel, and it supplies lubricants and fuel to the team. It also owned 40% ofSauber Petronas Engineering, the company that builds chassis which formerly usedFerrari designed engines used by the Sauber team, until being bought out by German motor company BMW. PETRONAS is also the main sponsor for Malaysian Grand Prix, and co-sponsors the Chinese Grand Prix. PETRONAS was the exclusive premium partner of the Sauber Petronas (1995–2005) and BMW Sauber F1 Team(2006–2009). BMW had acquired the controlling stake of the former Sauber Petronas Engineering, but left the sport after the 2009 season. On 21 December 2009, PETRONAS was confirmed as moving from BMW Sauber to the newly formedMercedes Grand Prix team.[23]

In terms of further Formula One involvement, every year PETRONAS took the BMW Sauber team to various parts of Malaysia for F1 demos so the public who are unable to go to the track itself get to experience a little bit of what F1 offers. Other promotional events are held in the run up to the race and the drivers play an integral part in this so much so that Nick Heidfeld conceded that there were more fans for BMW Sauber in Malaysia than in most other countries.

As part of its corporate social responsibility programme, PETRONAS also brings underprivileged children to watch the race.

PETRONAS also sponsors the Malaysian Cub Prix races. It also sponsors many other sporting events and teams, mostly motorsports. Some of these sponsorships includes the PERT (Petronas EON Rally Team), the now defunct Foggy Petronas Superbike team (in which PETRONAS debutes their own superbike, the FP1), and also the Petronas Adventure Team, a 4X4 adventure team. More recently Petronas is also a major sponsor for PETRONAS TOYOTA TEAM TOM’S which is currently participating in Super GT series, which they won the team title in 2008 and driver title in 2009. The series also race in Malaysia every season at Sepang International Circuit. PETRONAS signed a three-year sponsorship agreement with Fiat Yamaha motoGP team. The PETRONAS branding can be seen startingQatar race on the 10 to 12 April 2009.

Since 2010, PETRONAS is also the main sponsor of Mercedes Grand Prix team.


PETRONAS awards education sponsorships in the form of convertible loans to Malaysian and international students to further their studies at local or foreign universities. The PETRONAS unit that is responsible for handling education matters is called the Sponsorship & Talent Sourcing Unit (STS). These sponsorships are awarded based on academic results, co-curricular activities, family background as well as an assessment of student personality (which is conducted throughout a program called EduCamp, which all prospective PETRONAS students are required to undergo). Students who are absorbed by PETRONAS at the end of their tertiary studies have their convertible loans converted into full scholarships. These students are under contract agreement to work for the company for two years for every one year they are sponsored. PETRONAS has its own university, Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS (UTP). Built in 1997, the campus is located in Seri Iskandar, Perak.



From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.)
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.
Type State-owned enterprise
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 1976
Headquarters Caracas, Venezuela
Key people Rafael Ramirez, President
Products Fuel, natural gas and otherpetrochemicals
Revenue Increase $114 billion (2013)[1]
Net income Increase $15.8 billion (2013)[1]
Total assets Increase $231.1 billion (2013)[1]
Owners Venezuelan government
Subsidiaries PDV Marina
PDV (Deltaven)
Electricidad de Caracas, C.A. (93.62%)[2]
Citgo (100%)[3]
Website www.pdvsa.com (Spanish)

Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA, Spanish pronunciation: [peðeˈβesa]) (Petroleum of Venezuela) is the Venezuelanstate-owned oil and natural gas company. It has activities in exploration, production, refining and exporting oil, as well as exploration and production of natural gas. Since its founding on 1 January 1976 with the nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry, PDVSA has dominated the oil industry of Venezuela, the world’s fifth largest oil exporter.

Oil reserves in Venezuela are the largest in the world, and the state-owned PDVSA provides the government of Venezuela with substantial funding resources. The government of Venezuela treats PDVSA as a cash-cow,[4] and the company only hires political supporters of the president.[5] Between 2004 and 2010 PDVSA contributed $61.4 billion to the government’s social development projects. Around half of this went directly to various Bolivarian Missions, with the remainder distributed via the National Development Fund.[6] Incompetence has led to serious inefficiencies and accidents.[7]

Reserves and capacity

PDVSA Gas, Isla de Margarita.

Venezuela has 77.5 billion barrels (1.232×1010 m3) of conventional oil reserves according to PDVSA figures, the largest in the Western Hemisphere and making up approximately half the total. This puts Venezuela as fifth in the world in proven reserves of conventional oil. By also including an estimated 235 billion barrels (3.74×1010 m3) of tar-like extra heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt region, Venezuela claims to hold the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world. Venezuela also has 150 trillion cubic feet (4.2×1012 m3) of natural gas reserves.

PDVSA has a production capacity, including the strategic associations and operating agreements, of 4 million barrels (640,000 m3) per day (600,000 m³). Officials say production is around 3.3 million barrels per day (520,000 m3/d) although most secondary sources such as OPEC and the EIA put Venezuela’s output at least 500,000 barrels per day (79,000 m3/d) lower.


In 2006, Rafael Ramírez, the energy minister, gave PDVSA workers a choice: Support President Hugo Chávez, or lose their jobs. The minister also said: “PDVSA is red [the color identified with Chávez’s political party], red from top to bottom”. Chávez defended Ramírez, saying that public workers should back the “revolution”. He added that “PDVSA’s workers are with this revolution, and those who aren’t should go somewhere else. Go to Miami“.[8]

PDVSA continues to hire only supporters of the president, and PDVSA revenue is used to fund political projects. [9]



PDVSA purchased 50% of the United States gasoline brand Citgo from Southland Corporation in 1986 and the remainder in 1990.[10]


Filling station in Venezuela of PDV (a subsidiary of PDVSA)

In December 2002 the Venezuelan general strike of 2002-2003 saw many of PDVSA’s managers and employees (including the CTV trade union federation) lock out workers to pressure Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez to call early elections, and virtually stop oil production for 2 months. 19,000 employees left their jobs and the government reestablished production with employees loyal to the Chávez government.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) called on the Venezuelan government to launch “an independent investigation into allegations of detention and torture”, surrounding this strike.[2] The strike caused substantial macroeconomic damage, pushing unemployment up by 5% to a peak of over 20% in March 2003.[3] The company has since formed its own militia, which all employees join on a voluntary basis, to ward off a potential “coup” by the government. It considers itself virtually indistinguishable from the state, its social programs more or less running the country’s socialist revolution.[11]

In 2005 PDVSA opened its first office in China, and announced plans to nearly triple its fleet of oil tankers, to 58.[4]

In April and May 2005, PDVSA, per an agreement signed between the governments of Venezuela and Argentina, sent 50 million tonnes of fuel oil to the latter to alleviate the effects of an energy crisis due to a shortage of natural gas.

In November 2005, PDVSA and its subsidiary in the US, Citgo, announced an agreement with Massachusetts to provide heating oil to low income families in Boston at a discount of 40% below market price.[5] Similar agreements were later set up with other states and cities in the US Northeast including New York’s Bronx,Maine, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Delaware. Under the program, Citgo offered a total of around 50 million US gallons (190,000 m3) of heating oil at below market prices, equivalent to a discount of between 60 and 80 cents a gallon.

In February 2006 PDVSA completed ISO 9001:2000 process certification for its distribution system.[6]

On 28 July 2006, credit ratings agency Moody’s Investor Service said it was removing its standalone ratings on PDVSA because the oil company does not provide adequate operational and financial information. PDVSA has still not filed its 2004 financial results with the US Securities and Exchange Commission that were due in June 2005.

In 2007, PDVSA bought 82.14% percent of Electricidad de Caracas company from AES Corporation as part of a renationalization program. Subsequently the ownership share rose to 93.62% (December 2008).[2]

PDVSA has made contributions to the protection of the environment through showcase projects in shanty towns and waste removal.[12]

PDVSA is Latin America’s third-largest company, according to the a ranking of the region’s top 500 companies from Latin Business Chronicle.[13]


In 2010, PDVSA loaned the government of Antigua $68 million to repurchase all remaining shares of West Indies Oil Company (WIOC) from Bruce Rappaport‘s National Petroleum Ltd.[14]

In 2012, PDVSA announced that it would enter into a joint venture agreement with Eni SpA and Repsol in order to initiate a gas production project at the Cardon VI gas block in Venezuela. Production from this joint venture is estimated to reach between 80-100 million cubic meters of gas.[15]

In February 2014, PDVSA and the Anglo-French oil firm Perenco entered into talks for a $600 million financing deal to boost production at their Petrowarao joint venture.[16] In October 2014, Venezuela imported its first ever ship of oil from Algeria so that they could dilute their oil.[17]


Venezuela officially nationalized its oil industry on 1 January 1976, and along with it came the birth of PDVSA. See: History of the Venezuelan oil industry#Nationalization

Assets of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were expropriated in 2007 after they declined to restructure their holdings in Venezuela to give PDVSA majority control,Total, Chevron, Statoil and BP agreed and retain minority interests in their Venezuelan projects.[18] Arriving at a settlement with ExxonMobil has proven difficult with Venezuela offering book value for ExxonMobil’s assets and ExxonMobil asking for as much as $12 billion. This and a number of other matters including the claims of ConocoPhillips remain before the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.[19] PDVSA has paid compensation for assets it has nationalized including $255 million paid to ExxonMobil on February 15, 2012 in compensation for nationalization of ExxonMobil’s Venezuelan assets in 2007 and $420 million to be paid beginning in 2012 to U.S. firms Williams Cos Inc. and Exterran Holdings, Inc. for natural gas assets nationalized in 2009.[20]


There have been worsening safety problems since 2003,[5] culminating in a gas leak at the Paraguaná Refinery Complex in August 2012 which caused an explosion, killing 48 people and damaging 1600 homes.[21] Another major fire broke out at the El Palito refinery in September 2012.[22]

Presidents of PDVSA

Overseas assets

The Citgo sign, as seen from Lansdowne St., Boston

  • Citgo Petroleum Corporation, USA – Citgo is 100% owned by PDVSA.
  • Nynäs Petroleum, Sweden – PDVSA owns a 50% stake with Finland’s Neste Oil Oyj holding the other 50%.
  • Bahamas Oil Refining Company (BORCO), Bahamas – PDVSA was the sole owner of this oil storage terminal in the Caribbean until April 2008. The new owners were Royal Vopak (20%) and First Reserve Corporation (80%). It is doing business as Vopak Terminal Bahamas. They in turn sold the facility to Buckeye Partners in 2011.
  • Hovensa LLC refinery, US Virgin Islands – Hovensa is jointly owned by PDVSA and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.
  • Isla refinery, Curaçao – PDVSA leases the Isla refinery on the island.
  • BOPEC, Bonaire petroleum corporation 100% owned by PDVSA.
  • Ruhr Oel, Germany – PDVSA was a 50% owner of Ruhr Oel GmbH, the other half belonging to BP‘s German unit Aral AG. PDVSA sold its part to Russia’s Rosneft on October 2010.
  • PDVSA acquired a minority stake in the Jamaican state-owned oil refinery in 2006.

PDVSA also has offices in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, China, Cuba, Spain and Netherlands.

National Iranian Oil Company

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
National Iranian Oil Company
Type State-owned enterprise
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 1948
Headquarters Tehran, Iran
Area served Worldwide
Key people Bijan Namdar Zanganeh
Roknoldin Javadi
Products Oil, natural gas andpetrochemicals
Revenue Increase US$ 110 billion (2012)[1]
Total assets Increase US$ 200 billion (2012)[2]
Owners Iranian government
Employees 41,000 (2011)
Subsidiaries 23
Website NIOC.ir

The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) (Persian: شرکت ملّی نفت ایرانSherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Īrān), a government-owned corporation under the direction of the Ministry of Petroleum of Iran, is an oil and natural gas producer and distributor headquartered in Tehran. It was established in 1948.[3] NIOC ranks as the world’s third largest oil company, after Saudi Arabia‘s state-owned Aramco.[4] and Gazprom.

The NIOC is exclusively responsible for the exploration, extraction, transportation and exportation of crude oil, as well as sales of natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Having provided the domestic refineries and manufacturing plants with crude oil required for the petroleum products, the NIOC exports its surplus production according to commercial considerations in the framework of the quotas determined by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and at the prices prevalent in the international markets. The NIOC also signs some long term contracts on “buy-back” basis with foreign companies in order to exploit national oil fields and export its products. The NIOC exports natural gas and liquefied natural gas via the “National Iranian Gas Export Company”.[3]

NIOC’s oil and gas reserves in early 2005 was as follows;[5]

  • Recoverable liquid hydrocarbon reserves in early 2005, 136.99 billion barrels (21.780 km3) 10% of world’s total.
  • Recoverable gas reserves in early 2005, 28.17×1012 m3 (15% of world’s total).

Current NIOC production capacities include over 4 million barrels (640×103 m3) of crude oil and in excess of 500 million cubic meters of natural gas per day.[3] In 2008, the average extraction cost of oil was less than $5 per barrel. This does not include processing (refining) and distribution costs.[6]

Iran’s cumulative oil production has reached to 61 billion barrels (9.7×109 m3) by the end of 2007,[7] most of these volume produced after 1951, under the supervision of NIOC. Iran’s overall export crude oil was valued at US$85 billion in 2010.[citation needed]


Further information: Petroleum industry in Iran

Background: 1901 – 1951

The Shah opens the facilities of International Naval Oil Company of Iran in 1970.

In May 1901, William Knox D’Arcy was granted a concession by the Shah of Iran to search for oil, which he discovered in May 1908.[8] This was the first commercially significant find in the Middle East. In 1923, Burmah employed future Prime Minister, Winston Churchill as a paid consultant; to lobby the British government to allow APOC have exclusive rights toPersian oil resources, which were successfully granted.[9]

In 1935, Rezā Shāh requested the international community to refer to Persia as ‘Iran’, which reflected in the name change of APOC to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC).[8] Following World War II, Iranian nationalism was on the rise, especially surrounding the Iranian natural resources being exploited by the foreign companies without adequately compensating Iranian taxpayers. APOC and the pro western Iranian government led by Prime Minister Ali Razmara, initially resisted nationalist pressure to revise AIOC’s concession terms still further in Iran’s favour. In March 1951, Ali Razmara was assassinated; and Mohammed Mossadeq, a nationalist, was elected as the new prime minister by the Majlis of Iran.[10][11]

NIOC: 1951 – 1979

Emblem of NIOC during the 1950s-1970s

In April 1951, the Majlis nationalised the Iranian oil industry by unanimous vote, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was formed, displacing the APOC.[12] The APOC withdrew its management from Iran, and organised an effective worldwide embargo of Iranian oil. The British government, which owned the APOC, contested the nationalisation at the International Court of Justice at The Hague, but its complaint was dismissed.[13]

By spring of 1953, incoming US President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorised the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to organise a coup against the Mossadeq government, known as the 1953 Iranian coup d’état.[14] In August 1953, the coup brought pro-Western generalFazlollah Zahedi as the new PM, along with the return of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from his brief exile in Italy to Iran.[15] The anti-Mossadeq plan was orchestrated under the code-name ‘Operation Ajax‘ by CIA, and ‘Operation Boot’ by SIS (MI6).[14][16][17]

In 1954, the APOC became the British Petroleum Company. The return of the shah did not mean that British Petroleum would be able to monopolise Iranian oil as before. Under the pressure from United States, British Petroleum reluctantly accepted membership in a consortium of companies, founded in October 1954, to bring back Iranian oil to the international market. It was incorporated in London as a holding company called ‘Iranian Oil Participants Ltd‘ (IOP).[18][19] The founding members of IOP included British Petroleum (40%), Gulf (later Chevron, 8%), Royal Dutch Shell (14%), and Compagnie Française des Pétroles (later Total S.A., 6%). The four Aramco partners – Standard Oil of California (SoCal, later Chevron) – Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon, then ExxonMobil) – Standard Oil Co. of New York (later Mobil, then ExxonMobil) – Texaco (later Chevron) – each held an 8% stake in the holding company.[10][18]

All IOP members acknowledged that NIOC owned the oil and facilities in Iran, and IOP’s role was to operate and manage on behalf of NIOC. To facilitate that, IOP established two operating entities incorporated in Netherlands, and both were delegated to NIOC.[18][19] Similar to the Saudi-Aramco “50/50” agreement of 1950,[20]the consortium agreed to share profits on a 50–50 basis with Iran, “but not to open its books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors”.[21]The negotiations leading to the creation of the consortium, during 1954-55, was considered as a feat of skillful diplomacy.[10]

In Iran, IOP continued to operate until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The new regime of Ayatollah Khomeini confiscated all of the company’s assets in Iran. According to the company’s Web site: The victory of the Islamic revolution annulled the Consortium Agreement of 1954 and all regulations pertaining to it. The taking of power by the Islamic Republic led to the withdrawal of foreign employees from Iran’s oil industry; domestic employees took full control of its affairs.[22]

NIOC’s Oil Reserves

Main article: NIOC’s Oil Reserves

Iranian oil and gas fields, infrastructure

Iran oil production, domestic consumption and exports

Iran – Oil infrastructure

According to OPEC, NIOC recoverable liquid hydrocarbon reserves at the end of 2006 was 1,384 billion barrels (2.200×1011 m3).[7]

NIOC oil reserves at the beginning of 2001 was reported to be about 99 billion barrels (1.57×1010 m3),[7]however in 2002 the result of NIOC’s study showed huge reserves upgrade adding about 317 billion barrels (5.04×1010 m3) of recoverable reserves to the Iranian oil reserves.

After 2003 Iran has made some significant discoveries which lead to addition of another 7.7 billion barrels (1.22×109 m3) of oil to the recoverable reserves of Iran.[23]

The vast majority of Iran’s crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the south-western Khuzestanregion near the Iraqi border. Overall, Iran has 40 producing fields – 27 onshore and 13 offshore. Iran’s crude oil is generally medium in sulfur and in the 28°-35 °API range.

As at 2012, 98 rigs are in operation in onshore fields, 24 in offshore fields and a single rig is in operation in theCaspian Sea. Iran plans to increase the number of its drilling rigs operating in its onshore and offshore oilfields by 36 units to reach 134 units by March 2014.[24]

Table 1- The five biggest NIOC oil fields;[25]

Rank Field Name Formation Initial Oil in Place
(Billion Barrels)
Initial Recoverable Reserves
(Billion Barrels)
Thousand barrels per day
1 Ahwaz Asmari & Bangestan 65.5 25.5 945
2 Marun Asmari 46.7 21.9 520
3 Aghajari Asmari & Bangestan 30.2 17.4 200
4 Gachsaran Asmari & Bangestan 52.9 16.2 560
5 Karanj Asmari & Bangestan 11.2 5,7 200
Largest Iranian Oil Fields
Field’s Name Thousand
barrels per day
cubic meters per day
Ahwaz (Asmari Formation) 700 110
Gachsaran 560 89
Marun 520 83
Bangestan 245 39.0
AghaJari 200 32
Karanj-Parsi 200 32
Rag-e-Safid 180 29
BibiHakimeh 130 21
Darquin 100 16
Pazanan 70 11
Dorood 130 21
Salman 130 21
Abuzar 125 19.9
Sirri A&E 95 15.1
Soroush/Nowruz 60 9.5

Strategic petroleum reserves

Iran began in 2006 with plans to create a global strategic petroleum reserve with the construction of 15 crude oil storage tanks with a planned capacity of 10 million barrels (1,600,000 m3).[26] The storage capacity of oil products in the country is around 11.5 billion liters (2011), but it will reach 16.7 billion liters by the end of theFifth Five Year Development Plan (2010-2015).[27] As of 2012, Iran is capable of storing crude oil in the Persian Gulf for a period of 10–12 days. The figure should hit 30–40 days after the construction of new storage facilities are completed.[28]

NIOC’s gas reserves

NIOC holds about 1,000×1012 cu ft (28,000 km3) of proven Natural gas reserves of which 36% are as associated gas and 64% is in non associated gas fields. It stands for world’s second largest reserves after Russia.[29]

NIOC’s ten biggest Non-Associated Gas Fields;

NIOC’s ten biggest Non-Associated Gas Fields.[30]
Field’s Name Gas In Place Tcf Recoverable Reserve Tcf
South Pars 500 322
North Pars[31] 60 47
Kish[5] 60 45
Golshan[32] 55 25 – 45
Tabnak NA 21,2
Kangan NA 20,1
Khangiran NA 16,8
Nar NA 13
Aghar NA 11,6
Farsi (B-Structure) NA 11 – 22

Recent discoveries

Since 1995, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) has made significant oil and gas discoveries, standing for some 84-billion-barrels (1.34×1010 m3) of oil in place and at least 175×1012 cu ft (5,000 km3) of gas in place, which are listed below.[33]

NIOC Oil Discoveries Since 1995.[34]
Field’s name Oil in pPlace Recoverable oil Discovery year
Billion Barrel Billion Barrel
Azadegan 33.2 5.2
Yadavaran (Kushk+Hosseinieh) 17 3
Ramin[35] 7.398 1.11 2007
South Pars Oil Layer 6 NA
Band-E-Karkeh[36][37] 4.5 NA 2007
Mansour Abad 4.45 NA 2007
Changoleh[38] 2.7 NA
Azar[38][39] 2.07 NA 2007
Paranj 1.6 NA 2007
Andimeshk (Balaroud)[40] 1.1 0.233 2007
Binalood[41] 0.776 0.099 2008
Mansouri-Khami layer[39] 0.760 NA
Jofeyr-Fahliyan layer[42][43] 0.750 NA 2008
Asaluyeh[44] 0.525 NA 2008
Arvand[45] 0.500 NA 2008
Tusan 0.470 NA 2006
Arash 0.168 NA
Total 83.967 NA
NIOC Natural Gas Discoveries Since 1995.[46]
Field’s name Gas in place Recoverable gas reserve
Trillion cubic feet Billion cubic meters Trillion cubic feet Billion cubic meters
Kish[5] 59 1,700 47 1,300
Tabnak 30 850 NA
Farsi (B-Structure)[47] NA 11-23 310-650
Ghir (Sefid Zakhur) 11.4 320 8.5 240
Yadavaran-Gas Layer 9.75 276 NA
Lavan 9.1 260 NA
Balal-Dahroum Formation 8.8 250 NA
Homa 7.6 220 NA
Marun Gas Layer 6.2 180 NA
Gardan 5.7 160 NA
Day 4.4 120 NA
Binak Gas Layer 3.5 99 NA
Karanj Gas Layer 2.9 82 NA
BiBi hakime Gas Layer 2.4 68 NA
Zireh 1 28 NA
Kuh-e-Asmari (Masjed Soleiman)[48] 1 28 0.739 20.9
Arash 0.79 22 NA
Kheyr Abad 0.17 4.8 NA
Total 170 4,800 NA

Organizational structure

The company is completely owned by Iranian government. NIOC’s General Assembly consists of:

It is its highest decision marking body, determining the company’s general policy guide lines, and approving the annual budgets, operations and financial statements and balance sheets. The company’s Board of Directors has the authority and major responsibilities to approve the operational schemes within the general framework ratified by the General Assembly, approve transactions and contracts, and prepare budgets and Board reports and annual balance sheets for presentation to the General Assembly.

The Board supervises the implementation of general policy guidelines defined by the General Assembly, and pursues executive operations via the company’sManaging Director.

Subsidiary companies

With appropriate division of tasks and delegation of responsibilities to subsidiaries- affiliates, NIOC has been able to establish acceptable degrees of coordination within its organizational set up. In fact, NIOC’s Directors act primarily in policy making and supervision while subsidiaries act as their executive arm in coordinating an array of operations such as exploration, drilling, production and delivery of crude oil and natural gas, for export and domestic consumption.

The NIOC’s subsidiaries are as follows:

NIOC subsidiaries
Company Name Activities[49]
Iranian Offshore Oil Company(IOOC) in charge of offshore oil fields in the Persian Gulf offshore oil and gas fields with the exception of South Pars. It focuses mainly on production platforms, ancillary facilities, and installations.
Central Iranian Oil Fields Company supervises all upstream activities in the central oil and gas regions of the country, i.e. everything, excluding the oil-rich southern Khuzestan province, Caspian and offshore.
National Iranian Gas Export Co. (NIGEC) in charge of gas exports for the National Iranian Gas Company. Until May 2010, NIGEC was under the control of the NIOC, but the Petroleum Ministry transferred NIGEC, incorporating it under NIGC in an attempt to broaden responsibility for new natural gas projects.[50] See also: Persian pipeline and Peace pipeline.
National Iranian South Oil Company(NISOC) in charge of onshore oilfields in southern Iran. Focuses on onshore upstream activity in the province of Khuzestan. As Khuzestan is the main oil and gas-producing province, this entity is among the most significant in the NIOC family. It produces approximately 80 percent of all crude oil produced in Iran.[50]
National Iranian Central Oil Company supervises all upstream activities in the central oil and gas regions of the country, i.e. everything, excluding the oil-rich southern Khuzestan province, Caspian and offshore.
Khazar Oil Exploration and Production Company in charge of Iran’s Caspian Sea sector (onshore and offshore)
Karoon Oil and Gas Production Company (KOGPC) Operating in Khouzestan, the company operates 538 wells and delivers natural gas to NIGC.[50]
Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC) is the most important NIOC offshoot company. The responsibility for all buy-back projects under operation, study or negotiation has been given to PEDEC. This company enjoys full authority to manage the projects. Further information: Foreign Direct Investment in Iran
Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC) National Iranian Gas Company does not play a role in awarding upstream gas projects; that task remains in the hands of the National Iranian Oil Company.[51] Pars Oil and Gas Co. is in charge of the offshore North and South Pars gas fields and responsible for awarding the contracts for the different phases. Since 2010, it has been raising capital on the domestic and international markets in order to finance its projects.
Pars Special Economic Energy Zone Co. handles and organizes all activities in the Pars Special Economic-Energy Zone, located near the South Pars gas field (a subsidiary of Pars Oil & Gas Co.)
National Iranian Oil Terminals Company has four transport hubs including facilities on the three islands of Kharg, Lavan and Sirri consisting of 17 jetties capable of berthing tankers of all sizes to lift and export its crude oil that load more than 2,000 oil tankers per year.[52] 2,000 of them dock in Bandar Abbas Port, 1,000 in Khark Island. Iran earned nearly $2 billion in 2009 from bunkering ships in the Persian Gulf (25% market share).[53] Projected bunkering sites by 2015: Bandar Abbas (two sites), Kish, Qeshm, Bushehr, Mahshahr, Assalouyeh, Khark and Chabahar.[54] Fujairah bunkering hub, UAE is Iran’s main competitor in the Persian Gulf. The country’s terminal storage capacity should soar to 100 million barrels by 2015 from the current 24 million barrels.[55]
National Iranian Drilling Company(NIDC) in charge of all offshore and onshore drilling activities. NIDC provides more than 90 percent of drilling services needed by the oil companies inside the country. In 2011, NIDC, drilled or completed 192 oil and gas wells, drilled 454 thousand meters of wells and provided more than 8 thousand expert or technical services to customers.[56] As at 2012, 123 drilling rigs are in operation in Iran’s offshore and onshore.[24]
Ahwaz Pipe Mills Company manufacturing oil and gas pipes and has a capacity of up to 420,000 tons per year. It operates three plants.
Iranian Fuel Conservation Organization regimenting the fuel consumption in different sectors through review and survey of the current trend of consumption and executing conservation measures nationwide. See also: 2007 Gasoline Rationing Plan in Iran
National Iranian Tanker Company controls the second largest fleet of tankers in OPEC.
Exploration Service Company (ESC) responsible for providing operational services in all facets of exploration and production activities within NIOC onshore regions.
Kala Naft (London) Ltd. in charge of carrying out the procurement needs of the NIOC that cannot be met domestically. However, NIOC organizations can in theory also purchase directly from suppliers.
Kala Naft (Canada) Ltd. in charge of carrying out the procurement needs of the NIOC that cannot be met domestically
Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) (Switzerland) handles trading & swaps operations on behalf of NIOC. Iran has swap arrangements with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, under which it ships crude from the Central Asian producers to its Caspian ports. In exchange Iran delivers the equivalent barrels of crude on behalf of the three Central Asian producers to their costumers in the Persian Gulf.[57] In October 2010, Iran asked for the terms of the contract to be re-negotiated because it claims it has lost money because of it.[58] On 2 July 2011, NIOC resumed oil swaps with Caspian states.[59] NaftIran also buys the vast majority of Iran’s gasoline imports.[60] Naftiran is a key player in Iran’s energy sector.
Petropars General contractor for the oil & gas industry (a subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Co.)
Petroiran Development Company(akaPetroIran or PEDCO) General offshore contractor (a subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Co.). PetroIran was initially formed to be the Iranian partner of foreign contractors with a 10% share in each buy-back contract.
Iranian Oil Company(UK) in charge of Rhum gasfield (a subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Co.)
Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company(IOEC) First Iranian general contractor to the oil and gas industries. Joint venture with IDRO
Arvandan Oil & Gas Company (AOGC) responsible for the development of the Arvandan oil & gas fields. AOGC was established in 2004 working as the main operator in oil and gas production from Azadegan, Yadavaran, Darquain, Jufeyr, Moshtagh, Khorramshahr, Arvand, Susangerd, Band-e-Karkheh, Omid and other fields which are located in west of Karun River.[61]
Research Institute of Petroleum Industry (RIPI) NIOC will implement 69 research projects between 2010 and 2015 which include topics as enhancing recovery rate, modeling, control and management of reservoirs, production and exploitation, exploration, promotion and technology in drilling operations, establishment of an integrated data bank, industrial protection and environment, optimizing energy consumption, materials and equipments manufacturing, strategic and infrastructure studies, productivity and specialized maintenance.[56] Iran is expected to launch its first gas to liquids (GTL) plant by 2018.[62] See also:Science and technology in Iran.

Production costs and investments

The cost of producing each barrel will rise to $30 or more from $7 in 2012.[63]

Iran currently allocates $20 billion a year to develop fields and $10 billion on maintaining output. In the next decade, maintaining production will cost $50 billion, with a similar sum required for development.[63]

NIOC’s major domestic contractors

Although usually neglected and overlooked, Iran also has a number of very active private companies in the oil sector. The growing private sector activity is mainly active in projects involving the construction of oil field units, refinery equipment, tanks and pipelines,[64] as well as engineering. Iranian manufacturers will supply oil industry with $10 billion worth of domestically-made goods and equipment in 2012.[65]

Iranian companies are already outperforming foreign firms in South Pars.[66] NIOC produces 60-70% of its industrial equipment domestically including refineries, oil tankers, oil rigs, offshore platforms and exploration instruments.[67][68][69][70] Iran is also cooperating with foreign companies to transfer technology to Iranian oil industry.[71] The objective is to become self-sufficient by 85% before 2015.[72] The strategic goods include onshore and offshore drilling rigs, pumps, turbines andprecision tools. Domestic production of 52 petrochemical catalysts will be started in 2013.[73]

Participations in foreign gas fields

  • Iran has another 10% joint-venture participation with BP and other foreign oil companies in Azerbaijani Shah Deniz gas field, producing 8 billion cubic meters of gas per year, worth up to a reported $2.4 billion per year. The Iranian entity with which BP has partnered in these ventures is the Swiss-based Naftiran Intertrade, a subsidiary of NIOC.[60] Shah Deniz is not subject to US sanctions.[74]


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Coordinates: 55°39′31″N 37°33′23″E

Gazprom JSC
Газпром OAO
Type Public (OAO)
Traded as
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 1989
Headquarters Moscow, Russia
Key people Viktor Zubkov (Chairman)
Alexei Miller (Vice-Chairman andCEO)
Products Petroleum, natural gas, and other petrochemicals
Services Gas pipeline transport
Revenue Increase US$ 153.0 billion (2012)[1][2]
Net income Decrease US$ 38.7 billion (2012)[1][2]
Owners Russian Government (50.01%)
Employees 393,000
Subsidiaries List of subsidiaries
Website www.gazprom.com

Gazprom headquarters in Moscow

Open Joint Stock Company Gazprom (Russian: Открытое Акционерное Общество «Газпром», abbreviated OAO Gazprom, Russian: ОАО «Газпром», IPA: [ɡɐsˈprom]) is the largest extractor of natural gas in the world and one of the world’s largest companies. Its name is a contraction of the Russian words Gazovaya Promyshlennost (Russian:газовая промышленность – gas industry). Its headquarters are in Moscow.

Gazprom was created in 1989 when the Soviet Ministry of Gas Industry converted to a corporation, retaining all its assets. The company was later partly privatised, although the Russian government currently holds a majority stake. In 2011, the company produced about 513.2 billion cubic metres (18.12 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas, amounting to more than 17% of worldwide gas production. In addition, Gazprom produced about 32.3 million tons of crude oil and nearly 12.1 million tons of gas condensate. Gazprom’s activities accounted for 8% of Russia’s gross domestic product in 2011.

Gazprom’s major production fields are located around the Gulf of Ob in Western Siberia, and the Yamal Peninsula is expected to become the company’s main gas producing region in the future. Gazprom possesses the largest gas transport system in the world, with approximately 158,200 kilometres of gas trunk lines. Major new pipeline projects include Nord Stream and South Stream. The company has a number of subsidiaries in various industrial sectors, including finance, media and aviation, as well as majority stakes in various companies.


1989–1992: Inception

The Soviet Union created a separate gas industry in 1943 during World War II. In 1965, it centralized gas exploration, development, and distribution within the Ministry of Gas Industry. Large natural gas reserves discovered in Siberia and the Ural and Volga regions in the 1970s and 1980s were the basis for the Soviet Union’s becoming a major gas producer in the world. [3]

In August 1989, under the leadership of the Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Ministry of Gas Industry was reconfigured as State Gas Concern Gazprom, which became the country’s first state-corporate enterprise. The company was still controlled by the state, but it exercised control through shares of stock, 100% of which were owned by the state.[4][5]

When the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, assets of the former Soviet state in the gas sector were transferred to newly established national companies, such asUkrgazprom and Turkmengazprom.[6] Gazprom kept assets located in the territory of Russia, and was able to secure a monopoly in the gas sector. Assets in the oil industry, on the other hand, were divided among several companies.[5]

1993–1997: Privatisation

Gazprom’s political influence increased significantly after the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed the company’s chairman Chernomyrdin as his Prime Minister in December 1992. Rem Viakhirev took Chernomyrdin’s place as Chairman both of the Board of Directors and of the Managing Committee.[5]

The new government was eager to introduce economic reforms and began to privatize Gazprom. Following the Decree of the President of the Russian Federationof 5 November 1992 and the Resolution of the Government of Russia of 17 February 1993, the organization became a joint-stock company and started to distributeshares under the voucher method: every Russian citizen received vouchers to purchase shares of formerly state-owned companies. By 1994, 33% of the Gazprom’s shares had been bought by 747,000 members of the public, mostly in exchange for the vouchers. 15% of the stock was also purchased and allocated to Gazprom employees. The state retained 40% of the shares, but the amount was gradually lowered to 38%.[5] Trading of Gazprom’s shares was heavily regulated, and the by-laws of the company prohibited foreigners from owning more than 9% of the shares.

Gazprom slowly established credibility in the western capital markets with an offering of one percent of its equity to foreigners in October 1996 in the form of Global Depository Receipts and a successful large bond issue of US$2.5 billion in 1997.

1998–2000: Tax evasion and asset-stripping

As the Prime Minister of Russia, Chernomyrdin ensured that the state did not closely regulate Gazprom. The company evaded taxes on a large scale, and the state received little money in the form of dividends. The management and board members launched a massive asset-stripping, and Gazprom’s property was parceled out to them and their relatives. Some of the largest stripped assets were transferred to the controversial gas-trading company Itera. Chernomyrdin and Gazprom’s CEORem Viakhirev were leading figures in the process.[7]

In March 1998, for reasons unrelated to Gazprom, Yeltsin fired Chernomyrdin from his position as Prime Minister.[8] On 30 June 1998 Chernomyrdin returned to the company as the chairman of the board of directors.

2000–2003: The Putin reforms

Gazprom’s situation changed abruptly in June 2000, when Vladimir Putin became the President of Russia. Putin launched a campaign to rein in the oligarchs. Per his policy of the so-called national champions, he strengthened state control in strategic companies.[9] He launched an attack against what he saw as mismanagement and personal pilfering of state assets. After coming to power, Putin immediately fired Chernomyrdin from his position as the chairman of the company’s board and used the stock owned by the state to vote out Vyakhirev. The two men were replaced by Dmitry Medvedev and Alexei Miller, who had previously worked with Putin in Saint Petersburg.[9] Putin’s actions were aided by shareholder activism of Hermitage CEO William Browder and former Russian finance minister Boris Fyodorov. Miller and Medvedev were assigned the task to stop the asset-stripping, and also to regain lost possessions. By denying Itera access to Gazprom’s pipelines, Miller almost forced Itera to declare bankruptcy. As a result, Itera’s management agreed to sell the stolen assets back to Gazprom.[10]

2005–2006: Establishment of government control

In June 2005, Gazprombank, Gazpromivest Holding, Gazfond and Gazprom Finance B. V., subsidiaries of Gazprom, agreed to sell a 10.7399% share to the state-owned company Rosneftegaz for $7 billion, at what some western analysts viewed as an undervalued price.[11] The sale was to be completed by 25 December 2005, which, combined with the 38% share of the State Property Committee, gave the Russian government control over the company.[12]

As the Russian state had acquired a controlling share, it removed the 20% restriction on foreign investment in Gazprom, and the company became fully open to foreign investors.[13][14]

On 20 July 2006, the Federal LawOn Gas Export,” granting Gazprom exclusive right to export natural gas was published.[15] It was approved nearly unanimously by the State Duma on 5 July, by the upper house, the Federation Council on 7 July and signed into law by President Vladimir Putin on 18 July.[16][17][18]

2007 and later

On 4 September 2012, the European Commission said it had launched an anti-trust case against Gazprom. The Brussels-based competition watchdog said it opened the formal legal probe based on “concerns that Gazprom may be abusing its dominant market position in upstream gas supply markets.”[19]

On 21 May 2014, A 30 year deal between Gazprom and China‘s China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which was 10 years in the making is estimated worth $400 billion, The agreement which was signed at a summit in Shanghai is expected to deliver some 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year eastward toChina‘s burgeoning economy, which will start around 2018.[20][21] Construction has already begun, with pipes for the Power of Siberia pipeline delivered to Lensk, Yakutia in August 2014.[22]

Notable acquisitions

In April 2001 Gazprom took over NTV, Russia’s only nationwide state-independent television station held by the oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media-Most holding.[23][24][25] In 2002 the Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Media acquired all of Gusinsky’s shares in the companies held by Media-Most.[26]

In September 2005, Gazprom bought 72.633% of the oil company Sibneft (now Gazprom Neft) for $13.01 billion, aided by a $12 billion loan, which consolidated Gazprom’s position as a global energy giant and Russia’s biggest company.[27] On the day of the deal the company was worth £69.7 billion/US$123.2 billion.

In December 2006, Gazprom signed an agreement with Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, taking over a half plus one share in Sakhalin Energy.[28]

In June 2007, TNK-BP, a subsidiary of BP plc, agreed to sell its stake in Kovykta field in Siberia to Gazprom after the Russian authorities questioned BP’s right to export the gas to markets outside Russia.[29][30][31][32] On 23 June 2007, the governments of Russia and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on a joint venture between Gazprom and Eni SpA to construct a 558-mile (900 km) long gas pipeline to carry 1.05 trillion cubic feet (30 km3) of gas per year from Russia to Europe. The South Stream pipeline would extend under the Black Sea to Bulgaria with a south fork extending to Italy and a north fork to Hungary. On a visit to Turkey on 1 December, Putin said the project was over and that the 63 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/y) of gas would be shipped to Turkey instead of Bulgaria, which according to the Russian leader, had obstructed the project. Bulgaria was in a process of being sued by the EU for signing contract with Russia, which was not aligned with EU regulation. Moreover, the EU country didn’t have any contract for the profits but just for the costs according to the Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev, who commented that EU and Russia have to sign this contract in a speech on the next day.[33][34][35] [36] [37]

At the end of November 2013, Gazprom expanded its media interests with the acquisition of Profmedia from Russian metals tycoon Vladimir Potanin.[38]

In June 2014, Gazprom was in negotiations with a 24.9 percent stake in the Austrian oil and gas firm OMV, held by Abu Dhabi’s International Petroleum Investment Co (IPIC).[39]



In 2011, the Gazprom group produced 513.17 billion cubic metres (18.122 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas. This amounted to 17% of the worldwide and 83% of Russian production. Of this amount, the Yamburg subsidiary produced 41%, Urengoy 23.6%, Nadym 10.9%, Noyabrsk 9.3% and others 15.2%. In addition, the company produced 32.28 million tons of oil and 12.07 million tons of gas condensate.[40][41][42]

Major part of Gazprom’s current production fields are located in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region (near the Gulf of Ob) in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in WesternSiberia. The three largest ones — Medvezhe, Urengoy and Yamburg— have been sustaining Russian gas production for 20 years. They are now in a declining state of production, with levels falling by 20–25 bcm per year.[43][44] Gazprom’s fourth large field, Zaporliarnoe was able to increase production until 2004, which offset the decline in the three largest fields.[43] From 2004, the company has been able to sustain its overall production levels by launching production from new smaller fields and by purchasing production assets from other companies.[43][45]

Crude oil production comes mostly through the subsidiary Gazprom Neft, which was previously called Sibneft. Gazprom bought 75% of the company’s shares in 2005 for $13.1 billion.[46]

billion cubic metres 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Natural gas 552.5 555.0 556.0 548.6 549.7 461.5 508.6 513.2 487.0 487.4
Source: Gazprom in figures 2004-2008, 2007-2011 and 2009-2013.[40][41][42]
million tons 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Crude oil 0.9 9.5 34.0 34.0 32.0 31.6 32.0 32.3 33.3 33.8
Condensate 11.1 11.5 11.4 11.3 10.9 10.1 11.3 12.1 12.9 14.7
Source: Gazprom in figures 2004-2008, 2007-2011 and 2009-2013.[40][41][42]

Imports from Central Asia[edit]

Imports from Central Asia have become very important to Gazprom’s supply balance.[43] In 2007, Gazprom imported a total of 60.7 billion cubic metres (2.14 trillion cubic feet) from Central Asia: 42.6 billion cubic metres (1.50 trillion cubic feet) from Turkmenistan, 8.5 billion cubic metres (300 billion cubic feet) from Kazakhstan and 9.6 billion cubic metres (340 billion cubic feet) from Uzbekistan.[43] In particular, 75% of all Turkmen gas exports go to Gazprom, which in turn exports the gas to Ukraine. The price of the Central Asian gas received by Gazprom ranged from $130/mcm to $180/mcm in 2008. Gazprom has agreed that prices will rise to European levels in the near future.[43]


The company’s proved and probable reserves under PRMS international standards in 2011 were 22.844 trillion cubic metres (806.7 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas, amounting to 18.3% of the world’s proved natural gas reserves; 1.216 billion tons of crude oil and 757.8 billion tons of gas condensate.[40][41] 73.2% of Gazprom’s natural gas reserves were located in the Urals Federal District, 14.3% in the Arctic shelf, 7.8% in the Southern Federal District, 2.3% in the Volga Federal District, 1.2% in the Siberian Federal District, and 1.2% in other territories.[40][41]

trillion cubic metres 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Natural gas 20.90 20.66 20.73 20.84 21.28 21.95 22.52 22.84 23.37 23.24
Source: Gazprom in figures 2004-2008, 2007-2011 and 2009-2013.[40][41][42]

Development and exploration

Location of the Shtokman gas field

Since the production in Gazprom’s current main fields of activity is declining, new fields need to be launched in the next few years in order for overall production levels to be sustained.[43][45] Recognizing this, the company has been investing heavily in major projects, with overall yearly investment reaching about 480 billion rubles ($20 billion) in recent years.[43] Nearly 37% of Gazprom’s reserves are located in Yamal Peninsula and in the Barents Sea, and access needs to be gained to those reserves before they can begin production.[43]

Blue Stream Pipeline

One of Gazprom’s key projects is the Blue Stream Pipeline.[47] The Blue Stream Pipeline delivers natural gas to Turkey directly through the Black Sea; this is advantageous for Turkey because it does not have to rely on third party nations allowing the pipeline to be used. The agreement was signed between Turkey and Russia in 1997, and construction began in 2000 when the first joint was welded. Currently, the pipeline transports 16 billion cubic meters each year.[47]

Yamal Peninsula

Main article: Yamal project

Gazprom’s main solution to the decline of current fields is the development of new fields located in the Yamal Peninsula, which is expected to become the company’s main gas-producing region in the future.[44] The explored reserves there amount to over 10 trillion cubic metres of natural gas and over 500 million tons of oil and gas condensate. About 60% of these is located in major areas such as Bovanenkovo, Kharasavey and Novoportovo. The Bovanenkovo field is expected to become the first one commissioned, starting production in 2011. The natural gas production capacity of the Bovanenkovo field is projected as 115 billion cubic metres per annum (4.1 trillion cubic feet per annum), with the potential to increase to 140 billion cubic metres per annum (4.9 trillion cubic feet per annum).[40] The planned 2011 start date has been met with skepticism by analysts. The main obstacle for the deadline is the lead time necessary to mobilize materials to drill development wells, and especially the technically challenging construction of Bovanenkovo–Ukhta pipeline across Baydaratskaya Bay, which will connect the Bovanenkovo field to Gazprom’s gas transmission network. It has been predicted that failure to launch production in Yamal in 2011 will lead to a decline in Gazprom’s overall production capability. Even if the field is launched in time, this will only enable the company to sustain current levels, but not to increase general production.[43]

Shtokman field

Main article: Shtokman field

Gazprom’s other major future source is the Shtokman field—one of the world’s largest natural gas fields. It is an enormous area located offshore in the central part of the Barents Sea, 650 kilometres (400 mi) northeast of the city of Murmansk and 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) west of the Yamal Peninsula. The field is estimated to contain up to 3.7 trillion cubic metres (130 trillion cubic feet) of gas.[43] Potential production is 71 billion cubic metres per annum (2.5 trillion cubic feet per annum) in the initial phases, with a potential of increase to 95 billion cubic metres per annum (3.4 trillion cubic feet per annum).[40] Gazprom, French Total and NorwegianStatoil have created a joint company Shtokman Development AG for development of the phase 1 of the field.[48][49][50] The production is expected to start in 2015.[51]

Arctic shelf/Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Area

The Arctic shelf has been a recent focus of Shell and Gazprom. On 8 April 2013 in Amsterdam Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee and Jorma Ollila, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Royal Dutch Shell signed in the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte a Memorandum outlining the principles of cooperation within hydrocarbons exploration and development in Russia’s Arctic shelf and a section of deep-water shelf abroad. [52]

Other options

Another large-scale production option would be the development of the Kovykta field in Eastern Siberia, but this has been seen as a last resort alternative due to its cost.[43] In the short term, Gazprom plans to increase production to 570 bcm in 2010 by developing the following fields in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region: Zapolyarnoye, Pestsovoe, Kharvutinskoe, Yuzhno-Russkoe, Zapadno-Pestsovoe, the Nydinskaya part of the Medvezhe field and Urengoy Achimovskoe.[43]


In Russia, Gazprom carried out 284.9 kilometres (177.0 mi) of exploration well drilling; 124,000 kilometres (77,000 mi) of 2D seismic survey and 6,600 square kilometres (2,500 sq mi) of 3D seismic survey in 2008. As a result, gas reserves grew by 583.4 billion cubic metres (20.60 trillion cubic feet), while oil and condensate reserves grew by 61 million tons.

Gazprom also carries out prospecting and exploration in foreign countries such as India, Algeria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Libya, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstanand Tajikistan.[40]

Environmental impact

In 2011 Gazprom reported that it had improved key environmental indicators. Compared to 2010, air emissions had been decreased by 3%, production waste by 11% and water consumption by 7.5%, mainly by using advanced technologies. One method is recycling drilling waste into construction material.[53] In 2011 Gazprom environmental management system was successfully certified under ISO 14001:2004.[citation needed]


Natural gas pipelines from Russia to Europe

Gazprom’s Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS) includes 158,200 kilometres (98,300 mi) of gas trunklines and branches and 218 compressor stations with a 41.4 GW capacity. The UGSS is the largest gas transmission system in the world.[54] In 2008, the transportation system received 714.3 billion cubic metres (25.23 trillion cubic feet) of gas.[40] The UGSS is currently at the superior limit of its capacity.[54]

Major transmission projects include the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, as well as several pipelines inside Russia.[40]


In 2006, Gazprom sold 316 billion cubic metres (11.2 trillion cubic feet) of gas to domestic customers in Russia; 162 billion cubic metres (5.7 trillion cubic feet) to rest of Europe and 101 billion cubic metres (3.6 trillion cubic feet) to CIS countries and the Baltic states.[43] There is a considerable difference in gas prices for these three customer groups. Inside Russia, according to Russian government policy, Gazprom is forced to sell gas at a considerable discount.[citation needed] This is a result of the socialist legacy, according to which energy is a “basic human right.”[citation needed] Consequently, Gazprom receives about 60% of its revenues from its sales to European customers.[55]

The low domestic price has caused problems for the Russian economy, such as overdependency on gas as an energy source and lack of investment in new production fields.[citation needed] Until 2004, Gazprom could only sell gas inside Russia, with a loss. It has also been realized that development of the new high-cost gas fields will not be possible without prices increasing. In 2006, the Russian government decided that domestic gas prices for industrial customers will rise to European netback levels (with tariffs and transmission costs reduced) by 2011. In 2008, average gas price paid by Russian industrial customers was $71/mcm, while households paid $54/mcm. Both prices are expected to rise about 25% in 2009, 25% in 2010, and 40% in 2011.[43] Gazprom’s attempts to bring CIS export prices to European levels have led to several disputes, most seriously with the Ukraine in 2006 and 2009.[citation needed]

Gazprom sales of gas 2004-2008
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price
Russia 306 bcm $47/mcm 307 bcm $36/mcm 316 bcm $43/mcm 307 bcm $42/mcm 287 bcm $67/mcm
CIS+Baltic 66 bcm $36.33/mcm 77 bcm $50.02/mcm 101 bcm $76.37/mcm 100 bcm $91.6/mcm 96.5 bcm $118/mcm
Europe 153 bcm $101.61/mcm 156 bcm $140.09/mcm 162 bcm $192.59/mcm 168.5 bcm $185/mcm 184.4 bcm $313/mcm
Prices are excluding VAT and tax and custom duties, mcm means thousand (mega) cubic metre, not million. Sources:[43][56]

Natural gas prices have shown strong fluctuation since the year 2000. Furthermore Gazprom’s sales prices varied largely among their customers. By the end of 2007, the price at the New York NYMEX was 7,53 $ per MMBtu, at 26,4 m³ per MMBTU this means a price of $285 per 1000 Cubic metre. At the same time, based on their respective contracts with Gazprom, customers paid these prices: Germany $250, Poland $290, Ukraine $130 and Russia $49.[57]


Gazprom delivers gas to 25 European countries, the only major exceptions being Spain and Portugal. The vast majority of Russian gas in Europe is sold on long-term 20—25 year contracts, although recently the subsidiary Gazprom Marketing and Trading has been increasingly active in the short-term sales business.[43]

By the end of 2004 Gazprom was the sole gas supplier to at least Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Finland, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia and Slovakia, and provided 97% of Bulgaria’s gas, 89% of Hungary’s, 86% of Poland’s, nearly three-quarters of the Czech Republic’s, 67% of Turkey’s, 65% of Austria’s, about 40% of Romania’s, 36% of Germany’s, 27% of Italy’s, and 25% of France’s.[58][59] The European Union as a whole gets about 25 percent of its gas supplies from Gazprom.[60][61]

According to The Economist in 2014 Europe was the source of 40 % of Gazprom’s revenue. The proportion of Europe’s gas bought in the spot market rose from 15 % in 2008 to 44 % in 2012.[62]

At the G20 summit in September 2013, Gazprom signed an agreement with CNPC that the Henry Hub index would not be used to settle prices for their trades.[63]On 21 May 2014, Putin met with Jinping to negotiate what turned out to be a $400bn deal between Gazprom and CNPC.[64] The contract called for Russia to supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually over 30 years, making the price about $350 per thousand cubic meters. In 2013, the average price of Gazprom’s gas in Europe was about $380 per thousand cubic meters.[64] China offered a loan of about $50bn to finance development of the gas fields and the construction of the pipeline by Russia up to the Chinese border, with the Chinese to build the remaining pipeline.[64] The trade is scheduled to begin in 2018.[64] “The gas price formula, as in our other contracts, is pegged to the market of oil and oil products,” said Putin.[64]

Price disputes[edit]

On 1 January 2006, at 10:00 (Moscow time), during the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, Gazprom ceased the supply of gas to the Ukrainian market, calling on Ukraine’s government to pay increases that partially reflected the global increases in fuel prices. During the night from 3 to 4 January 2006, Naftogas of Ukraine and Gazprom negotiated a deal that temporarily[65] resolved the long-standing gas price conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

On 3 April 2006, during the Russia-Belarus energy dispute, Gazprom indicated it would triple the price of natural gas sold to Belarus after 31 December 2006. In December 2006m Gazprom threatened a cut-off of supplies to Belarus at 10 am Moscow time on 1 January 2007, unless it agrees to raise the price it pays for the gas from $47 to $200 per 1,000 cubic metres or to cede control over its distribution network.[66] Some analysts suggested Moscow was penalising Alexander Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, for not delivering on pledges of closer integration with Russia,[67] while others noted that other friendly countries like Armenia were paying as much for their gas as Belarus would with the new price levels.[68]

Gazprom later requested a price of $105,[69] yet Belarus still refused the agreement. Belarus responded that if supplies were cut, it would deny Gazprom access to its pipelines, which would hurt gas transportation to Europe.[70] However, on 1 January 2007, just a few hours before the deadline, Belarus and Gazprom signed a last-minute agreement. Under the agreement, Belarus undertook to pay $100 per 1,000 cubic metre in 2007. The agreement also allowed Gazprom to purchase 50% of the shares in Beltransgaz, the Belarusian pipeline network.[71] Immediately following the signing of this agreement, Belarus declared a $42/ton transportation tax on Russian oil travelling through the Gazprom pipelines crossing its territory.

After a three day crisis in the beginning of March 2008 where gas supplies to Ukraine were halved, Gazprom agreed on 13 March 2008 to supply the Ukraine with gas for the rest of the year in a deal that cut out intermediary companies, a move it hoped would end payment disputes. Ukraine was to pay $315 (£115) per 1,000 cubic metres of gas supplied in January and February 2008, and $179.50 per 1,000 cubic metres for gas between March and December.[72]

In November 2008, Gazprom and Ukraine escalated their dispute. This resulted in both Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz cutting gas supplies to part of Europe in 2009.[citation needed]

On 1 April 2014, Gazprom increased the gas price charged to Ukraine from $268.50 to $385.50 (£231.00) per 1,000 cubic metres, the chief executive Alexei Millersaid. He added that Ukraine’s unpaid gas bills to Russia stood at $1.7bn (£1.02bn).[73]

On 30 October 2014, It was announced that Russia had agreed to resume gas supplies to Ukraine over the winter in a deal brokered by the European Union.[74]

Company characteristics

Gazprom is a vertically integrated company which dominates both upstream and downstream activities. It owns all main gas-processing facilities in Russia, operates the country’s high pressure pipelines and has (since 2006) a legal export monopoly. “Gazprom’s strategic goal is to become a leader among global energy companies by developing new markets, diversifying business activities and securing the reliability of supplies.”[75] Other natural gas producers, such as Russia’s second largest gas company Novatek, are forced to use Gazprom’s facilities for transmission and processing.[55]

At the end of 2008, Gazprom had 221,300 employees in its major gas production, transportation, underground storage and processing subsidiaries. Of this, 9.5% were management, 22.9% were specialists, 63.4% were workers and 4.2% were other employees.[40] Its headquarters are in the Cheryomushki District, South-Western Administrative Okrug, Moscow.[76]

Gazprom belongs to the so-called national champions; a concept advocated by Russian president Vladimir Putin, in which large companies in strategic sectors are expected not only to seek profit, but also to advance Russia’s national interests. For example, Gazprom sells gas inside Russia considerably under the global market price as a form of subsidy to the public.[5] However, this lower price also allows Gazprom to undercut competition while presenting an image of advancing Russia’s interests.[citation needed]

The company also controls assets in banking, insurance, media, construction and agriculture.

In 2008, Gazprom’s activities made up 10% of the Russian GDP.[40]


As of 29 December 2006, Gazprom’s main shareholders were:[77]

The Russian government controls 50.002% of shares in Gazprom through Rosimushchestvo, Rosneftegaz, and Rosgazifikatsiya.[77]


Gazprom has several hundred subsidiaries in Russia and abroad owned and controlled directly or indirectly.


Gazprom Headquarters in Moscow

Board of directors

Gazprom’s Board of Directors as of June 2008:[78]

Former members of the board:

Management committee

Gazprom’s management committee as of December 2006:[79]

  • Alexei Miller (Chairman, Deputy Chairman of the Board, CEO, Chairman of Gazprombank, former Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia, member since 2001)
  • Alexander Ananenkov (Deputy Chairman, Deputy Chairman of the Board, Gazprom shareholder, member since 17 December 2001)
  • Valery Golubev (Deputy Chairman, Head of the Department for Construction and Investment, former Head of the Vasileostrovsky District, former member of theFederation Council of Russia, member since 18 April 2003)
  • Alexander Kozlov (Deputy Chairman, member since 18 March 2005)
  • Andrey Kruglov (Deputy Chairman, Head of the Department for Finance and Economics, member since 2002)
  • Alexander Medvedev (Deputy Chairman, Deputy Chairman of the Board, Director General of Gazprom Export, President of Kontinental Hockey League, member of the Coordination Committee of RosUkrEnergo, member since 2002)
  • Mikhail Sereda (Deputy Chairman, Head of Administration, Deputy Chairman of Gazprombank, member since 28 September 2004)
  • Sergei Ushakov (Deputy Chairman, member since 18 April 2003)
  • Elena Vasilyeva (Deputy Chairman, Chief Accountant, member since 2001)
  • Bogdan Budzulyak (Head of the Department of Gas Transportation, Underground Storage and Utilization, member since 1989)
  • Nikolai Dubik (Head of Legal Department, member since 2008)
  • Konstantin Chuychenko (Head of the Control Department of Russia, presidential aide to Dmitry Medvedev, former chairman of Gazprom Media, executive director of RosUkrEnergo, former KGB officer, member since 2002)
  • Viktor Ilyushin (Head of the Department of Relationships with Regional Authorities of the Russian Federation, member since 1997)
  • Olga Pavlova (Head of the Department of Asset Management and Corporate Relations, member since 2004)
  • Vasiliy Podyuk (Head of the Department of Gas, Gas Condensate and Oil Production, member since 1997)
  • Vlada Rusakova (Head of the Department of Strategic Development, member since 5 September 2003)
  • Kirill Seleznev (Head of the Department of Marketing and Processing of Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbons, member since 27 September 2002, Director-General of Mezhregiongaz)

Former members of the management committee:

  • Nikolai Guslisty (1997 – 18 March 2005)
  • Yury Komarov (former Director General and former Acting Director General of Gazprom Export, former head of development of the Shtokman Field, former Representative of Russia to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum) (8 August 2003 – 12 May 2005)
  • Alexander Ryazanov (former CEO of Surgut Gas Processing Factory, former First Deputy Chairman of the Board, former President of Sibneft, former deputy (i.e. member) of the State Duma) (2001 – 15 November 2006)
  • Mikhail Akselrod (until 18 March 2005)
  • Boris Yurlov (until 16 April 2004)
  • Nikolai Gornovsky (until 18 April 2003)
  • Vladimir Leviev (until 18 April 2003)
  • Sergei Lukash (until 18 April 2003)
  • Vladimir Rezunenko (until 26 June 2003)
  • Alexander Krasnenkov (until 8 August 2003)


Shares of the members of the Board of Directors and Management Committee (as of 5 September 2005):[80]

Others have no share.

Sports sponsorships

Gazprom is the owner and sponsor of Russian Premier League football club Zenit St. Petersburg.

On 1 January 2007, Gazprom also became the sponsor of the German Bundesliga club Schalke 04 paying up to €25 million a year for the privilege. On 23 November 2009, the partnership was extended for a further 5 years. The sponsorship is worth $150m (USD) spread over the 5 years.[81]

On 9 July 2010, Gazprom became sponsor of Serbian SuperLiga football club Red Star Belgrade.

Gazprom by 2010 Gold Partner of the Russian professional cycling team, Team Katusha, in alliance with Itera, and Russian Technologies (Rostekhnologii).[clarification needed]

On 9 July 2012, Gazprom became sponsor of UEFA Champions League and UEFA Super Cup for three season until 2015[82]

On 17 July 2012, Gazprom also became the official Global Energy partner of the UEFA Champions League 2012 winners Chelsea for 3 seasons, lasting until 2015.[83]


Yukos Oil Fraud

Yuganskneftegaz was the core production subsidiary of Yukos Oil Company, which was previously run by Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In 2003, the Russian tax authorities charged Yukos and Khodorkovsky with large-scale tax evasion. On 14 April 2004, Yukos was presented with a bill for over US $35 bn in back taxes and a demand to pay the entire bill the same day. Requests by Yukos to defer payment, allow payment by installments or to discharge the debt by sale of peripheral assets, including its shareholding in the Sibneft oil company, were also refused. Since Yukos was both legally and physically unable to pay the entire amount in cash on such short notice, Russian bailiffs froze Yukos’ shares in Yuganskneftegaz.

On 19 November 2004, Russian bailiffs placed a notice in the Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta announcing that Yuganskneftegaz would be sold at an auction scheduled to be held 30 days later on 19 December 2004.[84] The conditions for participation in the auction included an advance deposit of US $1.7 bn and prior clearance by the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service.

In early December, the Russian state-controlled gas monopoly Gazprom submitted an application to participate in the auction through its wholly owned subsidiary,Gazpromneft. Gazpromneft had been created in September 2004 in preparation for a planned merger between Gazprom and state-owned Rosneft.

On 15 December 2004, Yukos filed for a bankruptcy protection in a Houston court, and obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting Gazprom from participating in the auction. On the next day, December 16, a group of Western banks withdrew their financial support for the Gazprom application. On the same day, the previously unknown Baikalfinansgrup applied to participate in the auction.

On 19 December 2004, only two companies appeared for the auction: Gazpromneft and Baikalfinansgrup. Gazpromneft declined to place any offer, thus allowing Baikalfinansgrup to acquire Yuganskneftegaz on its first bid.

Four days later Baikalfinansgrup was acquired by Rosneft. Rosneft later disclosed it its annual financial statement that it had financed the acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz.[85] At the time, Rosneft president Sergey Bogdanchikov was also the CEO of Gazpromneft.[86]

Shortly after the auction, the planned merger between Gazprom and Rosneft merger was called off, and Sergey Bogdanchikov resigned his post as CEO of Gazpromneft.

On 7 February 2006, in response to a question by a Spanish journalist, Russian President Vladimir Putin disclosed that Rosneft had used Baikalfinansgrup as a vehicle to acquire Yuganskneftegaz in order to protect itself against litigation risks.[87]

Gazprom’s oil drilling in the Arctic have drawn protests from environmental groups, particularly Greenpeace. Greenpeace has opposed oil drilling in the Arctic on the grounds that oil drilling would cause damage to the Arctic ecosystem and that there are no safety plans in place to prevent oil spills.[88] In August 2012, Greenpeace had staged protests against the Prirazlomnaya oil platform, the world’s first off-shore Arctic drill site.[89][90]

On 18 September 2013, the Greenpeace vessel MV Arctic Sunrise staged a protest and attempted to board Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya oil platform, the world’s first off-shore Arctic drill site. Greenpeace stated that the drill site could cause massive disruption to the Arctic ecosystem, which Gazprom denied.[91] In response, after arresting two campaigners attempting to climb the rig,[92] the Russian Coast Guard seized control of the ship via helicopter drop, and arrested thirty Greenpeace activists. Over thirty crew have been arrested and come from sixteen different nationalities. The Arctic Sunrise was also towed by the Russian Coast Guard toMurmansk. The Russian government intended to charge the Greenpeace campaigners with piracy and hooliganism, which carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years of imprisonment, while Greenpeace claimed they were in international waters.[93] The Russian government’s actions generated protests from governments and environmentalists worldwide.[88][94] According to Phil Radford, Executive Director of Greenpeace in the U.S. at the time, the reaction of the Russian coast guard and courts were the “stiffest response that Greenpeace has encountered from a government since the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985.”[95] The charges of piracy were dropped in October, and 27 of the campaigners were released on bail in November 2013.[96][97]

In May 2014, the first shipment of Arctic oil that Greenpeace had protested arrived at a refinery in the Netherlands. The French company Total bought this cargo despite statements in 2012 about the potential dangers of offshore oil exploration in the region.[98]

Saudi Aramco

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Saudi Arabian Oil Company
Type State-owned enterprise
Industry Oil and gas
Founded 1933 (as California-Arabian Standard Oil Co.)
1944 (as Aramco)
1988 (as Saudi Aramco)
Headquarters Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
Area served Worldwide
Key people Khalid A. Al-Falih[1]
(President & CEO)
Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi[2]
(Minister of Petroleum
and Mineral resources)
Products Petroleum, natural gas and other petrochemicals
Revenue Increase US$ 356 billion (2012)[3]
Total assets Increase US$ 30 trillion (2012)[4]
Owners Saudi Arabian government
Employees 57,283 (2013)[5]
Website www.saudiaramco.com

Saudi Aramco (Arabic: أرامكو السعوديةʾArāmkō s-Saʿūdiyyah), officially the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, most popularly known just as Aramco (formerly Arabian-American Oil Company) is a Saudi Arabian national petroleum and natural gascompany based in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.[6][7] Saudi Aramco’s value has been estimated at up to US$10 trillion in theFinancial Times, making it the world’s most valuable company.[8][9][10] Saudi Aramco has total assets estimated at US$30 trillion, which includes the company’s natural gas and oil reserves.[11]

Saudi Aramco has both the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, at more than 260 billion barrels (4.1×1010 m3),[5]and largest daily oil production.[12]

Headquartered in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,[13] Saudi Aramco operates the world’s largest single hydrocarbon network, the Master Gas System. Its 2013 crude oil production total was 3.4 billion barrels (540,000,000 m3),[5] and it manages over 100 oil and gas fields in Saudi Arabia, including 288.4 trillion standard cubic feet (scf) of natural gas reserves.[5]Saudi Aramco operates the Ghawar Field, the world’s largest onshore oil field, and the Safaniya Field, the world’s largest offshore oil field.[14]


Saudi Aramco’s origins trace to the oil shortages of World War I and the exclusion of American companies from Mesopotamia by the San Remo Petroleum Agreement of 1920. The US Republican administration had popular support for an Open Door policy, which Herbert Hoover, secretary of commerce, initiated in 1921. Standard Oil of California (SoCal) was among those US companies seeking new sources of oil from abroad.[15]

SoCal through its subsidiary company, the Bahrain Petroleum Co. (BAPCO), struck oil on Bahrain in May 1932. This event heightened interest in the oil prospects of the Arabian mainland. On 29 May 1933, the Saudi Arabian government granted a concession to SoCal in preference to a rival bid from the Iraq Petroleum Co..[16]The concession allowed Socal to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia. SoCal assigned this concession to a wholly owned subsidiary, CASOC. In 1936, with the company having had no success at locating oil, the Texas Oil Co. (Texaco) purchased a 50% stake of the concession.[17]

After four years of fruitless exploration, the first success came with the seventh drill site in Dhahran in 1938, a well referred to as Dammam No. 7. This well immediately produced over 1,500 barrels per day (240 m3/d), giving the company confidence to continue. On 31 January 1944, the company name was changed from California-Arabian Standard Oil Co. to Arabian American Oil Co. (or Aramco).[18] In 1948, Standard Oil of New Jersey (later known as Exxon) purchased 30% and Socony Vacuum (later Mobil) purchased 10% of the company, with Socal and Texaco retaining 30% each.[19] The newcomers were also shareholders in the Iraq Petroleum Co. and had to get the restrictions of the Red Line Agreement lifted in order to be free to enter into this arrangement.[20]

In 1950, King Abdulaziz threatened to nationalize his country’s oil facilities, thus pressuring Aramco to agree to share profits 50/50.[21]

A similar process had taken place with American oil companies in Venezuela a few years earlier. The American government granted US Aramco member companies a tax break known as the golden gimmick equivalent to the profits given to King Abdulaziz. In the wake of the new arrangement, the company’s headquarters were moved from New York to Dhahran.[22] In 1951, the company discovered theSafaniya Oil Field, the world’s largest offshore field.In 1957, the discovery of smaller connected oil fields confirmed the Ghawar Field as the world’s largest onshore field.[14]

In 1973, following US support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, the Saudi Arabian government acquired a 25% stake in Aramco. It increased its shareholding to 60% by 1974, and finally took full control of Aramco by 1980,[23] by acquiring a 100% percent stake in the company. Aramco partners continued to operate and manage Saudi Arabia’s oil fields.[24] In November 1988, a royal decree changed its name from Arabian American Oil Co. to Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (or Saudi Aramco)[23] and took the management and operations control of Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas fields from Aramco and its partners. In 1989–90, high-quality oil and gas was discovered in three areas south of Riyadh—the Raghib area about 77 miles southeast of the capital.[25]

In 2005, Saudi Aramco was the world’s largest company with an estimated market value of $781 billion.[26] In 2011, Saudi Aramco started production from the Karan Gas Field, with an output of more than 400 million scf per day.[27]


Headquarters of Aramco Services Co. in Houston

Saudi Aramco is headquartered in Dhahran; and its operations span the globe which include exploration, producing, refining, chemicals, distribution and marketing. All these activities of the company are monitored by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources together with the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals.[28] However, the ministry has much more responsibility in this regard than the council.[28]


A significant portion of the Saudi Aramco workforce consists of geophysicists and geologists. Saudi Aramco has been exploring for oil and gas reservoirs since 1982. Most of this process takes place at the Exploration and Petroleum Engineering Center (EXPEC). Originally, Saudi Aramco used Cray Supercomputers (CRAY-1M) in its EXPEC Computer Center (ECC)[29] to assist in processing the colossal quantity of data obtained during exploration and in 2001, ECC decided to use Linux clusters as a replacement for the decommissioned Cray systems. ECC installed a new supercomputing system in late 2009 with a disk storage capacity of 1,050 terabytes (i.e, exceeding one petabyte), the largest storage installation in Saudi Aramco’s history to support its exploration in the frontier areas and the Red Sea.[30]

Refining and Chemicals

While the company did not originally plan on refining oil, the Saudi government wished to have only one company dealing with oil production. Therefore, on 1 July 1993, the government issued a royal decree merging Saudi Aramco with Samarec, the country’s oil refining company. The following year, a Saudi Aramco subsidiary acquired a 40% equity interest in Petron Corp., the largest crude oil refiner and marketer in the Philippines. Since then, Saudi Aramco has taken on the responsibility of refining oil and distributing it in the country.[14]

Currently, Saudi Aramco’s refining capacity is more than 4 million barrels per day (640,000 m3/d) (International joint and equity ventures: 2,060 Mbbl/d (328,000,000 m3/d), domestic joint ventures: 1,108 mpbd, and wholly owned domestic operations: 995 Mbbl/d (158,200,000 m3/d).) This figure is set to increase as more projects go online.[31]

Saudi Aramco’s downstream operations are shifting its emphasis to integrate refineries with petrochemical facilities. Their first venture into it is with Petro Rabigh, which is a joint venture with Sumitomo Chemical Co. that began in 2005 on the coast of the Red Sea.[14]

List of refineries

List of domestic refineries:[31]

List of domestic refining ventures:[31]

List of international refining ventures:[31]


Saudi Aramco has employed several tankers to ship crude oil, refined oil and gas to various countries. It has created a subsidiary company, Vela International Marine, to handle shipping to North America, Europe and Asia.[33]

Environmental record

The company has an “Environmental Master Plan” to reduce the emissions provided by Capital Programs, some of which has already been completed.[citation needed]Saudi Aramco is a leading company in the region in reducing sulfur emissions, CO2, and flaring.[citation needed] Also, a CEO Dashboard complemented by an annual Environmental Report shows the exact Environmental statistics and Key Performance Indicators in terms of air and sea water pollutions.

Financial data

The “FT’s Non-Public 150” by the Financial Times and McKinsey – the study of the world’s largest unlisted companies — 2006).[34][35]

Financial data (2011):[36]

  • Fiscal Year End: December
  • Revenue: $182 billion est. (2010)[37]
  • Employees: 55,441
  • Employee Growth (1 yr): 4.50%
  • Oil reserves: 259.9 billion barrels (4.132×1010 m3)
  • Production: 12.0 million barrels per day (1,910,000 m3/d)

Cyber attack

Aramco computers were attacked by a virus on 15 August 2012.[38][39] The following day Aramco announced that none of the infected computers were part of the network directly tied to oil production, and that the company would soo resume full operations.[40] Hackers claimed responsibility for the spread of the computer virus.[41] The virus hit companies within the oil and energy sectors.[42][43] A group named “Cutting Sword of Justice” claimed responsibility for an attack on 30,000 Saudi Aramco workstations, causing the company to spend a week restoring their services.[38] The group later indicated that the Shamoon virus had been used in the attack.[44] Due to this attack, the main site of Aramco went down and a message came to the home page apologizing to customers.[45] Computer security specialists said that “The attack, known as Shamoon, is said to have hit “at least one organization” in the sector. Shamoon is capable of wiping files and rendering several computers on a network unusable.”[43]

List of oil fields

An oil refinery in Mina-Al-Ahmadi,Kuwait

This list of oil fields includes some major oil fields of the past and present.

The list is incomplete; there are more than 65,000 oil and gas fields of all sizes in the world.[1] However, 94% of known oil is concentrated in fewer than 1500 giant and major fields.[2] Most of the world’s largest oilfields are located in the Middle East, but there are also supergiant (>10 billion bbls) oilfields in India, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

Amounts listed below, in billions of barrels, are the estimated ultimate recoverable petroleum resources (proved reserves plus cumulative production), given historical production and current extraction technology. Oil shale reserves (perhaps 3 trillion barrels (4.8×1011 m3)) and Coal reserves, both of which can be converted to liquid petroleum, are not included in this chart. Other non-conventional liquid fuel sources are similarly excluded in this list.

Oil fields greater than 1 billion barrels (160 million cubic metres)[edit]

Field Location Discovered Started Production Peaked Recoverable Oil, Past and Future (Billion Barrels) Production (Million Barrels/day) Rate of Decline
Ghawar Field Saudi Arabia 1948[3] 1951[3] 2005,[4]disputed[5] 75-83[6][7] 5[8] 8% per year[citation needed]
Burgan Field Kuwait 1937 1948 2005[9] 66-72[6][7] 1.7[10] 14% per year[citation needed]
Ferdows/Mound/Zagheh Field Iran 2003 7-9 (38 Gb resource)[11]
Sugar Loaf field Brazil 2007 ~ 25-40[12] Not yet developed
Cantarell Field Mexico 1976 1981 2004[13] 35,[7] 18 billion recoverable .340 [14] peaked in 2004 at 2.14 million barrels per day (340,000 m3/d)[14]
Bolivar Coastal Field Venezuela 1917 1922 30-32[7] 2.6-3[7]
Azadegan field Iran 2004 26 (9 recoverable)[15]
Lula Field Brazil, Santos Basin 2007 5-8
Safaniya Oil Field Saudi Arabia/Neutral Zone 1951 30
Esfandiar Field Iran 30
Rumaila Field Iraq 1953 17[16] 1.3[16]
Tengiz Field Kazakhstan 1979 1993 2010 26-40[7] .53[7] Expanding from 285k to 1.3 m bpd [1]
Ahwaz Field Iran 1958 1970s[17] 10.1 .700[18] Expected to surpass original peak due to new gas injection.[2]
Kirkuk Field Iraq 1927 1934 8.5 0.480
Shaybah Field Saudi Arabia 15
Agha Jari Field Iran 1937 8.7 .200
Majnoon Field Iraq 1975 11-20[16] 0.5[16]
Samotlor Field Russia, WestSiberia 1965 1969 1980[19] 14-16 0.844 [20] (depletion: 73%) [20]
Romashkino Field Russia Volga-Ural 1948 1949 in decline 16-17 .301 (2006) [20] depletion: 85% [20]
Prudhoe Bay United States,Alaska 1967-68 1977 1988 [21] 25 (~13 recoverable) 0.66 11% per year[citation needed]
Sarir Field Libya 1961 1961 12 (6.5 billion recoverable)
Priobskoye field Russia, WestSiberia 1982 2000 13 0.680 (2008) 14% depleted, Production rapidly expanding.[22]
Lyantorskoye field Russia, WestSiberia 1966 1979 13 0.168 (2004) [20] depletion: 81% [20]
Abqaiq Field Saudi Arabia 12 0.43[23]
Chicontepec Field Mexico 1926 6.5 [14] (19 certified)[24]
Berri Field Saudi Arabia 12
Zakum Field Abu Dhabi,UAE 1965[25] 1967 12
West Qurna Field Iraq 1973 15-21 [16] 0.18-0.25 (pot.)*civil war[16]
Manifa Field Saudi Arabia 11
Fyodorovskoye Field Russia, WestSiberia 1971 1974 11 1.9 (197x)
East Baghdad Field Iraq 1976 8 [16] 0-0.05 (pot.)*civil war [16]
Faroozan-Marjan Field Saudi Arabia/Iran 10
Marlim Field Brazil, Campos Basin in decline 10-14 8% per year[26]
Awali Bahrain 1
Aghajari Field Iran 14
Azadegan Field Iran 1999 5.2
Gachsaran Field Iran 1927 15
Marun Field Iran 16
Mesopotamian Foredeep Basin Kuwait 66-72
Minagish Kuwait 2
Raudhatain Kuwait 11
Sabriya Kuwait 3.8-4
Yibal Oman 1
Mukhaizna Oil Field Oman 1
Dukhan Field Qatar 2.2
Halfaya Field Iraq 4.1
Az Zubayr Field Iraq 6
Nahr Umr Field Iraq 6
Abu-Sa’fah field Saudi Arabia 6.1
Hassi Messaoud Algeria 9
Kizomba Complex Angola 2
Dalia (oil field) Angola 1
Belayim Angola >1
Zafiro Angola 1
Zelten oil field Libya 2.5
Agbami Field Nigeria 0.8-1.2
Bonga Field Nigeria 1.4
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli Azerbaijan 1985 1997 5.4
Karachaganak Field Kazakhstan 1972 2.5
Kashagan Field Kazakhstan 2000 30 [27]
Kurmangazy Field Kazakhstan 6-7
Darkhan Field Kazakhstan 9.5
Zhanazhol Field Kazakhstan 3
Uzen Field Kazakhstan 7
Kalamkas Field Kazakhstan 3.2
Zhetybay Field Kazakhstan 2.1
Nursultan Field Kazakhstan 4.5
Ekofisk oil field Norway 1969 3.3
Troll Vest Norway 1.4
Statfjord Norway 1974 3.4
Gullfaks Norway 1978 2.1
Oseberg Norway 1979 1988 2.2 3.78
Snorre Norway 1.5
Mamontovskoye Field Russia 8
Russkoye Field Russia 2.5
Kamennoe Field Russia 1.9
Vankor Field Russia 1983 2009 3.8[28]
Vatyeganskoye Field Russia 1.4
Tevlinsko-Russkinskoye Field Russia 1.3
Sutorminskoye Field Russia 1.3
Urengoy group Russia 1
Ust-Balykskoe Field Russia >1
Tuymazinskoe Field Russia 3
Arlanskoye Field Russia >2
South-Hilchuy Field Russia 3.1
North-Dolginskoye Field Russia 2.2
Nizhne-Chutinskoe Field Russia 1.7
South-Dolginskoye Field Russia 1.6
Prirazlomnoye Field Russia 1.4
West-Matveevskoye Field Russia 1.1
Sakhalin Islands Russia 14
Odoptu Russia 1
Arukutun-Dagi Russia 1
Piltun-Astokhskoye Field Russia 1
Ayash Field East-Odoptu Field Russia 4.5
Verhne-Chonskoye Field Russia 1.3
Talakan Field Russia 1.3
North-Caucasus Basin Russia 1.7
Clair oilfield United Kingdom 1977 5 (1.75 recoverable)
Forties oilfield United Kingdom 1970 5
Jupiter field Brazil 7
Cupiagua/Cusiana Colombia 1
Boscán Field, Venezuela Venezuela 1.6
Pembina Canada 1953 1953
Swan Hills Canada
Rainbow Lake Canada
Hibernia Canada 1979 1997 3
Terra Nova Field Canada 1984 2002 1.0
Kelly-Snyder / SACROC United States,Texas 1.5
Bakken Oil Field United States,North Dakota 1951 .862
Yates Oil Field United States,Texas 1926 1926 1929 3.0 (2.0 billion recovered; 1.0 reserve remaining)[29][30]
Kuparuk oil field United States,Alaska 1969 6
Alpine United States,Alaska 0.4-1
East Texas Oil Field United States,Texas 1930 6
Spraberry Trend United States,Texas 1943 10[31]
Wilmington Oil Field United States,California 1932 3
South Belridge Oil Field United States,California 1911 2[32]
Coalinga Oil Field United States,California 1887 1
Elk Hills United States,California 1911 1.5[32]
Kern River United States,California 1899 2.5[32]
Midway-Sunset Field United States,California 1894 3.4[32]
Thunder Horse Oil Field United States,Gulf of Mexico >1
Kingfish Australia 1.2
Halibut Australia 1
Daqing Field China 1959 1960 16 depletion: 90%
Jidong Field China 2.2
Tahe Field China 8
Nanpu Oil Field China 7.35

See also